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The global business environment is 
increasingly complex and uncertain as it is 
being shaped by globalization forces, rapid 
technological change, and intensiﬁed 
competition. This calls for strategic changes 
and new capabilities from multinational 
corporations. This study puts forward in-
depth case studies of Nokia, Kone, and 
Iittala as they were undergoing strategic 
changes, in order to explain what drives 
capability development and how it is 
performed within multinational 
corporations. The study identiﬁes four 
different capability logics that the 
companies may employ in order to perform 
changes in their capability base. At the same 
time, it calls attention to various 
complexities that multinational companies 
encounter in performing these changes, and 
highlights the growing importance of 
enterprise ‘ecosystems’ in the development 
of new capabilities within the MNC context.  
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Abstract 
The operating environment is being shaped by globalization forces, rapid technological 
change and intensiﬁed competition, which call for strategic changes and new capabilities from 
multinational corporations. Even though the capability-based determinants to ﬁrm survival 
and growth have been recognized, research on capability development has been limited. This 
study investigates capability dynamics within MNCs and the interactions between strategy and 
the environments internal and external to the ﬁrm. It puts forward longitudinal case studies of 
three Finnish multinational ﬁrms, Nokia, Kone and Iittala, as they were undergoing strategic 
changes, in order to explain how capabilities are developed within MNCsand how the MNC 
context, including globalization, has an impact on capability development. 
The ﬁndings explain how MNC strategies and activities trigger various mechanisms and 
generate complex outcome patterns in capabilities. The ﬁndings indicate that the various 
patterns or ‘logics’ by which the MNCs build capabilities can be regrouped into four main 
logics: variation-based, (internal) selection-based, retention-based and access-based logics, 
which represent patterned links between intra-ﬁrm evolutionary processes, dynamic 
capabilities and capability development. This study demonstrates how the case ﬁrms employed 
different capability logics at different periods of time in order to adapt to external changes, but 
also to shape the external environment. 
The ﬁndings also elucidate the ‘liability of complexity’ that the multinational corporations 
encounter, as they possess complex internal and external selection environments and need to 
respond to divergent external and internal pressures. This may create various forms of inertia 
or counteracting mechanisms to capability development and may result in ‘indirect selection’ 
of certain capabilities with signiﬁcant implications on ﬁrm performance. The study also  
demonstrates how the advantages of the multinational ﬁrm increasingly relate to and are 
augmented by its capacity to use not only the subsidiary network but also its global network of 
partner ﬁrms, ‘enterprise ecologies’, to complement its internal capability base with co-
specialized assets. 
This study extends current research by explicitly integrating the dynamic capabilities view 
(DCV) and the evolutionary perspectives for a more holistic picture on capability development 
within the MNC context. It also provides empirical evidence of the dynamic process of 
capability development when subject to a global business environment of uncertainty and 
complexity. The managerial implications of the study involve the capability logics that 
managers may employ to cope with and to inﬂuence the external environment. They also relate 
to identifying the various complexities within the MNC context and promote aligning the 
internal selection criteria with strategy. 
Keywords capability development, multinational corporations, dynamic capabilities, 
evolutionary perspective, case studies 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Background  
 
Globalization forces, along with rapid technological change, deregulation 
and intensified competition are shaping the operating environment, and 
redefining the conditions of survival and growth for many firms. Because of 
the changing global landscape, multinational firms (MNCs) are forced to 
operate in a setting that is characterized by both uncertainty about the 
institutional-, technological-, or market environment of the firm, and 
complexity that results from the interdependencies between markets and 
actors. Within this type of environment the firm’s growth and even survival 
have come to depend on its capacity to develop new products and methods 
of organization (Kogut and Zander, 1992; 1993), create new institutions or 
organizational forms (Dunning and Lundan, 2010), and to orchestrate and 
combine co-specialized assets on a global scale both within and across 
organizational boundaries, and to shape business ecosystems (Teece, 2007; 
2009). It has been argued that it is precisely the unstable market conditions 
with intensified and diversified competition that have prompted 
“organizational capabilities rather than served markets becoming the 
primary basis upon which firms establish their long-term strategies" (Grant, 
1996a: 375) and resulted in resources and organizational capabilities 
becoming the main source of sustainable competitive advantage. Moreover, 
as change has become endemic to the way many organizations compete and 
critical to survival in many industries (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), a 
capacity of an organization to change its resource and capability base 
(Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece and Winter, 2007) has 
become paramount. 
The introduction of routines, resources and capabilities at the center of 
the theory of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982) has not 
only informed competitive advantage or superior enterprise performance 
(e.g. Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2009), but has 
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also provided a deeper understanding of firm-level development and 
change, as well as of the more macro-level and contemporary phenomena, 
such as social change and industry evolution (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich and 
Ruef, 2006). Resources, organizational capabilities, and routines have been 
claimed to be key concepts to understanding the impact of external and 
internal change on organizations (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Becker, 
Lazaric, Nelson and Winter, 2005; Feldman, 2004; 2000). In addition to 
views emphasizing adaptation to the external environment, the dynamic 
capabilities view has come to underline the ability of firms not only to 
respond to changes in the environment but also to influence their 
environment and prevalent external selection criteria, for example by 
creating market change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) or by shaping 
business eco-systems (Teece, 2007; 2009). 
Similarly, within international business and MNC research, ever since the 
seminal work of Hymer (1976), firm-specific advantages (FSA) have 
received keen scholarly interest among international business researchers. 
The firm-specific advantages have been argued to provide the primary 
motivation for firms to expand internationally and therefore to explain the 
existence and behavior of multinational firms. Because the replication and 
transfer of knowledge and capabilities, as well as the creation of new 
capabilities, are fundamental to growth in international markets, MNCs 
play a major role in the generation and diffusion of capabilities globally 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2010). The ability of the MNC to transfer non-
codified and complex knowledge across borders (Kogut and Zander, 1993) 
and to make the locally embedded knowledge and capabilities that reside 
within subsidiaries available to the rest of the multinational through 
integration and transfer (Dunning, 1988; Madhok and Liu, 2006), have 
been argued to constitute the main advantages of the MNC. More recently, 
the dynamic capabilities view has been integrated with the international 
business literature emphasizing changing capability dynamics during the 
processes of firm internationalization and globalization (Tallman and 
Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002; Luo, 2000; 2002) and arguing that the ability of 
multinational firms to engage in cross-border transfer of capabilities and to 
create institutional innovation to encounter uncertainty underlie the 
dynamic capabilities of the MNC (Dunning and Lundan, 2010). The current 
perspectives have also come to underline the MNCs’ ability to transform the 
environment by shaping the external selection criteria (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2010; Teece, 2009), suggesting that in the context of complex 
external change, the strategic focus of MNCs is increasingly shifting to the 
processes by which they can respond to and influence changes in the 
environment (Cantwell et al., 2010). 
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The objective of this thesis is to shed further light on capability 
development within MNCs. The MNC provides a specific type of context 
with a complex and heterogeneous external and internal environment (see 
e.g. Roth and Kostova, 2003; Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008; Ghoshal and 
Westney, 1993). It seems that the MNC context has important implications 
on the theory on capability development, and that the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the MNC context, on the one hand, and the power of these 
firms on the other, pose fundamental challenges for some of the 
assumptions underlying the current perspectives. Research on MNCs, 
therefore, seems to provide an opportunity for further theory building on 
capability development.  
 
1.2 Research Objective and Context  
 
Against the background depicted above, my objective with this monograph-
based dissertation is to investigate capability development within MNCs 
and the interactions between strategy and the internal and external 
selection environments within the MNC context over time (see Figure 1). I 
do so by taking capabilities as the main units of analysis and drawing on 
organizational capabilities-, evolutionary-, and MNC literatures, and by 
means of a multiple, longitudinal case study and process research. I seek to 
understand both the internal managerial and organizational factors 
underlying capability development, as well as the impact of the external 
factors on capability development, and the co-evolution between firm action 
and the globalizing external environment. By approaching capability 
development as an outcome of a co-evolutionary process supported by a 
comparative case study, I hope to provide both theoretical and empirical 
insights into capability development within the MNC context. 
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Figure 1. The Research Problem 
 
The MNC provides an interesting context to study capability development, 
as it presents a rich setting of both internal and external forces originating 
from multiple environments. Subsequently, the MNCs are confronted with a 
variety of external and internal stimuli as they operate a network of 
subsidiaries within a number of different contexts, leading to ample 
variation and frequent internal and external selection events. Moreover, 
within the MNC environment the temporal and spatial interrelatedness 
between multiple contexts come into play. Conceptualizing the 
multinational firm in terms of an “evolutionary system and subsystems that 
co-evolve in interaction with each other, as well as with their differentiated 
environments” (Westney, 2009:133) therefore provides an ideal arena to 
study capability development. 
The globalizing business environment itself also warrants further 
research. Many researchers seem to agree that many global industries today 
can be characterized as highly competitive, where technological change is 
rapid and innovation plays a key role, and where the nature of future 
markets and competition is difficult to determine (Teece et al., 1997; Zander 
and Kogut, 1995; D’Aveni, 1994). As an outcome, in many industries there 
has been a shift from moderately dynamic environments with relatively 
stable industry structures and clear market boundaries, to fast-paced and 
highly volatile settings characterized by unstable industry structures, 
blurred market boundaries and non-linear, unpredictable changes 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Bettis and Hitt (1995) argue that within 
many industries the concept of ‘industry’ has become ambiguous along with 
the rapid technological change that has made industry boundaries fuzzy, 
and with substitute products, technological mergers and strategic alliances 
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that have modified traditional industry boundaries and dynamics. They also 
suggest that as firms have moved into global markets, the identification of 
current and future competitors along with their resources and strategies has 
become more difficult. As an outcome, they argue, industry dynamics have 
become increasingly non-linear with unclear and unstable relationships, 
with cause and effect difficult to identify and replicate, and thereby making 
organizational learning more difficult. Therefore, globalization seems to not 
only have caused more changes in the external environment but has also 
affected interdependencies between events and processes representing a 
progress from a lower, simple state to a higher, more complex one 
(Levinthal, 2002). Moreover, globalization has been associated with the 
increasing amount of uncertainty in the environment (Cantwell et al., 2010; 
Jalonen, 2012).  
In line with Tallman (1991) in his suggestion that international studies 
may have important value to refining strategy theories, I argue that an 
international business approach that puts emphasis on context has the 
potential to enrich organizational capabilities research1. Similarly, 
Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen and Vaara (2010) maintain that MNCs as 
research objects can contribute to research more widely as they point to the 
complexities and challenges that relate to operating large organizations (in 
line with Roth and Kostova, 2003; and Zander, Zander, Gaffney and Olsson, 
2010). I also agree with Teece in his argument that the “capabilities 
approach provides a significant augmentation to our understanding of the 
MNE” (2009:175) and at the same time, the claim that in the presence of 
globalization forces and incomplete cross-border integration “the study of 
international business and multinational enterprise remains an important 
scholarly activity” (Augier and Teece, 2007:182) that requires a theoretical 
distinction to complement mainstream strategy and management research.  
 
                                                   
1 Moreover, Nordic international business research seems to be well positioned to 
study capabilities, as well as the strategy and management of international firms 
(Björkman and Forsgren, 2000). These authors claim that because of the openness 
of the economy in the Nordic countries, international firms have received special 
interest in business research and in general, Nordic researchers have proved to 
have a better access to managers and organizational processes than many of their 
colleagues in other economies. Moreover, and partly because of this, there has been 
an inclination towards the behavioral perspective in studying the international 
firm, and a special interest in the knowledge and capabilities of the firm. 
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1.3 Research Questions  
 
In line with the research objective described above, I will address the 
following main research question: 
 
How are capabilities developed within MNCs? 
 
I address this main research question through the following sub questions: 
 
1. What are the processes and mechanisms underlying capability 
development within MNCs? 
2. How does the MNC context, including globalization, impact 
capability dynamics? 
 
The first sub question seeks to identify the processes and mechanisms 
underlying capability development, while the second sub question 
investigates the impact of the context, in this case the MNC environment 
and globalization, on capability dynamics.   
My objective is to gain access to various patterns and processes in 
capability development, as well as to unravel the underlying mechanisms. 
Towards this end, I will put forward in-depth case studies of three Finnish 
multinational firms as they were undergoing strategic changes. I will 
provide a detailed analysis of the process of capability development in these 
firms, as well as a temporal analysis of key events or sequences of individual 
and collective events, actions and activities that relate to capability 
development both at industry and firm level. Moreover, by building on 
insights gained from privileged access to the case firms’ managers and data, 
I seek to construct a rich and holistic account of both the internal and 
external environments of the firm as they influence capability development, 
including their co-evolution. In doing so, I seek to understand the 
mechanisms that underlie capability development within the MNC context. 
At the same time, I also take into consideration the mechanisms that 
condition, and may either promote or counter the MNC’s efforts to change 
its resource and capability base. 
My aim with this explanatory study is to put forward an integrated 
approach on capability dynamics within MNCs, and at the same time focus 
on what I consider to be the missing pieces in getting the whole picture, 
namely understanding the interactions between the environments internal 
and external to the firm, and the impact of the globalizing business context. 
I expect to challenge existing conceptualizations and theory by providing 
alternative explanations that integrate the MNC context into the analysis. 
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By doing so, this approach will hopefully enrich research on capability 
development and provide an avenue for further theory development. 
Moreover, capitalizing on extensive empirical and interview data, this thesis 
hopes to work towards enhanced convergence of academic and practitioner 
views, and to generate theory and insights that are relevant to both 
academics and practitioners alike (Corley and Gioia, 2011). 
This study is founded on critical realist paradigmatic assumptions. The 
motivation for me to adopt this paradigm is that a critical realist approach, 
by focusing on combinations of entities with causal powers and contextual 
factors that may activate these powers, enables access to processes and 
mechanisms underlying the researched phenomenon (capability 
development), as well as integration of the impact of the context 
(globalization and the MNC environment). In line with Piekkari and Welch 
(2011) I consider that the ontological and epistemological assumptions that 
are implicit in current theories have accounted for the current 
conceptualizations within the field. Agreeing with them, I trust that the 
emerging paradigmatic assumptions, such as those presented by critical 
realism, and methodological pluralism will, in part, contribute to 
overcoming current limitations. The ontological and epistemological 
assumptions will be further elaborated on in the methodology section. 
 
1.4 Key Constructs  
 
In this study I follow Helfat and Peteraf’s definition of organizational 
capabilities as the “ability of an organization to perform a coordinated task, 
utilizing organizational resources for the purpose of achieving a particular 
end result” (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003: 999).  To be defined as an 
organizational capability, Nelson and Winter (1982) and Levinthal (2002) 
have argued that any capacity must involve collective action to generate an 
outcome that the actors are not capable of generating individually. These 
organizational capabilities include both operational and dynamic 
capabilities of the firm (Helfat and Winter, 2011), and may consist of both 
routine-based (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and knowledge-based capabilities 
(Grant, 1996a; 1996b; Kogut and Zander, 1993).  
Agreeing with Helfat and Peteraf (2003), I consider that all organizational 
capabilities are capable of accommodating change when influenced by 
factors internal and external to the organization, while dynamic capabilities 
are a specific type of capabilities that enable change and modify other 
resources and capabilities within the firm’s capability base (Helfat et al., 
2007; Teece et al., 1997). Moreover, in contrast to the resource-based view 
that takes into consideration those firm assets, organizational processes and 
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capabilities that are controlled by a firm (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 
1989), this study integrates all those capabilities that the firm has access to 
on a preferential, or semi-permanent basis, in line with Helfat and Peteraf 
(2003) and Helfat et al. (2007). With an objective to explain development 
and change, I do not limit my investigation only to those resources and 
capabilities that contribute to the competitive advantage of the firm, but 
take into consideration all those capabilities that contribute to the firm’s 
ability to maintain or create evolutionary fitness (Helfat et al., 2007). 
Following Siggelkow’s (2002) definition on organizational configurations, 
I define capability as core if it interacts with many other current or future 
organizational capabilities, i.e., the value of other organizational capabilities 
is dependent on its presence and vice versa. This is consistent with 
Leonard-Barton’s (1992) view of core capability as an interrelated and 
tightly coupled system. Likewise, following Siggelkow’s (2002) notion on 
organizational elements, I consider organizations to consist of 
interconnected capabilities (e.g. core capabilities, elaborating capabilities, 
independent capabilities and inconsistent capabilities) that reinforce each 
other. 
I define development as a change process, as opposed to an outcome. 
Process has been defined in different ways in prior research (Van de Ven, 
1992), namely as 1) a logic in explaining causal relationship in variance 
theories; 2) a category of concepts referring to activities of either individuals 
or organizations; and 3) a sequence of events describing change over time. 
Van de Ven and Poole (2005) also point to the epistemological and 
ontological differences in organization and management research 
determining whether organizations are perceived to consist of ‘things’ or 
‘processes’. The perspective viewing organizations as ‘things’, such as social 
entities or structures, presumes the identity of the organization to persist 
even when changing from one state to another, whereas the latter 
perspective regards that it is the processes that preserve the organization by 
continuously restructuring it and maintaining its boundaries despite 
external processes that break the organization and its boundaries apart. 
Similarly, these authors suggest that change can be conceptualized either as 
an observed difference over time in an organization or some of its 
dimensions, or as a sequence of events that unfold over time. The approach 
I adopt in this study is that development is a change process, with 
“progression of change events that unfold during the duration of an entity’s 
existence” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995: 512). Within the present study, the 
focus is on change as patterns of organizational activities that together 
produce capabilities as outcomes. 
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Central to this study is the concept of equifinality, assuming that there are 
multiple causal paths to the same outcome. Following Gresov and Drazin 
(1997), equifinality is viewed as a property of open systems, assuming that a 
particular outcome or state can be achieved “from different initial 
conditions and in different ways” (Bertalanffy, 1968, in Gresov and Drazin, 
1997: 403). Within organization studies, the concept of equifinality has 
been applied to studying various strategy or structure configurations, or 
organizational designs (e.g. Gresov and Drazin, 1997; Gresov, 1989; Payne, 
2006; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005). Within the present study the concept of 
equifinality is applied to studying various alternative capability 
development paths by looking at different context-mechanisms-outcome 
(CMO)-configurations.  
With regards to the MNC2 I adopt the following perspectives. First, I take 
an organizational capabilities perspective of the MNC, following such works 
as Kogut and Zander (1993), Zander and Kogut (1995), Cantwell (1989) and 
Cantwell and Piscitello (2000). At the same time I recognize the evolved 
character of the multinational firms to a more networked structure or that 
of a ‘coordinated system of cross-border value-creating activities’ (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008; Cantwell et al., 2010) that is part of a larger 
evolutionary system or set of evolutionary systems (Westney, 2009). 
Secondly, and contrary to some of the aforementioned studies within MNC 
research that have depicted capability development mainly as an intra-firm 
phenomenon (see Forsgren, 2008, for a review), I do regard the external 
environment as pivotal when seeking to explain capability dynamics within 
the MNC. However, instead of adopting the contingency theory perspective 
that emphasizes adaptation to the external environment to achieve a 
strategic fit, I seek to understand the behavior of the MNC not only in 
adapting to the external environment but also its role in shaping the 
external environment. 
Finally, this study follows Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist’s definitions in 
that firm internationalization refers to a process of international expansion 
with a “strategy of greater presence in international locations” (2002: 123), 
and firm globalization to a process of global integration, and a “strategy of 
consolidating international markets and operations into a single worldwide 
strategic entity” (2002: 123). The global stage, alternatively, refers to a stage 
where the emphasis of the MNC is to dynamically operate and manage an 
established “network of differentiated but integrated subsidiaries, affiliates, 
alliances and associations” (2002: 124). As opposed to firm globalization, I 
consider globalization as a macro-level phenomenon to act as an external 
                                                   
2 This part has largely benefited from the review put forward by Forsgren (2008) on 
the competing MNC theories, which is gratefully acknowledged 
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evolutionary (and co-evolutionary) force but also to affect the 
interdependencies between events and processes, and represent a progress 
from a lower, simple state to a higher, more complex one (Levinthal, 2002). 
Following Simon (1969), Levinthal (2002) has defined complexity as a 
function of the degree of interrelationships among parts of a system that 
may take the form of either spatial or temporal interrelatedness, and a 
complex business environment as one that is tightly coupled and where 
activities in one market influence those in another. Globalization has also 
been associated with an increasing amount of uncertainty. Following Knight 
(1921) and Galbraith (1977), Jalonen (2012) has related uncertainty to the 
fact that “events in the future do not follow the course of the past events” 
(2012: 1) as well as to the fact that “knowledge of the future is always 
incomplete” (2012:1). This is in line with Cantwell et al. (2010) who have 
associated globalization with the increasing amount of non-ergodic type of 
uncertainty in the environment, referring to the type of uncertainty where 
prediction relying on extrapolation from past events or prior behavior 
becomes infeasible. 
 
1.5 Limitations of the Study 
 
This study is subject to the following limitations. First, a capabilities 
approach has been applied to welfare economics and includes many notable 
works, such as those by Amartya Sen (e.g. 1989, 1993) and Martha 
Nussbaum (e.g. 1993, 2000). The focus of my study is on the organization 
and management of multinational firms and therefore this stream of 
literature is excluded from the study. 
Second, the objective of this study is to explain development and change 
and consequently, another limitation is that the study does not assess how 
differences in capability development and management affect the firm's 
economic and competitive performance3. Although firm performance has 
been said to provide a focal point for the investigation to enable the 
examination of variations in context or process as they lead to differences in 
performance outcomes (e.g. growth or survival) across firms (Pettigrew, 
Woodman and Cameron, 2001), performance implications are outside the 
focus of this study. 
Third, I have conducted the study mainly from a headquarters perspective 
(with the exception that a number of interviews were conducted in China to 
incorporate a market context into the analysis) and consequently, analysis 
                                                   
3 In prior research, organizational capabilities have been assessed as critical to two 
distinct outcomes 1) the survival of the firm and 2) firm growth (Sapienza, Autio, 
George and Zahra, 2006). 
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on macro- and micro-level factors from the subsidiary perspective is 
limited. Although I do acknowledge that the MNC is not a unitary actor and 
that much of the MNC’s advantages relate to the competences that reside 
within the subsidiary network (e.g. Forsgren, 2008), I consider capability 
development that occurs within subsidiaries but is limited to a local market 
context to be outside the scope of this study.  
Fourth, as suggested by Laamanen and Wallin (2009) there are different 
levels of capability dynamics depending on whether the unit of analysis is 
the firm’s operational capabilities, its portfolio of multiple capabilities, or 
the firm’s entire capability constellation. Within the present study, the main 
focus is on the firm’s individual capabilities as well as its capability base. 
However, the firm’s entire capability constellation at the extended 
enterprise, or ecosystem level, including partnerships and strategic alliances 
provides an interesting area for future research (in line with research 
undertaken by Paukku, forthcoming; Vapola, 2010; Vapola, Paukku and 
Gabrielsson, 2010). 
Fifth, globalization is a multifaceted and complex construct and a 
phenomenon that can be approached from various perspectives, e.g., 
political, institutional, economic or cultural perspectives. Within the 
economic perspectives certain views have emphasized the industry as the 
key driver of globalization (e.g. Yip, 2003; Tallman and Yip, 2009; Porter, 
1985, 1990) while others have focused more on global trends and market 
drivers (e.g. Castells, 2000). Owing to the complexity of the globalization 
phenomenon it does not lend itself to objective assessment, and 
consequently, this study relies on the reflective views and perceptions that 
managers have on globalization, rather than studying the globalization 
phenomenon per se, e.g., the interdependencies between various markets, 
competition or actors.  
Finally, although international business scholars have called for more 
contextualized theories that recognize the diversities of a context, including 
the national, cultural, political and institutional contexts, the main 
emphasis of this study is on the MNCs’ organizational and business 
environment, which, however, I approach holistically. Although 
institutional theories are not explicitly included in the study to reduce its 
complexity, I do acknowledge that firms build their capabilities in an 
institutional and cultural context, and these contexts were taken into 
account to the extent that they emerged from the data. However, as the 
institutional environment is central to the co-evolution logic (Lewin and 
Volberda, 1999), and capability management within MNCs (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2010; Cantwell et al., 2010), I do encourage future studies that 
explicitly incorporate this theoretical lens. 
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1.6 Research Process 
 
This study has benefited from a research project funded by the national 
agency for technology and innovations (TEKES) that took place between 
2006-2009. The theme of the research project was the impact of 
globalization on firm competitiveness with the purpose to identify 
appropriate strategies within a number of leading technology- and 
knowledge-intensives multinational firms in Finland. Industry globalization 
along with rapid technological change and intensified competition, 
including new competition from emerging markets had forced these 
companies to operate in a setting of continuous changes in the institutional-
, technological-, and market environments of the firms. In addition to 
changing industry and competitive dynamics, new and sometimes divergent 
customer and consumer needs from both emerging and developed markets 
were driving these firms to revise their strategies. Of the five firms studied 
in the project4, four were global firms operating in technology intensive 
fields: Nokia, in the field of mobile phones, Wärtsilä, a global metal 
engineering firm, Kone, an elevator and escalator firm, and Perlos, an 
electromechanical component manufacturer. Iittala, a homeware and 
design company was part of the research project due to the high level of 
knowledge intensity of its operations. In these five technology- and 
knowledge-intensive firms there was evidence of recent business 
environment and/or business strategy change resulting from the 
globalization impact, requiring them to reassess their corporate strategies, 
including the configuration of their activities on a global basis.  
The project involved a project leader and I was one of the four full-time 
researchers, each with a respective focus area. This study, as part of the 
research project, benefited from negotiated and privileged access to the case 
firms’ top managers and strategists, and from the motivation of the 
company representatives to participate and deliver data. The inclusion of 
multiple researchers enabled the rapid acquirement of data on the global 
context gathered across multiple firms simultaneously prior to proceeding 
into more specific research areas.   
After the end of the project, I was able to pursue a more focused study on 
capability development within the case firms. The rationale for this was that 
the project research findings suggested that differences in performance 
between different firms could not be simply explained by differences in 
                                                   
4 A sixth company, Honkarakenne was initially part of the research sample but was 
not involved in the research phase on capabilities, and consequently is not 
discussed here 
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strategies, but rather by the underlying capabilities of the firm. 
Consequently, the changes in the business environment and strategies were 
occasioning activity in capability development within the case firms. On the 
one hand, the rise of the emerging markets resulted in increasing cost 
pressures and required operational efficiencies in order to be able to offer 
lower cost products to satisfy customer needs within these markets. On the 
other hand, the intensifying competition originating from these countries, 
required firms to find new innovative and value-creating strategies and 
activities. Changes in the external environment also forced the case 
companies to perform organizational changes, which however, seemed to be 
highly dependent on their ability to build or acquire new capabilities and to 
change their corporate cultures. 
Amongst the different capabilities in the firm’s capability base, I put 
special emphasis on design capability development. Three of the five case 
firms, namely Nokia, Kone and Iittala, although operating in different 
industries, had identified design as a strategic capability. With the exception 
of Iittala, the case firms under investigation had traditionally considered 
technology as their principle driver of value creation and innovations, and 
as their main source of competitive advantage. However, these firms 
contested that their competitors increasingly had access to the same or 
similar technology making it more difficult to build competitive advantage 
solely on technology. Moreover, there proved to be a new phenomenon of 
firms that do not possess technological advantage within a specific industry 
but have managed to build sustainable competitive advantage on a 
capability to identify relevant user needs and preferences, and to satisfy 
these needs with user-focused product and service offerings. The most 
explicit cases on this phenomenon are firms that do not possess any 
technological knowledge or manufacturing capabilities, but acquire them 
through markets. A motivation to investigate design was that this capability 
seemed to be closely connected to this type of strategy. While the 
contribution of design has traditionally been associated with the ability to 
differentiate products (mainly through appearance) and manage corporate 
identity and image, there was evidence of a growing phenomenon of firms 
who exploit design to a larger extent in innovation management. Design-
based methods and processes, therefore, are increasingly used to identify 
emerging user needs, solve user-focused problems, and create new user-
centered knowledge and transform this knowledge into products/services 
and processes that incorporate value significant to the company and its 
customers. This phenomenon suggests that in addition to technology-driven 
innovations, user-driven innovations, stemming from new information 
about emerging or existing user needs and preferences, are gaining 
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momentum in the market place5. Finally, as the development of design 
capability within the case companies was fairly recent, it was feasible to set 
the boundaries to this development process and to collect the key events 
and activities with regards to this specific capability. Moreover, the key 
informants were both identifiable and available for interviews. 
A multiple case study was initially adopted as the research method in the 
project. Case studies have been assessed as suitable to address real 
management problems, and when the research is performed in interaction 
with practitioners with an objective to create knowledge that is relevant to 
managers (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). To gain a multi-faceted 
understanding of the context and strategies of the firms under investigation, 
different theoretical perspectives, such as industrial organization 
economics, and resource-based approaches were integrated into the first 
stage questionnaire, considered as theoretical ‘probes’ in order to find the 
most appropriate theoretical lens for further application. The interviewees 
raised the role of emerging markets, such as China as paramount, 
necessitating the integration of this market context into the study. The 
second stage involved focus group interviews at the headquarters level, as 
well as individual interviews conducted in China. At a later stage I 
complemented the initial project research design and the correspondent 
interview data with process research and more focused interviews in order 
to deepen the understanding and to capture the complexity of the capability 
development phenomenon. The research approach and methodology 
adopted in the study, and the fairly long research period, allowed the use of 
a mixture of different approaches, including abduction or iterative cycles of 
deduction/induction (Pettigrew, 1997; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005).  
Figure 2 depicts the research process from the initiation of the research 
project to the finalization of the doctoral thesis. The first stage involved 
defining the initial question of the study, including related themes and 
questions that led to the first data collection and early pattern recognition. 
This stage involved all five case firms and I was part of the research group. 
The second stage involved more elaborate themes and questions on the 
impact of globalization on firm capabilities, further data collection, 
additional pattern recognition and comparative analysis across cases. At 
this stage all five firms were involved and I acted as the lead researcher. 
Finally, the third stage included a more detailed study and research 
questions on capability development within three of the case firms, Nokia, 
                                                   
5 Design has also attracted an increasing amount of scholarly interest and 
substantial academic research in the field (e.g. Ainamo, 1996; Salimäki, 2003; 
Karjalainen, 2004; Valtonen, 2007; and Bello, 2008). 
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Kone and Iittala. This research, which I performed individually at the final 
stage, became the core of this doctoral thesis.  
Finally, the rationale for adopting a monograph-format is that it has less 
space constraints than articles and consequently allows for an extensive 
elaboration on each case company to capture some of the richness and 
complexity that is fundamental to the understanding of the research 
phenomenon. Moreover, it enables a very detailed description on the 
methods employed and data analysis performed, judged as key criteria for 
evaluating qualitative research (Pratt, 2008). This monograph presents the 
research findings that I concluded individually and primarily after the 
research project. Some of these findings have been presented earlier in the 
form of conference papers (see Appendix 3). Joint research outcomes have 
been disseminated in the form of working papers, company reports and 
conference papers (see Appendix 3) and they are briefly elaborated upon in 
the literature review, but otherwise excluded from the study. Whenever 
joint research is discussed, it is indicated in the text. This research has also 
benefited from my long executive experience in a large multinational 
corporation that is not included in the sample but has enabled me to reflect 
upon and assess the validity of the findings in another context. Moreover, 
this experience facilitated my conversations with the interviewees owing to 
a ‘common language’, and aided me in better understanding the managers’ 
mindsets during the study. 
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Figure 2. Research Process  
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provide justification for the context-mechanisms-outcome (CMO) –analysis 
as the main approach to studying capability dynamics within MNCs. 
Moreover, I will explain the scope of the study and display the key 
constituents of the internal and external selection environments of the firm 
to enable a dynamic analysis of the co-evolution between various internal 
and external elements across multiple levels of analysis. 
In the fourth chapter, the methodology chapter, I will explain the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions adopted in the study as well as 
the longitudinal multiple case study and process research methods adopted 
to build focused CMO-configurations and mechanisms-based explanations. 
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CMO-configurations for an analysis on capability development and the 
underlying internal and external processes. The second part provides a 
cross-case analysis. 
In the sixth chapter, the discussion chapter, I will explain how integrating 
the evolutionary and dynamic capability perspectives with international 
business theories enables access to the various patterns and mechanisms by 
which multinational firms develop capabilities when faced with uncertainty, 
but also to the internal and external selection mechanisms that condition 
these development processes within the MNC context. By doing so I seek to 
provide insights on the interplay between internal and external 
environments within multinational firms and point to the factors that 
impact capability development within this context. Finally, I will compare 
the results of this study with existing research and discuss the implications 
and contribution of the study. 
The following Figure 3 demonstrates the outline of the study.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Outline of the Study  
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2. Literature Review  
The introduction of organizational routines, resources and capabilities at 
the center of the theory of the firm (Penrose, 1959) and as main units of 
analysis (Nelson and Winter, 1982) has had substantial consequences both 
for the understanding of firm evolution or firm behavior, as well as more 
macro-level and contemporary phenomena, such as social change and 
industry evolution. Resources, organizational capabilities, and routines 
have been claimed as key concepts to understand the impact of external and 
internal change on organizations as they indicate the ways in which external 
change has an influence on organizations and help identify drivers of 
internal organizational change (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Becker et al. 
2005; Feldman, 2004; 2000). This part will first review literature on 
organizational capabilities and capability development. Then, the 
discussion will be extended to organizational change and co-evolution. 
Second, capabilities research within international business literature will be 
reviewed, including research on MNCs.  
 
2.1 Organizational Capabilities and Development 
 
The organizational capabilities literature can be divided into the 
evolutionary perspective, the resource-based view and the dynamic 
capabilities view, with antecedents in Schumpeterian theory (1934), 
behavioral theories of the firm, the evolutionary theorizing in economics 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) and in the theory of the growth of the firm 
(Penrose, 1959). While the evolutionary perspective to organizational 
capabilities has been mainly concerned with explaining development and 
change in a context of industrial competition and development, the 
resource-based and the dynamic capabilities views are more in the tradition 
of studies in business strategy, with the principal purpose to identify the 
factors that contribute to the competitive advantage of firms (Dosi, Nelson 
and Winter, 2002). Compared to the more static resource-based view, the 
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dynamic capabilities view is mainly concerned with change within the 
domain of business strategy. 
 
2.1.1 Organizational Capabilities 
 
With their seminal work on evolutionary theorizing in economics, Nelson 
and Winter (1982) set organizational routines at the focus of attention when 
investigating change at both organizational and industry level. The latter 
works in the tradition of evolutionary theorizing have extended the 
discussion beyond routines to capabilities that involve purposeful planning 
and organized activity compared to the quasi-automatic organizational 
“routines” (see e.g. Dosi et al., 2002). In order to differentiate capabilities 
from routines, Winter has described capabilities as “higher level and more 
significant aggregates of routines, which are more a matter of managerial 
discretion in their exercise” (in Murmann, Aldrich, Levinthal, and Winter, 
2003: 27). These features distinguish ‘capabilities’ from the quasi-
automatic organizational ‘routines’. 
The resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), 
in contrast, has taken resources as main units of analysis when examining 
the linkage between a firm’s internal features and competitive advantage. 
Within this view, a firm’s competitive advantage is built on the 
heterogeneity of resources, in line with the VRIN- criteria6  (Barney, 1991), 
considered to be the central factor in explaining the differences in 
performances between firms. Within the knowledge-based view (Grant, 
1996a and 1996b; Kogut and Zander, 1992), which is closely associated with 
the RBV, knowledge is considered the key or strategic asset for a firm. The 
ability to create value is mainly based on intangible knowledge-based 
resources, and competitive advantage stems from uncommon and 
idiosyncratic stocks of organizational knowledge, as well as from the ability 
to generate new knowledge and to transfer it efficiently within the 
organization (Kogut and Zander, 1992). In order to understand variation of 
firm performance and growth, the knowledge-based view focuses on the 
organizing principles as units of analysis and mechanisms through which 
knowledge is created and transformed into economically rewarding 
products and services, as well as in the transfer and imitation of knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
The dynamic capabilities view (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2009; Helfat et 
al., 2007) takes a dynamic and temporal approach to firm capabilities by 
                                                   
6 The VRIN-criteria refers to the heterogeneity of resources, i.e., resources need to 
be valuable (V), rare (R), inimitable (I) and non-substitutable (N) in order to 
provide sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
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focusing on those capabilities of the firm that enable it to “purposefully 
create, modify and expand its resource and capability base” (Helfat et al., 
2007: 1) when addressing changes in its environment. Teece has proposed 
that for analytical purposes, dynamic capabilities may be disaggregated to 
“a capacity 1) to sense and shape opportunities and threats, 2) to seize 
opportunities, and 3) to maintain competitiveness through enhancing, 
combining, protecting, and when necessary, reconfiguring the business 
enterprise’s intangible and tangible assets” (Teece, 2009:4). It has also been 
suggested that dynamic capabilities are the type of capabilities that modify 
other resources and capabilities within the firm’s capability base and 
determine their rate of change (Helfat et al., 2007; Winter, 2003). While 
the evolutionary and resource-based views have centered their attention on 
internal routines or proprietary resources and capabilities, the dynamic 
capability view takes into consideration all resources and capabilities that 
the organization “owns, controls or has access to on preferential basis” 
(Helfat et al., 2007:4), explicitly considering firm action to reach outside 
the boundaries of the firm (Helfat et al., 2007). Moreover, by incorporating 
the notion of a changing and competitive environment (Teece et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) the dynamic capability view has been said to 
add to the understanding of the link between firm capabilities and the 
external environment, especially in industries where change is rapid and 
innovation a central aspect of competition (Dosi et al., 2002).   
As the main focus of this study is on capability development within 
multinational corporations in the context of a changing, globalizing 
environment, rather than in explaining performance or competitive 
advantage, the subsequent parts will focus on the evolutionary and dynamic 
capability perspectives that enable access to the process of capability 
development and firm evolution, compared with the more static resource-
based view. 
 
2.1.2 Capability Development  
 
The evolutionary perspective views capability development as being a 
gradual, cumulative process subject to evolutionary processes of variation, 
selection, and retention (Dosi et al., 2002). Variation signifies departure 
from existing routines and practices, and forces that select or eliminate 
certain types of variations generate the evolutionary process of selection, 
while retention preserves the selected variations (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). 
New resources and capabilities become manifest in new variants of 
products and services introduced into the market place, which are then 
constantly evaluated and selected both internally and by the external 
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environment through external evolutionary mechanisms. As a result of 
external evolutionary mechanisms, certain routines and capabilities are 
retained, and diffused into other firms (Nelson and Winter, 1982) shaping 
both organizational and social change (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich and Ruef, 
2006). Although the latter works in the tradition of evolutionary theorizing 
have extended the discussion beyond routines to capabilities that involve 
purposeful planning and organized activity compared to the quasi-
automatic organizational ‘routines’ (see e.g. Dosi et al., 2002), this stream 
of literature stresses the evolutionary process of selection over strategic 
planning as a key organizational process, arguing that “selection logic is 
what most cleanly separates evolutionary theory from the other kinds of 
theories in management” (Aldrich in Murmann et al., 2003: 37).  
Closely related to the evolutionary perspective, Helfat and Peteraf (2003) 
have put forward a model labeled the dynamic resource-based view7. It 
holds that the emergence and development of capabilities are dependent on 
both internal and external factors that form the ‘internal and external 
selection environments’ of the firm and determine the development paths of 
its capabilities. These authors maintain that the internal selection 
environment consists mainly of managerial decisions, while the factors in 
the external selection environment include changes in demand, science and 
technology, raw material availability and government policy. Other 
researchers have pointed to the key role of environmental shocks as part of 
the firm’s external environment (Sirmon, Hitt and Ireland, 2007). Pettigrew 
(1987) has taken a broader perspective and has defined the 'outer context' 
as the entire social, economic, political, and competitive environment of the 
firm, and the 'inner context' as the firm’s structure, corporate culture, and 
political context through which the initiatives for change have to proceed. 
Burgelman and Siegel (2008:141), in contrast, have defined the internal 
selection environment as the set of corporate contextual factors that 
maintain the alignment of the official corporate strategy, the basis of 
competitive advantage within the industry, as well as the firm’s distinctive 
competencies and strategic actions. Burgelman (1996) contends that the 
internal selection environment comprises of the strategic context and the 
structural context that together constitute the internal selection process. 
The strategic context refers to the process through which initiatives are 
internally selected and retained and that relates to the revision of firm 
strategy (Barnett and Burgelman, 1996: 7; see also Burgelman, 1983), while 
the structural context refers to the strategic planning process, organization 
structure, and resource allocation that align action with strategy 
                                                   
7 These authors have claimed that this model is also deeply rooted in evolutionary 
economics (Helfat et al., 2007:38) 
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(Burgelman, 2002). He also claims that whereas the structural context 
tends to select initiatives that are consistent with the extant strategy, this 
type of inertia can be overcome through the process of strategic context 
determination that enables initiatives to be internally selected and 
integrated into the corporate strategy despite the structural context. 
It follows that what has become central to the organizational capabilities 
literature within this research tradition is the concept of 'fit' determining 
how well capabilities perform in the selection environments of the firm, and 
consequently driving capability development (Aldrich, 1979; Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003; Helfat et al., 2007; see also Siggelkow, 2002). Selection 
criteria are established through the operation of market and competitive 
forces, the institutional environment, or internal factors, such as 
managerial decisions. Whereas environmental selection has been 
considered to closely resemble natural selection, researchers have pointed 
to various search and selection rules and practices operational within firms 
(Burgelman, 1991; 1994; Levinthal in Murmann et al., 2003; Henderson 
and Stern, 2004). Internal selection occurs for example when the 
management decides to discontinue a product or a technology before they 
become externally selected out, e.g., in order to release resources for the 
development of new technologies. External selection, on the other hand, 
kills a product, or an entire organization, and renders the underlying 
capabilities obsolete (Henderson and Stern, 2004). Henderson and Stern 
(2004) found external selection to be more powerful than internal selection 
in driving firm adaptation as it indicates mismatches between the firm 
products or capabilities and external demands. They also found that 
especially in high-velocity settings, firms experience selection events 
frequently and recurrently, requiring organizational learning and repetitive 
trial-and-error searches in order to generate a positive, cumulative impact 
of the firm’s future actions. Likewise, Nelson and Winter (2002) suggest 
that changes in the external environment may lead to misfits between firm 
capabilities and the environment because of learning and adjustments gaps, 
and instability in the processes of experimentation. In contrast, research 
conducted by Burgelman (1991; 1994) has shown how in successful firms, 
the internal selection processes may effectively substitute the external 
selection processes. He also found that firms may build internal selection 
mechanisms and establish internal selection criteria that more effectively 
reflect external selection criteria than the official corporate strategy. 
Westney (2009), in contrast, has called attention to the possibility of weak 
selection (as opposed to strong selection) that at the population level refers 
to learning and adaptation, and at organizational level to a process where 
certain organizational patterns are neither positively selected nor negatively 
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selected out. This gives them the opportunity to continue to survive and to 
potentially serve as sources of variation in the future as circumstances 
change. 
Other researchers have also pointed to factors that may impact capability 
development or change within firms. An obstacle to capability development 
and organizational change may be internal selection criteria that reflect past 
external criteria and have become inappropriate in the changed context 
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Henderson and Stern (2004) also suggest that 
internal selection may be biased by internal politics when individuals aim to 
influence selection criteria to enhance their power and control, or individual 
activities directed towards maintaining consistency despite external 
environmental pressures (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006), even when it implies 
accepting low performance (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper 
and Woo, 1997). Core capabilities may also develop to incorporate 
dysfunctional sides and thereby become core rigidities that inhibit change 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992), or they may generate competency traps (Levinthal 
and March, 1993). 
As an outcome of internal and external selection, the lifecycle framework 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) contends that capabilities, just like products, 
follow lifecycles that include several stages, such as the founding, the 
development, and the maturity stage as the capability evolves over time. 
While these stages are dependant on factors internal to the organization, 
the further development of the capability also depends on external factors. 
When the internal and external selection events have a strong enough 
impact to change the development path of the capability, transformation or 
‘branching’ of the original capability takes place, and it takes an altered 
form of retirement, retrenchment, replication, renewal, redeployment or 
recombination. Retrenchment refers to a gradual decline of a capability 
while retirement signifies the death of a capability as an outcome of internal 
or external selection events. Replication means the reproduction of the 
capability in another geographic location whereas redeployment refers to its 
application to another product (or service) market. These two latter 
processes often involve recombination, when the original capability is 
combined with another capability which often leads to its upgrading. 
Finally, renewal reflects either minor or major modification to the original 
capability. The research undertaken by Laamanen and Wallin (2009) has 
complemented this research by pointing to different dynamics depending 
on whether the unit of analysis is an individual capability, the capability 
base or the firm’s entire capability constellation. They note that while 
individual capabilities may evolve continuously at their own pace, capability 
development at the portfolio level resembles a “race in which different co-
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specialized capabilities are evolving in parallel” (2009: 977). These authors 
also note that at the level of capability constellations of co-specialized assets 
the dynamics may include revising business models and investing in 
multiple capability development areas at the same time. 
Compared to the evolutionary perspective, the dynamic capabilities view 
(Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2009; Helfat et al., 2007) puts more emphasis on 
the ability and key role of top management in “appropriately adapting, 
integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external resources and 
capabilities to match the requirements of a changing environment” (Teece 
et al. 1997: 515). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) have proposed four 
different modes in altering the firm’s resource and capability base, namely 
leveraging, creating, accessing, and releasing. Related to the concept of 
dynamic capabilities is that of ‘combinative capabilities’ (Kogut and Zander, 
1992), referring to the firm’s ability to exploit its existing knowledge to new 
opportunities and to manage change by transforming existing capabilities 
into new ones. As opposed to the evolutionary perspective, the dynamic 
capability view takes into consideration all resources and capabilities that 
the organization has access to (Helfat et al., 2007), including firm action to 
reach outside the boundaries of the firm to acquire new capabilities or to 
gain access to resources and capabilities of other firms through relational 
capabilities such as alliances (Helfat et al., 2007). It also underlines the 
ability of the firm to take advantage of external innovation before 
competitors (Teece, 2009).  
Consistent with this dynamic approach, Helfat et al. (2007) differentiate 
between ‘technical fitness’ and ‘evolutionary fitness’, the former indicating 
how well a capability performs its function while the latter determines a 
firm’s ability to ‘make a living’ in a changing environment (Teece, 2009; 
Helfat et al., 2007). Evolutionary fitness is dependent on the firm’s dynamic 
capabilities as they enable firms to “identify the need or opportunity to 
change, formulate a response to such a need or opportunity and implement 
a course of action” (Helfat et al., 2007:2). Helfat et al. (2007) suggest that 
the identification of a need or opportunity deals with problemistic search 
and opportunity recognition processes, the formulation of a response 
involves, e.g., resource allocation processes, while the implementation may 
involve a variety of managerial and organizational processes such as 
developing new products or processes, entering/exiting businesses, 
extending current businesses internally or alternatively, through 
acquisitions or strategic alliances. 
Helfat et al. (2007) have also suggested that while firm survival is 
dependent on the firm’s ability to adapt to the external environment, firm 
growth depends on the level of its evolutionary fitness, and long-term 
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survival on the ability to sustain evolutionary fitness over time. These 
authors suggest that maintaining an evolutionary fitness requires 
reconfiguration of the firm’s capability base and may also necessitate 
deselecting or divesting unnecessary resources or capabilities that no longer 
yield value (see also Teece, 2009). Although the dynamic capabilities view 
stresses the ability of an organization to purposefully modify its resource 
and capability base, it also emphasizes the path-dependent nature of 
capabilities. The path-dependent nature of capabilities relates to the fact 
that capabilities are “a function of knowledge and experience that the firm 
has acquired over time” (Augier and Teece, 2007:178). This perspective 
holds that the enterprises capability development may be tied to a certain 
trajectory determined by its current position, former investments and 
routines (Teece et al., 1997). In addition to path-dependency, recent 
research has come to emphasize the role of managerial cognition in 
affecting capability development (Laamanen and Wallin, 2009; Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Gavetti, 2005; Danneels, 2010). 
Laamanen and Wallin (2009), in investigating the cognitive dynamics of 
capability development paths found development in operational capabilities 
to be mainly driven by instrumental cognition and the development in the 
firm’s capability portfolio by managerial attention, whereas managerial 
foresight was critical to driving changes in the firm’s entire capability 
constellation at the level of the extended enterprise. 
Although the dynamic capabilities view (DCV) has been considered as 
closely related and complementary to the evolutionary perspective of the 
firm (e.g. Helfat et al., 2007; Dosi et al., 2002; Teece, 20098), there are also 
fundamental differences between these two perspectives that the following 
Table 1 seeks to highlight. First, as discussed earlier, the evolutionary 
perspective has focused on the relationship between internal and external 
selection environments, and put emphasis on internal routines and 
proprietary resources and capabilities as well as internal learning. The DCV, 
in contrast, has emphasized the relationship between firm capabilities and 
the external environment, focusing on those capabilities that enable change 
in order to achieve congruence with the external conditions, and integrating 
external capabilities into the analysis. Second, as previously discussed, the 
evolutionary perspective builds on the processes of variation, selection and 
                                                   
8 Teece has claimed the dynamic capabilities to be “partially but not entirely in the 
spirit of evolutionary theorizing” (2009:50) as its focus is on the variables and 
relationships that need to be “manipulated” in order to achieve superior 
performance (Teece, 2009:50). These acts include creative destruction, spin-offs 
and spinouts as well as neutralizing decision biases. Teece concludes: “enterprises 
may be more like biological organisms than some economists, managers, and 
strategy scholars are willing to admit; but they are also more malleable than some 
organizational ecologists are willing to recognize” (2009: 50). 
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retention, and stresses selection as the key process, while the DCV puts 
more emphasis on the role and ability of top management in adapting to 
and influencing the external environment. Third, although both of these 
perspectives emphasize the concept of ‘fit’, the DCV has put more emphasis 
on evolutionary fitness that it claims to be a function of the firm’s dynamic 
capabilities and its external environment. As an outcome, while the 
evolutionary perspective regards capability development to be an outcome 
of internal and external selection, the DCV perspective regards capability 
development to be an outcome of managerial exercise and its dynamic 
capabilities over time (Wang and Ahmed, 2007). Finally, as the 
evolutionary perspective seeks to explain development and change, these 
accounts tend to be more descriptive by nature as opposed to the more 
prescriptive nature of the DCV as it endeavors to explain corporate 
performance and competitive advantage. 
 
 
 Evolutionary perspective Dynamic capabilities view (DCV) 
Main focus Internal routines and proprietary 
resources and capabilities, internal 
learning 
Capabilities that enable the firm to create, 
modify and expand its resource and capability 
base, includes firm action to reach outside the 
boundaries of the firm to acquire new 
capabilities  
 Relationship between internal and 
external selection environments 
Relationship between firm capabilities and the 
external environment 
Key process Variation, selection, retention Strategic action to modify the firms resource 
and capability base 
Fitness The concept of ”fit” determining 
how well capabilities perform in 
the internal and external selection 
environments of the firm  
The ”evolutionary fitness” of the firm being 
dependent on the external environment and the 
firms dynamic capabilities 
Internal vs. external 
selection criteria 
Firms set internal search and 
selection rules to reflect or ‘mimic’ 
external selection criteria 
 
Firms are able to influence their environment 
and prevalent external selection criteria to 
improve their evolutionary fitness or to create 
market change  
 
Capability 
development 
Capability development is a 
gradual, cumulative process 
subject to evolutionary processes 
of variation, selection and 
retention 
 
Capability development is an outcome of 
managerial exercise and the firm’s dynamic 
capabilities, subject to path-dependency 
Outcome Development and change Performance and competitive advantage 
Nature Descriptive Prescriptive 
 
 
Table 1. Evolutionary vs. Dynamic Capabilities Perspectives 
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Next, the discussion will be extended from organizational capabilities and 
capability development to organizational development and change, as well 
as to macro-level evolution, including the co-evolution between the firm 
and its environment.  
  
2.1.3 Organizational Development and Change 
 
Prior research has also provided illustration of how the evolutionary 
processes of variation, selection, retention and struggle shape 
organizational change and suggested that the existing routines, 
organizations, and organizational forms are an outcome of long-term 
evolutionary processes (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). These 
authors claim that it is these evolutionary processes that drive 
organizational development and change by determining the opportunities 
of change and generating the critical events that shape organizations. They 
suggest that at an organizational level variation signifies change in existing 
routines and practices, and may include both intentional and blind 
variation. Organizational variation may also originate from various sources 
and through multiple mechanisms, such as formal programs and processes, 
experimental probes or cooperative arrangements. Unintentional variation, 
on the other hand, may result from trial and error learning, imitation, ad 
hoc problem-solving vis-à-vis external changes, or be simply an outcome of 
mistakes or luck (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Referring to the various forms of 
strategy processes it is primarily the autonomous, as opposed to induced, 
processes that are likely to produce the most variation within organizations 
(Burgelman, 1991). 
Forces that select or eliminate certain types of variations in organizational 
routines and practices then generate the evolutionary process of selection 
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Internal selection operates through 
organizational mechanisms such as resource allocation and induced 
strategy process, while external selection operates through market forces, 
competitive action, or the institutional environment (Burgelman, 1991). 
Aldrich and Ruef (2006) maintain that the processes of variation and 
selection are linked by continuous feedback loops and cycles, and occur 
simultaneously rather than sequentially as variations become selected based 
on existing internal or external selection criteria. They also claim that as 
long as the selection criteria remains unchanged, the selected routines, 
structures and procedures maintain existing organizational forms. 
Retention then, preserves the selected variations and provides the 
mechanisms by which the benefits of selected variations are collected 
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). As an outcome, retention becomes manifested in 
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the form of organizational-level learning and core competence (Burgelman, 
1991), but also in the form of culture and socialization (Westney, 2009). 
At the firm level the process of variation-selection-retention is closely 
related to the exploration–exploitation discussion. While exploration at 
firm level parallels the process of variation, exploitation is closely akin to 
selection and retention processes (Henderson and Stern, 2004). Firm 
growth to new product or geographic markets through the replication of 
existing routines and capabilities can also be considered as closely related to 
the retention process, where a firm extends the use of the selected 
variations in order to grow and to collect the benefits of its variety-
generating activities.  
Compared with firm growth that may occur through the replication of 
existing routines and capabilities into new product or geographic markets, 
Aldrich and Ruef maintain that organizational transformation signifies a 
“shift to new kinds of competences that challenge existing organizational 
knowledge” (2006:134). Organizational transformation thus involves a 
major change in an organization over time and a shift in the firm’s 
capability base that may include eliminating certain resources or 
capabilities. It also represents a substantial variation, planned or 
unplanned, that has been selected and retained, and represents a 
discontinuity in existing routines and capabilities (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). 
Selecting forces, these authors claim, may be internal (e.g. managers) or 
external (e.g. market forces and government regulations). Feldman (2004) 
has argued that existing resources and routines may either promote or 
inhibit change, and that it is the context-dependent and dynamic nature of 
resources and capabilities that enables continuous change to occur.  
Aldrich and Ruef (2006) suggest that the evolutionary approach can also 
be considered a generic framework in understanding development and 
change at multiple levels of analysis. At the macro level, the evolutionary 
framework accounts for the variation within existing organizations as well 
as variations introduced by new organizations or new organizational 
populations (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Research on technological change 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Anderson and Tushman, 1990) has 
illustrated how radical innovations represent departures from established 
organizational forms, as they transform the conditions of existence for 
incumbent organizations by rendering their competencies obsolete or 
decreasing their value. In evolutionary terms (Nelson and Winter, 2002; 
Henderson and Stern, 2004), scientific breakthroughs set off periods of 
ferment that create variety, followed by eras where industries converge on a 
dominant design, exemplifying natural selection that destroys variety. The 
periods of incremental change, in which a few players come to dominate, 
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then, exemplify retention at industry level. At the macro-level retention may 
also refer to a certain type of collective action, e.g., establishment of 
standards and regulations (Westney, 2009). 
Reflecting on population-level changes, Adner and Levinthal (2002) have 
pointed out that simply applying existing technology to a new application 
domain may generate a speciation event, where a new ‘population’ is set out 
on a new evolutionary path. Consequently, radical, discontinuous changes 
may originate from minor technological changes or no change at all, they 
argue. However, they may signal important breakpoints as new selection 
criteria may emerge and there may be a significant change in the resources 
available for subsequent development. As an outcome, new selection 
criteria, irrelevant in the former application domain, may become key, as 
these authors point out. 
Recent research within this tradition has also come to emphasize the 
difference between collective and individual action. Felin and Foss (2005) 
argue that research should increasingly focus on micro-foundations of firm 
capabilities as local search or imitative behavior at individual level may 
unintentionally lead to emergence or changes in organizational routines or 
capabilities. Thus, individual action may include both intentional and 
unintentional action, as well as positive and negative events that occur as a 
response to current opportunities and problems rather than as a result of 
‘strategic planning’ (Mintzberg, 1974). Likewise, Burgelman (1991) 
differentiates between induced and autonomous strategy processes, and 
claims that variation works primarily through autonomous strategy 
processes and individuals, and may emerge from all levels of management, 
especially those levels where managers are in direct contact with 
developments in technology or markets. 
The dynamic capabilities view, once more, emphasizes the role of top 
management in driving organizational-level changes by “orchestrating 
complementary and co-specialized assets, inventing and implementing new 
business models, and making astute investment choices (including with 
regard to R&D and M&A)” (Teece, 2009:74). This perspective thereby 
extends the scope of dynamic capabilities well beyond just managing the 
firm’s resource and capability base. These firm-level changes may then have 
a wider impact, e.g., when the market entry by a firm with new and superior 
capabilities may decrease the value of the incumbent’s capabilities, as 
pointed out by Teece (2009). Likewise, in the context of the multinational 
firm, the cross-border activities may also have a similar effect, as an entry 
into a host market by a multinational firm may drastically reduce the value 
of the local firms’ capabilities or even render them obsolete. Finally, Helfat 
et al. (2007) argue that just like the evolutionary perspective, the concept of 
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dynamic capabilities can be extended from firm level to macro-level 
phenomena as “industry evolution reflects the evolution of firms, each of 
which may have dynamic capabilities that in turn affect both firm and 
industry evolution” (2007: 120), which leads us to the next topic of co-
evolution. 
 
2.1.4 Co-evolution  
 
The co-evolutionary perspective (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Madhok and 
Liu, 2006) at least partially reconciles these seemingly contrasting 
perspectives. Reflecting on both organizational (micro) and industry-level 
(macro) processes, this approach emphasizes the simultaneous evolution of 
the organizations and their environments as a continuous and interactive 
process. According to this view, both the external macro and the internal 
micro level undergo change as a result of selection and adaptation 
processes, and evolve simultaneously, which comprises the co-evolutionary 
process. This process occurs within a dynamic framework that includes the 
ongoing iteration of variation, selection and retention. This view suggests 
that as an outcome of the interactions between firm-level processes and the 
macro-level processes (e.g. dynamics of competition and selection), 
organizations co-evolve with their environments leading to changes that are 
joint outcomes of managerial action and external, such as environmental 
and institutional effects (Lewin and Volberda, 1999).  
Both the evolutionary and the dynamic capabilities views recognize the 
process of co-evolution. Within the evolutionary perspective, organizational 
change is explained as an outcome of the dynamic interplays between 
exogenous industry-level and endogenous firm-level forces (Burgelman, 
1991; 1994). Similarly, Aldrich and Ruef maintain that external events 
interact with a firm’s action to determine the rate and course of change, 
resulting in organizational change and emphasize the “interaction of 
external selection with internal variation, with change proceeding at a pace 
set by the intersection of organizational and external forces” (2006:162). In 
addition, by focusing on intra-organizational processes, research from this 
perspective examines how the dynamics of firm-level distinctive 
competences matches, or fails to match the dynamics of the basis of 
competition in the industry (Burgelman, 1991; 1994; Burgelman and Siegel, 
2008), e.g., during technological change that disrupts or destroys 
competences (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), or has an impact on the 
relative importance of different competencies (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
Similar to the concept of ‘fit’ is the idea of symmetry, or synchronization, 
between the micro and macro-level contexts (McKelvey, 1997).  
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In line with the co-evolution logic, recent contributions within the 
dynamic capabilities literature consider firms to be able to influence their 
environment and prevalent external selection criteria (Teece, 2007; 2009) 
or to create market change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) including 
“shaping the rules of the game in the global market place” (Teece, 2009:6). 
The dynamic capabilities view regards market structure as an endogenous 
outcome of both innovation and learning, and argues that by means of their 
dynamic capabilities firms not only adapt to the external environment but 
also shape the environment through co-evolution and complex interactions 
between various actors in the business ecosystem (Teece, 2009)9. Moreover, 
Teece (2009) has emphasized the level of co-specialization as a key 
dimension of ‘fit’. He claims that in the case where managers are able to 
combine co-specialized assets on a global scale and to shape the external 
environment to the firm’s advantage ‘co-evolutionary fitness’ may be 
attained.  
 
2.1.5 A Typology of Organizational Development and Change 
 
Aldrich and Ruef (2006) have contested that while an evolutionary model 
serves as a generic framework for understanding change within multiple 
levels, it does not specify the ‘engines’ driving the evolutionary processes 
and needs complementary perspectives when building explanations. 
Westney (2009) has suggested that it is precisely these ‘engines’ that serve 
to differentiate between the main theories and points to resource efficiency, 
legitimacy, as well as power and interest as ‘engines’ or key selection criteria 
in the main organizational theories. In order to reconcile the various 
perspectives, Van de Ven and Poole (1995) have put forward an overarching 
framework derived not only from management and organization studies but 
from other fields as well. This framework includes four alternative models 
that these authors refer to as ‘process theories’ in order explain the 
mechanisms, circumstances and contingencies that generate change events. 
 These process theories are characterized by different sequences of events, 
different generative mechanisms and different modes of change which all 
operate at different levels of analysis (see Figure 4). These models or 
process theories, however, are not mutually exclusive and Van de Ven and 
Poole (1995) claim that combining different theories may provide stronger 
explanatory power than the approaches building on singular theories. They 
also criticize the fact that organizational researchers have tended to focus 
                                                   
9 In his more recent contribution, Teece (2009) has put ‘ecosystems’ at center stage 
and defines the environmental context not as ‘industry’ but rather as ‘ecosystem’ 
that comprises of the organizations, institutions, and individuals that impact the 
enterprise and its customers and suppliers 
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on linear or cyclical models of organizational development and have treated 
other seemingly random patterns as either ‘stochastic processes’ or as 
‘various forms of error distributions’. Consequently, they argue that the 
framework extends other models by including nonlinear and dynamic 
models of organizational change and development. Likewise, Aldrich and 
Ruef (2006) suggest that current models of transformations should be 
complemented with models that do not assume a predetermined order of 
developmental sequences. Instead, they call for explanations that take into 
account interactions between external events and firm action, which may 
result in organizational change that is rather algorithmic, than 
developmental in nature. Figure 4 displays the four alternative process 
theories including life cycle, teleological, dialectical, and evolutionary 
theories, along with the corresponding units and modes of change, as well 
as the related ‘engines’. 
   
 
 
 
Figure 4. Process Theories of Organizational Development and Change (Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995)  
 
The lifecycle process theory of organizational change reflects organic 
growth, where an organizational entity evolves through natural or logical 
sequences or stages. Although the external environment influences the 
development process, Van de Ven and Poole (1995) argue that it is an 
entity’s “imminent program, logic and rules”, as well as its potential, that 
govern the development and mediate the external impact. They note that 
lifecycle theories are commonly applied to explain development and change 
in terms of institutional programs or rules that require organizational 
activities to proceed in a given order. Consequently, they argue the 
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progression of events is viewed as linear and irreversible, leading to stages 
that are programmed and regulated by nature, logic or institutions.  
Teleological process theory, in contrast, views development as a sequence 
of goal setting, implementation, evaluation, and modification of the set 
goals (see Figure 4). As an outcome, as Van de Ven and Poole (1995) point 
out, the organizational entity proceeds toward a planned goal or end state, 
producing sequences of events that may be recurrent and discontinuous. 
Consequently, there are no given rules or predetermined sequences in a 
teleological process but rather multiple, equifinal ways to achieve the goal 
or end state. Therefore, these authors regard both the external environment 
and the resources of the entity as influential to the development process, 
e.g., by creating constraints or opportunities that push the entity toward a 
new developmental path.  
The two final process theories operate at the level of multiple entities (see 
Figure 4). The dialectical process theory views change as an outcome of a 
process where opposing forces contradict to challenge the existing status 
quo. The struggle between the existing thesis and the challenging anti-thesis 
produces a synthesis as a new construction that then becomes the new 
thesis in the next dialectical cycle. The dialectical model requires, as Van de 
Ven and Poole (1995) explain, at least two entities that represent the 
oppositions, resulting in a frequent and discontinuous sequence of  
‘confrontation, conflict and synthesis’ between opposing a contradictory 
interests, values or events. They claim that these oppositions may either be 
internal to the organization, e.g., when multiple conflicting goals or 
interests compete for attention or resources, or external when activities of 
one organization or group of organizations contradict with those of other 
organizations or groups.  
Evolutionary process theory, in contrast, regards change as an outcome of 
a continuous cycle of variation, selection, and retention that produce 
recurrent and cumulative events within a population. In this process theory, 
the outcome of the natural selection is competitive survival among 
organizational entities as they struggle for scarce resources. This 
evolutionary process theory, as presented by Van de Ven and Poole (1995), 
is primarily concerned with cumulative changes in populations of 
organizational entities resulting from natural selection and builds on the 
idea of environmental selection, in line with the works by Hannan and 
Freeman (1977). Therefore, it represents a more restrictive view of the 
evolutionary perspective than the one adopted in this study. The 
evolutionary perspective adopted in this study and discussed above builds 
more on the view put forward by Aldrich and Ruef (2006) and Nelson and 
Winter (1982) and assumes that ‘routines’ of the firm, as a persistent nature 
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of the organization, determine the possible behavior of the firm, while the 
actual behavior is also determined by the environment. This focus on 
routines and capabilities, rather then the external environment, is the 
fundamental divergent point between the evolutionary perspective adopted 
in this study and the definition offered by Van de Ven and Poole (1995). In 
addition, these authors apply the evolutionary model to populations as units 
of analysis whereas the present study, in line with Aldrich and Ruef (2006), 
applies the evolutionary perspective also to a study on single organizational 
entities. 
In terms of informing drivers of development and change, the 
evolutionary model holds that it is mainly the competition for scarce 
resources that drives development and change, whereas in the dialectical 
model it is the conflict between entities that represent opposing forces, 
interests or classes that produces change (see Figure 4). Teleological models 
propose that it is managerial action and social construction among 
individuals that generate purposeful variation and selection processes, as 
opposed to the lifecycle model, which views different stages to be influenced 
by various institutional or natural rules, programs or logic (see Figure 4). In 
addition, as Van de Ven and Poole (1995) point out, these different drivers 
of change may also operate on a different timeframe and therefore different 
drivers may be acting simultaneously resulting in development and change 
that is influenced by diverse internal and external factors. As a result, 
whereas the evolutionary processes may operate within a population during 
longer periods, this process may be punctuated by teleological actions by 
individual entities that produce transformations. The interaction between 
multiple drivers of change, involving feedback loops, may then produce 
complex and multilayered phenomena, including non-linear and dynamic 
changes in organizations and organizational populations, as these authors 
point out. Likewise, Westney (2009) suggests that it is likely that multiple 
‘engines’ or selection criteria such as resources efficiency, legitimacy or 
power and interest co-exist within multinational firms, especially within the 
various evolutionary subsystems of geography, business or function. 
Finally, Van de Ven and Poole (1995) suggest that there is a difference as 
to the mode of change involved: the evolutionary and lifecycle perspectives 
operate on a prescribed modality, producing change that is first-order by 
nature and represents a variation within an existing framework. The 
teleological and dialectical perspectives, in contrast, operate in a 
constructive modality producing second-order change that disrupts existing 
assumptions or frameworks.  
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These various types of development and change are summarized in the 
Figure 4 and I will return to them in the next section when reflecting upon 
the different theories in international business. 
 
2.1.6 Summary and Research Problematization  
 
Despite the large body of literature and important contributions on 
organizational capabilities, I identified the following aspects in existing 
literature that are worth problematizing, and that warrant both further 
empirical research and theoretical development. 
First, much of the organizational capabilities literature has been directed 
towards explaining competitive advantage at a given time as opposed to 
explaining development and change. Consequently, especially the more 
static approaches have focused their attention on the types of capabilities 
(e.g. along the VRIN-criteria) that provide the firm with ideal fit or 
sustainable competitive advantage, rather than addressing the dynamism in 
capabilities and focusing on how firms develop or change capabilities over 
time. Moreover, these perspectives have emphasized the quality of fit and 
have, to a large extent, ignored the role of time and timing in developing 
and managing firm capabilities. 
Secondly, regarding those perspectives that explain development and 
change, a review of the literature indicates that there is a fundamental 
difference between the evolutionary and dynamic capabilities perspectives 
as to the drivers of capability development, especially as it comes to the role 
of top management. While the evolutionary perspective (e.g. Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Dosi et al., 2002; Aldrich and Ruef, 2006) views capability 
development as being a gradual, cumulative process driven by the 
evolutionary processes of variation, selection and retention, the dynamic 
capabilities view (Teece et al., 1997; Teece 2007; 2009; Helfat et al., 2007; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) emphasizes strategic action as a response to 
changes in the operating environment focusing on those capabilities of the 
firm that enable it to change its resource and capability base (Teece et al., 
1997; Helfat et al., 2007).  
Thirdly, there is a limited understanding of the elements external to the 
firm as they relate to capability development, and of the interactions 
between internal and external elements. Consequently, research on the 
“complex interactions that occur over time between the firm's resources and 
its competitive environment” (Priem and Butler, 2001: 35) has been called 
for and the MNC context and the globalizing business environment of 
uncertainty and complexity seem to offer an ideal object of such a study. 
The integration of the external environment then, provides a better 
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understanding of the different patterns of development and change (e.g. 
Van de Van and Poole, 1995) that may result from the interactions between 
firm action and environmental effects, and the co-evolution between the 
two. 
Fourthly, the organizational and managerial processes internal to the firm 
have commonly been reduced simply to 'managerial decisions' or 
'management agency', which not only ignores the richness and complexity 
of the environment internal to the firm but also disregards the forces 
underlying organizational and managerial decision-making (for notable 
exceptions see Burgelman 1991; 1994; 1996; 2002; Burgelman and Siegel, 
2008). Moreover, the mechanisms that challenge the firm’s dynamic 
capabilities or top management action warrant further research. These 
problematizations seem particularly pertinent in the case of the 
multinational firm, as will be discussed next.  
  
2.2 Organizational Capabilities and the MNC 
 
Within international business research, and ever since the seminal work of 
Hymer (1976), firm-specific advantages have received keen scholarly 
interest among international business researchers seeking to explain the 
existence and behavior of multinational firms. Because the replication and 
transfer of knowledge and capabilities, as well as creation of new 
capabilities are fundamental to growth in international markets, MNCs play 
a major role in the generation and diffusion of capabilities globally 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2010). The ability of the MNC to transfer non-
codified and complex knowledge across borders (Kogut and Zander, 1993) 
and to access and integrate locally embedded knowledge and capabilities 
that reside within subsidiaries and make them available to the rest of the 
multinational firm (Dunning 1988; Madhok and Liu, 2006) have been 
argued to constitute the main advantages of the MNC. More recently, the 
dynamic capabilities view has been integrated with the international 
business literature emphasizing changing capability dynamics during the 
processes of firm internationalization and globalization  (Tallman and 
Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002; Luo 2000; 2002) and arguing that the ability of 
multinational firms to engage in cross-border transfer of capabilities and to 
create institutional innovation underlie the dynamic capabilities of the 
MNC and are at the very core in explaining the advantages of the 
multinational firm (Dunning and Lundan, 2010). 
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2.2.1 Capability Processes within MNCs 
 
Traditional international business or MNC theories have been characterized 
as capability recognizing as they assume that internationalizing firms or 
MNCs possess some unique firm-specific and often home-based advantages 
that enable them to expand internationally (Tallman and Fladmoe-
Lindquist, 2002) or to overcome the liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1976; 
Zaheer, 1995). In the traditional international business literature these firm 
resources and capabilities have been referred to as firm-specific advantages 
(Hymer, 1976), market knowledge and learning (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977), organizational capacity (Welch and Luostarinen, 1988), or ownership 
advantages (Dunning, 1981). Several researchers have argued that firms 
first exploit the routines and capabilities built to fit the home country 
environment during international expansion (Kogut, 1997; Collis, 1991) by 
choosing foreign locations that provide the best application for their 
internal, mainly home-based capabilities (Collis, 1991) and by expanding 
horizontally through the processes of transfer and replication (Meyer, 
2006). Consequently, this earlier literature has mainly treated firm 
resources and capabilities as prerequisites for internationalization or as 
rather static firm-specific advantages and therefore, capability development 
has been seen as a rather unilinear process of capability accumulation and 
building. Although some of the early perspectives have included an idea of 
acquiring complementary location-specific advantages (Dunning, 1981) in 
order to overcome the liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995), 
or an idea of learning and building experience beyond exploiting the initial 
domestic competitive advantage (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), these 
perspectives have mainly depicted the development of firm-specific 
resources and capabilities as an incremental intra-firm process as the firms 
learn in foreign locations. Especially, Nordic scholars have conceptualized 
the international firm as a “learning organization characterized by bounded 
rationality and limited knowledge” (Björkman and Forsgren, 2000: 7). 
Consequently, much of the traditional IB literature seems to suggest that 
the firm’s initial international development is dominated by exploitation 
and replication of existing resources and capabilities within different 
geographic locations, seen as a key mechanism for firm growth 
internationally (see also Kilpinen, Paukku, Salonen and Gabrielsson, 2009). 
The more recent literature on multinational companies or global 
industries has also identified organizational capabilities as key in 
determining performance and strategy in global markets (Tallman and 
Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002; Luo 2000; 2002). In this more contemporary 
work, the models relying on exploitation and replication of firm-specific 
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advantages have been replaced by dynamic processes in which the 
multinational firm’s subsidiary network contributes to the development and 
upgrading of its original advantages (Forsgren, 2008). Therefore, although 
the firm advantages may have originally been linked to its home country, 
the further development of these advantages is drawn from and influenced 
by the multiple environments where it operates (Forsgren, 2008). 
Therefore, this more recent literature (e.g. Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 
2002; Luo, 2002) has focused not only on leveraging or exploiting existing 
firm capabilities but also on building new capabilities, in line with the 
recent dynamic capabilities literature.  
The accumulation and acquisition of new resources and capabilities have 
been raised as being particularly relevant in the case of born-global firms or 
latecomer MNCs (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004; Mathews and Zander, 2007; 
Sapienza et al., 2006). Mathews and Zander (2007) claim that most of the 
existing frameworks and models do not capture the behavior of these ‘new 
species’ of global firms that do not seek to exploit home-based advantages, 
but to gain access to resources and capabilities through their international 
operations, including the “ability to draw competitive advantage from 
external networks and inter-firm relationships rather than from 
internalized resources, skills and knowledge” (2007: 399). They suggest 
that literature on international new ventures or born-globals, as well as on 
latecomer or newcomer MNCs, suggests that their origins, growth, 
organizational forms, and strategies differ from the traditional and 
resource-rich MNCs represented by most frameworks and models. These 
authors also note that these characteristics and behavior, such as 
outsourcing of critical resources or accelerated internationalization, 
demonstrate fundamental differences compared with the lengthy and 
sequential learning process of the incremental internationalization theories 
in the establishment of competitive of advantage. Instead, literature 
suggests that these firms “begin with a global view of their markets, and 
develop the capabilities needed to achieve their international goals at or 
near the firm’s founding” (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004: 125) or move globally 
to acquire new resources and capabilities from the early stages (Mathews 
and Zander, 2007). Moreover, as pointed out by Mathews and Zander 
(2007), the existing frameworks, due to limited dynamic content, have been 
insufficient in explaining the transformation of competitive advantages 
during the internationalization process. These recent views challenge not 
only the exploitation and replication logic but also the necessity to build an 
established home market position in the internationalization process 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2004).  
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As part of the research project that relates to this study10, Kilpinen et al. 
(2009) found differences in capabilities through which a firm 
internationalizes and those by which it globalizes, including those by which 
it copes with industry globalization as an outcome of the different roles that 
the internal and external selection environments of the firm play in the 
process of firm internationalization and globalization. They found three 
different logics in capability development, namely that ‘internationalization 
logic’ involves exploiting, replicating and incrementally developing firm 
capabilities as the firm expands internationally. The process of firm 
globalization, or strategy of ‘global integration’ involves a logic of 
integrating and reconfiguring firm capabilities on a global basis. The 
‘dynamic capability logic’ involves not only modifying the firm’s internal 
capability base but also exploiting external capability networks in order to 
achieve a better fit with the competitive, changing environment. Moreover, 
when investigating capability dynamics within a specific market context, 
Kilpinen and Paukku (2011) found multiple, equifinal paths in capability 
development as the firms responded to changes in a key market, suggesting 
that the geographic expansion of the multinational firm may either be 
categorized as a routine activity or as a non-routine activity that relies on a 
high level of dynamic capabilities (Helfat and Winter, 2011) depending on 
the external market context.  
Similarly, research undertaken by Cantwell (1989) and Cantwell and 
Piscitello (2000) on technology accumulation within MNCs found that 
during firm expansion into new product or geographic markets, firms first 
exploit their existing potential for growth, manifested in the form of existing 
competences and resources. While firms internationalize their markets in 
order to exploit their competences, the internationalization of R&D 
activities is related to adaptation to local conditions or establishment of new 
local industries rather than to creating new capabilities (Cantwell, 1989). 
Second, multinational firms establish a system for the creation of new 
competences that involves both learning and experimentation. At this stage, 
in order to consolidate their capabilities multinational firms extend and 
leverage their capabilities within related fields of activity or across different 
geographical locations, taking advantage of the variety in sources of 
learning within different institutional settings. Finally, their research found 
that multinational firms employ both internationalization and 
diversification in order to spread the resource and capability base of the 
firm, form internationally integrated networks and source new resources 
and capabilities from different geographical locations. 
 
                                                   
10 Please see the introductory part on research process 
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2.2.2 Evolution and the MNC 
 
As pointed out by Westney and Zaheer (2009) many models of MNCs have 
an evolutionary character although those models that explicitly incorporate 
an evolutionary perspective are only few (Westney, 2009). Evolutionary 
theory of the MNC by Kogut (1997) and Kogut and Zander (1993) provides 
perhaps the most comprehensive view on multinational firm development, 
conceptualizing the multinational network as an organizational evolution as 
it responds to a diversity of national contexts and the uncertainty of the 
environment. According to this perspective it is the dynamic processes of 
capability development and transfer that underpin the creation and 
development of firm-specific advantages and consequently explains the 
existence and behavior of the multinational firm (see Forsgren, 2008, for a 
review on the different MNC theories). 
The evolutionary theory of the multinational firm emphasizes the 
possession of superior capabilities and knowledge, including the ability to 
develop new knowledge through experiential learning and to transfer it 
across borders faster than competitors are able to imitate, as the main 
source of growth and competitive advantage in international markets 
(Kogut, 1997; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Zander and Kogut, 1995). Like 
former perspectives, this theory regards the firm’s country of origin as 
determinantal to its capabilities and relates the accumulation of organizing 
principles to the firm’s national origins. This theory also portrays 
international development of an MNC as a sequential process where a firm 
first exploits its current knowledge for expansion into new geographic 
markets, the initial entry serving as the platform that recombines the 
knowledge acquired in its home market with the incremental learning in the 
foreign market. In the final stage of this sequential process, “the learning in 
the foreign market is transferred internationally and influences the 
accumulation and recombination of knowledge throughout the network on 
subsidiaries, including the home market” (Kogut and Zander, 1993: 523). 
This process, as these authors claim, alters the global knowledge of the firm 
as it transforms the network of subsidiaries through cross-border transfer 
of learning.  
Westney and Zaheer (2009) suggest that in the context of the MNC, 
internal selection forces result from internationalization, and relate to the 
increasing scale, complexity and diversity, as well as to the need to 
coordinate activities, resources and capabilities across various subunits. 
Similarly, other scholars within international business have highlighted 
those activities of the MNC that relate to its ability to coordinate resource 
deployments to exploit interdependencies and complementarities across its 
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businesses and value chain activities globally (Luo, 2002; Roth, 1992), as 
well as to its ability to accumulate, transfer and integrate knowledge, 
resources and capabilities across the dispersed organizational units (Nohria 
and Ghoshal, 1994; 1997) or to use the subsidiary network as a competence 
creating force (Cantwell and Narula, 2001; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). 
The current perspectives, viewing the MNC as a coordinated system of 
cross-border value-creating activities (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; 
Cantwell et al., 2010), emphasize not only internal transfer, but also the 
ability of the firm to transfer knowledge and capabilities to its coordinated 
network. For MNCs, Dunning and Lundan (2010) point out that successful 
transfer requires the ability to codify knowledge and routines to make them 
transferable within the firm, a process likely to increase the transparency of 
firm capabilities, to the point where they will also become transferable to 
other firms (either intentionally or by imitation). Therefore, similar to the 
case of technology transfer, there are likely to be spillover effects that are a 
consequence of the efforts undertaken by MNCs to make best practices 
transferable within the firm and to their local partners, such as suppliers 
and distributors (Cantwell et al., 2010). The more market-based 
transactions are used in the firm’s system of value adding activities, the 
more likely is the diffusion to other firms (Dunning and Lundan, 2010). 
Consequently, MNCs are likely to impact the evolution of other firms within 
their coordinated network and be impacted by these other firms as well. 
Westney (2009) has portrayed the multinational firm not only as being 
part of a larger evolutionary system or several evolutionary systems, but 
also as an evolutionary system itself with multiple evolutionary subsystems 
and selection regimes (referring to the selection criteria, outcomes, agents 
and targets). Subsequently, a key concern in MNC management has become 
the alignment of the evolutionary processes of the corporate system and the 
three subsystems, namely geography, business, and function that may result 
in different patterns at different points in time. She argues that by altering 
the evolutionary processes within the MNE, its managers can better cope 
with changes in the external environment. Moreover, as Westney (2009) 
points out, it is this idea of multiple interacting evolutionary processes that 
impact each other that constitutes the co-evolutionary process within the 
MNC context. Moreover, she argues that portraying the MNE in terms of an 
“evolutionary system and subsystems that co-evolve in interaction with 
each other, as well as within their differentiated environments” (2009:133) 
provides a means to address and deal with the complexity of the MNC 
context.  
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2.2.3 Co-evolution between the MNC and Its Environment 
 
In line with the co-evolutionary perspective discussed earlier, recent 
research on MNCs has also emphasized the co-evolutionary processes 
between the MNC and its environment (Cantwell et al., 2008; 2010; 
Madhok and Liu, 2006) suggesting that while organizations often adapt to 
their environments, they also impact the ‘selection rules’ and alter the 
environment in line with their needs. This research maintains that 
underlying this co-evolutionary process is the interplay between the local 
contexts, subsidiary capabilities and trajectories, and headquarters 
influence, e.g., the mandates granted to the subsidiary. According to this 
research, subsidiaries both create variation in the local environment, as well 
as absorb the successful variation from other parts of the MNC network. 
Madhok and Liu (2006) suggest that the local environment also generates 
direct selection pressures and the evolution is often faster at subsidiaries 
than at higher levels of the organization due to fewer complexities at the 
subunit rather than at the overall system level. Furthermore, these scholars 
argue that those MNCs that are able to direct the macro-evolutionary 
process, both by anticipating environmental selection forces as well as 
through managerial adaptation, will tend to create organizational structures 
and processes that allow subsidiaries to fit better into their environment. 
They also point out that when internal microevolution is faster than 
macroevolution, the MNC is more likely to shape the environment than 
being shaped by it, e.g., internal selection may outpace external selection if 
the MNC transfers a unique capability to a subsidiary that gives it a 
competitive edge over its local competitors.  
The emerging perspectives (Dunning and Lundan, 2010; Cantwell et al., 
2010) also argue that a critical driving force in the co-evolution process is 
how MNCs adjust their strategies and structures to counter uncertainty, 
complexity and changes in their environment. Cantwell et al. (2010) suggest 
that MNCs are the entities that are the most directly affected by the 
increasing uncertainty and complexity in their environment. However, they 
also suggest, because these firms engage in constant experimentation and 
search across borders, they have a higher propensity to innovate solutions 
to encounter such an environment. These authors claim that the MNC 
responds to the increasing uncertainty through the development of both 
new institutions and open network structures, motivated by rising 
interconnections between various geographic markets and the growing 
amount of market-based transactions. They also contend that the flexibility 
provided by the open network structure has then enabled the MNC and its 
affiliates to better address changes in the external environment as well as to 
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engage in multiple cross-border experiments, but also forced them to 
formalize new practices into transferable routines likely to generate spill-
over effects at a larger scale. Similarly, Siggelkow and Rivkin (2005) 
propose that rapid technological change, deregulation, and intensified 
competition have led to more modular organizational forms. They also 
suggest that information technologies, by standardizing interfaces, have 
enabled managers to conduct more transactions across organizational 
boundaries, which is likely to enhance the diffusion of capabilities across 
organizational boundaries and impact co-evolution. 
Cantwell et al. (2010) argue that MNCs are in the position to shape the 
environment, both through their innovative activities as well as through 
diffusion of new capabilities at the extended enterprise level. These authors 
also suggest that in contexts of complex technological and institutional 
change, the strategic focus of MNCs is increasingly shifting to the 
evolutionary processes by which they can respond to and influence changes 
in the environment, e.g., the institutional setting in which they operate. 
However, their research also suggests that both embeddedness and agency, 
and periods of inertia and change, are likely to characterize the behavior of 
MNCs (Cantwell et al., 2008). Thus different forms of behavior are not 
mutually exclusive, and the “MNCs are likely to exhibit both adaptation and 
co-evolution with institutions in different home and host countries, in 
different industrial sectors and at different points in time” (Cantwell et al., 
2010: 577). Likewise, Westney and Zaheer (2009) attribute the external 
selection pressures to two distinct levels of analysis: that of the multiple 
country environments that incorporates the selection mechanisms both in 
the home and host counties, as well as that of the global ‘meta-
environment’, the selection mechanisms of which operate either at the 
industry or the supra-national institutional level. 
Consistent with the co-evolution logic, recent works within dynamic 
capabilities research explicitly argue that MNCs exist because of the efforts 
to create and capture value through organizational designs that leverage 
capabilities, co-create cross-border markets and shape eco-systems (Pitelis 
and Teece, 2010; Teece, 2009). These views perceive MNCs as instruments 
that integrate globally dispersed assets and participate in ‘eco-system’ 
engineering on a global scale in order to achieve complementarities both 
horizontally and vertically. This view also holds that the role of the MNC 
has evolved from that of a ‘system-integrators’ within a specific sector, 
region or nation, to that of an ‘orchestrator’ in the global value creation 
process (Pitelis and Teece, 2010). 
To summarize, in the context of the modern MNC, the evolutionary and 
co-evolutionary processes involve those activities of the MNC by which it 
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generates variety in the environment, and engages in selection, retention 
and cross-border diffusion of certain routines and capabilities. This process 
involves the practices and capabilities that are both developed by the MNC 
parent or the affiliates, and includes both locally embedded capabilities as 
well as those that are mobile across borders, and transferred within the 
MNC network of subsidiaries or to the external network. They also involve 
those co-evolutionary activities by which the MNC creates variation by 
responding to uncertainties and complexities in the environment through 
experimental search and by creating new institutions and organizational 
forms to modify the external selection criteria (Dunning and Lundan, 
2010). Alternatively, they might involve the activities the MNC undertakes 
to orchestrate assets or to shape ecosystems to create value on global basis 
(Teece, 2009; Pitelis and Teece, 2010). So, in addition to international 
business research emphasizing exploitation as well as selection and 
retention, involving transfer and redeployment of the firm’s routines and 
capabilities from one geographic location to another, and their coordination 
within the MNC network, the recent research has come to emphasize 
exploration and those specificities of the MNC that enable it to create 
variation in the environment and shape the external environment, including 
the eco-systems within. 
 
2.2.4 Summary and Research Problematization  
 
Despite the growing attention on organizational capabilities within 
international business (IB) as well as the prominent works discussed above, 
the following characteristics of current research on capability development 
within MNCs offer opportunities to problematize and refine current 
perspectives.  
First, although the dynamic nature of capability development within 
MNCs has been recognized in IB literature (e.g. Cantwell, 1989; Cantwell 
and Piscitello, 2000; Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002; Luo, 2000; 
2002), the current literature is still limited in recognizing multiple, 
equifinal paths in capability development or potential non-linear capability 
trajectories. With regards to the various types of development and change 
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) discussed earlier, the above literature review 
indicates that many of the international business theories are implicitly 
based on a life cycle model, adopting a developmental view assuming that 
organizations change gradually or in stages, and resulting in an 
evolutionary process at industry level. Consequently, it has been claimed 
(e.g. Teece, 2009) that traditional international business theories have been 
incomplete in specifying the sources of firm-specific advantages or the 
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mechanisms by which multinational firms sustain or renew these 
advantages.  
The inclination to view capability development as an intra-firm activity 
and as a rather unilinear process of capability accumulation and building 
seems to result from the tendency to neglect the role of the external 
environment or the tendency to draw a distinct line between the firm and its 
external environment (see Forsgren, 2008, for a review). On the one hand, 
Aharoni (2011) suggests that MNC theories have either treated firms as 
black boxes, or environments have been treated as independent of the 
firms. On the other hand, Faria contends that current research has failed to 
acknowledge “the power and influence of the global supra-network, led 
mainly by transnational corporations, within and outside the ‘networks’ of 
firms” (2004:212). Despite the emerging perspectives that recognize the 
role of MNCs in shaping the environment (e.g. Cantwell et al., 2010), this 
research has focused on the institutional environment, i.e., how MNCs 
transform the environment through institutional and organizational 
innovation, while research on how MNCs shape the environment through 
the innovation and diffusion of new products, services and business models 
has been limited. Therefore, it seems that research has, to some extent, 
failed to cope with changes in the operating environment and ignored the 
changing reality in the global environment, and the subsequent impact of 
the external environment on the firm’s internal processes. Related to this, 
there seems to be an insufficient understanding of the factors that condition 
the MNCs ability to respond to or influence changes in the environment. 
The tendency to neglect the role of the external environment seems also to 
be an outcome of insufficient amount of empirical contributions, a gap that 
this thesis’s contribution seeks to address. 
As the above discussion reveals, the complexity and heterogeneity of the 
MNC context, on the one hand, and the power of these firms on the other, 
seems to call for further theory development on capability development. In 
order to be able to contribute to existing research, I will put forward in-
depth case studies on three multinational firms. This data will be addressed 
by taking capabilities as units of analysis and by examining how external 
conditions and events interact with firm action to produce different 
patterns in capability development. By taking a stance that does not assume 
a predetermined order of developmental sequences, I seek to provide a 
better understanding of the behavior of multinational firms and the 
capability dynamics within.  
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3. The Development of the Theoretical 
Approach  
 
As the introductory part sought to elucidate, the objective of the study is to 
examine the capability-related processes within MNCs, and in particular the 
dynamic interactions between firm capabilities and the internal and 
external selection environments of the firm. Consequently, capability 
development is investigated as a phenomenon that interacts in a dynamic 
way with various contextual factors in the internal and external 
environment of the firm, and as a change process involving a sequence of 
events that unfold over time. As stated earlier, the main research question 
of the study is: How are capabilities developed within MNCs? This 
research question is approached by identifying the processes and 
mechanisms underlying capability development within MNCs, as well as by 
addressing the impact of the context, i.e., MNC environment and 
globalization on capability dynamics. The objective is to gain access to 
various patterns and processes of capability development, as well as to 
unravel the underlying mechanisms.  
First, in order to access the mechanisms underlying patterning in 
capability development, context-mechanisms-outcome (CMO)-analysis 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997, Figure 5) will be applied. CMO-analysis 
incorporates capability outcomes with the various mechanisms and contexts 
(internal and external) involved. Constructing the CMO-configurations also 
serves to illuminate the various component parts of the mechanisms under 
investigation (Pajunen, 2008). Second, this section will illustrate the scope 
of the study (see Figure 6). This illustration serves to depict both the 
simultaneous and sequential organizational activities and contextual forces 
across multiple levels, in order to illuminate the co-evolutionary processes 
and to construct a more holistic picture of capability dynamics than those 
offered by much of existing literature.  Finally, this section will discuss the 
impact of the MNC context and globalization on the external and internal 
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selection environments of the firm, and consequently on capability 
dynamics.  
 
3.1 CMO-analysis and Scope of the Study 
 
First, CMO-analysis (see Figure 5) will work towards unraveling the 
processes as well as to illustrate how these processes are influenced by and 
operate in conjunction with external contingencies to produce certain 
events. CMO-configurations are derived from the realist formula outcome = 
mechanism + context, building on the realist assumption that “causal 
outcomes follow from mechanisms acting in contexts” (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997: 58). This analysis involves identifying both the processes and the 
contingencies, or the mechanisms that lead to observable outcomes in the 
form of a single event or a regularity. The explanation takes the form of 
putting forward an underlying mechanism (M), which generates the 
outcome (O), and specifying how the interaction between structure and 
agency has generated the outcome. This also involves investigating how 
such mechanisms are contingent and conditional, and thus only activated in 
a particular context (C) (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  
 
 
 
Figure 5. CMO-analysis, Adapted from Pawson and Tilley, 1997 
 
Second, I seek to identify the key determinants and selection mechanisms 
within the internal and external environments of the firm, including their 
co-evolution. I will do so by providing a detailed account of key events or 
sequences of individual and collective events, actions and activities that 
relate to capability development at industry, firm and manager level (see 
Figure 6). Displaying the key determinants in temporal sequences enables 
capturing the interplay between them over time in order to identify co-
evolutionary effects.  
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Figure 6. The Scope of the Study 
 
Within the evolutionary perspective, three different units of analysis have 
mainly been applied (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006: 28): 1) routines and 
competencies within organizations, 2) organizations as a whole, or 3) entire 
organizational populations or communities. Following Henderson and 
Stern (2004) I assume that the external selection does not always equate 
with organizational failure and that partial selection of certain capabilities 
within an organization is more likely than full selection of entire 
organizations, and consequently I take capabilities rather than 
organizational units or organizations as units of analysis.  
Some scholars have also suggested focusing on complementary sets of 
routines or capabilities, rather than taking individual capabilities in 
isolation (Levinthal, 1991), because routines and competencies are often 
tightly coupled at the organizational level. This is supported by prior 
research that has identified different capability development paths 
depending on whether the unit of analysis is individual capability, the firm’s 
capability base or the firm’s entire capability constellation (Laamanen and 
Wallin, 2009). Likewise, the idea of multi-level selection (Murmann et al., 
2003) implies that the level of ‘fitness’ is determined upon a larger unit 
than the immediate one within which the routine or capability resides. This 
entails that the effectiveness of a particular capability is affected by other 
capabilities and therefore, selection of a particular capability may be based 
on the fit with surrounding routines and capabilities. Multilevel selection 
involving selection at the group level in addition to selection at an 
individual level affects, e.g., internal resource allocation within 
organizations that has an impact on capability development (Murmann et 
al., 2003; Zollo and Winter, 2002). Therefore, the approach that I adopt is 
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that in addition to investigating capabilities individually, they should also 
be investigated as constituents of the firm’s resource and capability base. 
In addition to assuming partial selection as the dominant selection 
outcome, this study assumes that capabilities are often indirectly selected 
through the selection of specific products or services that are likely to serve 
as units of selection. Thus, the direct effect of external selection occurs at 
the level of products and services with an indirect effect on the underlying 
capabilities and routines. Likewise, while the target of selection at firm level 
is not only end products or services but also the internal routines and 
processes that can best facilitate microevolution (Madhok and Liu, 2006), 
these routines and processes become manifest in the products, services and 
organizational forms put in the market place. Therefore, capabilities as well 
as products and services in which they are embodied serve as units of 
selection as illustrated in Figure 6.  
Within this study, the internal selection environment encompasses both 
the organizing principles of the firm, including its organizational structure, 
processes, practices and routines, and its corporate culture, including the 
interests, values and norms present in the organization. These factors are 
considered as factors that underlie and impact managerial decision-making 
and internal politics, and consequently either facilitate or inhibit capability 
development within the firm. Moreover, the dynamic capabilities11, 
embedded in organizational structures, processes, routines and individuals 
are assumed to act as important determinants on capability development as 
they govern the rate of change of the other capabilities of the firm (Helfat et 
al., 2007; Winter, 2003). Finally, this study postulates that much of the 
selection criteria are also embedded in, and influenced by the external 
environment. Within this study, the external environment is defined 
broadly, assuming that external selection criteria are embedded in, and may 
originate from the institutional-, technological-, competitive or market 
environment of the firm.  
 
3.2 Processes and Mechanisms Underlying Capability 
Development  
 
Having found patterns in the capability dynamics I aim at unraveling the 
underlying mechanisms that shape patterning in the observed processes 
(Pettigrew, 1997). Pettigrew (1997) has suggested that these mechanisms 
may be directly observable, intentional actions undertaken by the key 
                                                   
11 As the dynamic capabilities of the firm are assumed to be embedded in its 
structures, processes, routines and individuals they do not figure as a separate layer 
in Figure 6 
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actors, or they may be contextual factors or driven by interactions between 
different levels of the context and the process. As an outcome, he claims, 
these processes may be either linear, directional and cumulative, or 
discontinuous, open ended and transformational, and therefore the 
researcher has to search for more holistic explanations than those that are 
simply linear or singular. As the purpose is to understand the underlying 
logics in the process of change, Pettigrew (1990) has suggested that data on 
events needs to be complemented with interpretations of patterns in those 
events, and with logics that may explain the chronological sequences.  
Mechanisms have been claimed to indicate the way in which a structure is 
activated and provide a deeper explanation of how internal contexts or 
relations work (Harrison and Easton, 2004). Accordingly, Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) suggest that mechanisms should 1) reflect the embeddedness 
of the intervention within the stratified nature of reality, 2) provide an 
account for both the micro and macro processes as constituents of the 
intervention, as well as 3) demonstrate how outputs result from the choices 
(reasoning) combined with the capacity (e.g. resources). Within social 
investigation, mechanisms thus refer to the choices and capacities, which 
lead to a certain pattern of behavior (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). 
Finally, Pajunen (2008) claims that explanation should unravel how the 
mechanism was activated and the specific outcome or phenomenon 
produced, suggesting that it is the entities and activities that form the 
component parts of the mechanisms, and the combination or configuration 
of the components activates the mechanism that produces the outcome. 
Moreover, he argues that explanation needs to consider the hierarchical 
structure of the mechanisms: at a higher level it is the mechanism that 
determines how the outcomes are produced, whereas at a lower level it is 
the operation and combination of the constituent parts that determine how 
the mechanism is activated and outcome produced within the particular 
case and its context (Pajunen, 2008). These mechanisms-based 
explanations do not represent organizational mechanisms per se, but are 
rather more abstract models of mechanisms operative in organizational 
processes, comparable between cases. Decomposing mechanisms into their 
component parts also illustrates the interplay between internal and external 
selection, in line with the co-evolution logic. 
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3.3 The Impact of the MNC Context and Globalization on 
Capability Development 
 
Finally, I investigate the impact of the MNC environment, including 
globalization, on capability dynamics. In doing so I seek to provide 
contextualized research, linking capability development and organizational 
change to the MNC context and the globalization phenomenon. The 
purpose is to further extend extant research by putting forward mechanisms 
underlying the different capability paths within the MNC context. This 
study postulates that capability dynamics is affected by activities and 
processes both at the headquarters level and within its network of 
subsidiaries. Accordingly, the macroevolution of the external environment 
encompasses both events and processes at global, or supranational, level as 
well as the country level, and the microevolution of the internal 
environment includes events, activities and processes at the headquarters 
and among the MNC’s subsidiaries.  
To identify the impact of globalization, as discussed earlier, this study 
subscribes to Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist’s definitions in that firm 
internationalization refers to a process of international expansion with a 
“strategy of greater presence in international locations” (2002: 123), and 
firm globalization to a process of global integration, and a “strategy of 
consolidating international markets and operations into a single worldwide 
strategic entity” (2002: 123). The global stage, alternatively, refers to a stage 
where the emphasis of the MNC is to dynamically operate and manage an 
established “network of differentiated but integrated subsidiaries, affiliates, 
alliances and associations” (2002: 124). These phases seem to provide 
relevant points of reference in order to investigate the impact of firm 
globalization on capability development at organizational level, including 
the underlying mechanisms. 
As opposed to firm globalization described above and as explicated earlier, 
I consider globalization as a macro-level phenomenon to not only act as an 
external evolutionary (and co-evolutionary) force but also to affect the 
interdependencies between events and processes, and represent a progress 
from a lower, simple state to a higher, more complex one. Following Simon 
(1969) and Levinthal, complexity is seen as a “function of the degree of 
interrelationships among parts of a system” (2002:376) and a complex 
business environment as one that is tightly coupled and where activities in 
one market affect those in another. Another property of complex, non-linear 
systems is that the relationship between cause and effect may be 
proportional, i.e., a small cause may have a significant effect or vice versa 
(Bettis and Prahalad, 1986). 
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Finally, Faria (2004) contends that the global supra-network, led by 
transnational corporations within and outside the ‘networks’ of firms, 
embody power and influence that should be accounted for within academic 
research. Reasoning on the stratified nature of reality12, I assume that 
MNCs are endowed with causal powers that reside in the domain of ‘real’ as 
tendencies and that MNCs, by controlling for certain activities, create such 
conditions that translate tendencies into desirable outcomes. I seek to 
understand how MNCs construct and perform those mechanisms, and how 
they impact capability dynamics within MNCs. In the case of the present 
study, this analysis involves building explanations about why and how the 
research objects (MNCs) having structures (network of affiliates and 
associates) and necessarily possessing causal powers (to build new 
capabilities or modify existing capabilities by means of dynamic 
capabilities) and liabilities (complexity of the environment internal and 
external to the firm) will under specific conditions produce a specific 
capability outcome, and alternatively under other conditions produce 
another capability outcome. 
   
                                                   
12 The ontological assumptions that underlie this view will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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4. Methodology  
 
4.1 Research Approach 
 
As discussed in the previous section, I approach capability development as a 
phenomenon that interacts in a dynamic way with various contextual 
factors in the internal and external environment of the firm, and as a 
change process involving a sequence of events that unfold over time. My 
objective with this explanatory study is to specify the processes and 
mechanisms underlying the researched phenomenon (capability 
development), as well as to integrate the impact of the context (MNC 
environment and globalization). Consequently, the research phenomenon is 
inherently dynamic entailing both processual and evolutionary elements. 
Moreover, the underlying assumption is that both temporal and spatial 
factors at multiple levels simultaneously shape the phenomenon under 
study.  
To support this dynamic and multi-level approach, I adopted process 
research and longitudinal case study as research methodology13. First, the 
case study methodology enabled to approach the research phenomenon 
holistically and to incorporate the context into the analysis.  Second, 
process research methods enabled to approach the dynamics of the 
phenomenon and access the patterns of events and their underlying causal 
mechanisms across different levels of analysis. Moreover, this approach 
enabled to take into account different kind of effects, such as critical events, 
contextual factors, as well as underlying causal factors that influence the 
sequencing of events (Van de Ven and Poole, 2005). Another reason for 
adopting a longitudinal approach was the embeddedness of the researched 
phenomenon, and the potential asymmetry between levels of contexts, 
                                                   
13 Variance methods have been criticized for explaining change in terms of 
relationships among independent and dependent variables and consequently 
disregarding the dynamic nature of processes (see e.g. Van de Ven and Poole, 2005) 
or the complex, open and dynamic nature of the social world (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997). 
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including the asymmetric micro/macro interdependencies likely to 
influence the phenomenon under study (Pettigrew et al., 2001; Blazejevski, 
2011). 
The aforementioned approach was also justified from the critical realist 
paradigmatic assumptions adopted in the study14. First, a case study, by 
providing a holistic account, is in line with the ontology and epistemology of 
critical realism15 (Ackroyd, 2004). Easton (2010) suggests that a critical 
realist case study is well adapted to approach dynamic, complex 
phenomena, or to address research questions on causal mechanisms, or 
relations among the objects or entities that relate to the researched 
phenomenon. He argues that “critical realism is particularly well suited as a 
companion to case research” (2010:119). Second, process research accords 
with the critical realist retroduction logic, as it enables addressing various 
patterns of events and their underlying causal mechanisms that may 
operate on different time scales and span different levels of analysis or 
domains of reality. As critical realism is a fairly novel philosophical 
movement and may be unfamiliar to some of the readers, I will next provide 
a brief description of this philosophy of science. In what follows I will 
discuss some of the key ontological and epistemological assumptions and 
compare them with other dominant perspectives16. 
 
4.1.1 Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions 
 
In terms of ontology, critical realism shares the same perspective as 
positivism in that reality is considered to exist independently from our 
knowledge of it (objectivist view). However, critical realism rejects the 
determined empiricist ontology promoted by positivism, arguing that it 
ignores the complex mechanisms that connect different variables (Ackroyd, 
2004). Instead of treating firms or other similar categories as ‘black boxes’, 
critical realism seeks to unravel the various mechanisms-context-outcome 
combinations underlying the phenomena under study.  
                                                   
14 This study follows mainly the realist and critical realist ideas introduced by 
Bhaskar (1975; 1979; 1998), Sayer (1992; 2002), as well as those who have applied 
these ideas to organization and management studies, e.g., Ackroyd and Fleetwood 
(2000), Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004) and Tsoukas (1989 and 2000), or case 
research, e.g., Welch et al. (2011), Piekkari and Welch (eds, 2011), Easton (2000; 
2010), and Harrison and Easton (2004). 
15 In fact, recently the case study methodology has been increasingly associated with 
this paradigm (e.g. Easton, 2000; 2002; 2010; Tsoukas, 1989; Welch et al., 2011) in 
addition to the more positivistic case study tradition (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2003). 
16 The characteristics of critical realism are primarily discussed in comparison with 
positivism, as this philosophy of science largely dominates business research in 
general and international business research in particular (for elaboration see 
Piekkari et al., 2009; Welch et al., 2011; Piekkari and Welch (eds), 2011). 
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According to the critical realist paradigm, reality is ‘stratified’ and consists 
of three domains: the real, the actual and the empirical domain (Bhaskar, 
1979; Sayer, 1992) and at the same time, ‘emergent from’ its constituents 
(Sayer, 2000). Causal mechanisms are considered to arise from the causal 
powers (or liabilities) inherent in objects, structures or entities that then 
become activated under specific conditions (Bhaskar, 1979). These causal 
powers reside in the real domain while the activation of these powers 
potentially gives rise to patterns of events in the actual domain, which then 
become experiences in the empirical domain (Sayer, 2000; Morais, 2011). 
However, these powers are regarded as ‘tendencies’ that may or may not be 
exercised, and even when exercised, may or may not actualize, e.g., when 
the effects are counteracted by other powers (Fleetwood, 2004). Moreover, 
these powers are considered to act transfactually, building on the 
assumption that causal powers or liabilities continue to exist even when 
they do not manifest themselves into outcomes at the level of events or 
observations (Fleetwood, 2004).  
In terms of epistemology, there are more fundamental differences 
between critical realism and positivism, and critical realism has been said to 
“avoid[s] the traditional epistemological poles of positivism and relativism” 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997:55). Whereas positivists argue for the existence of 
knowledge that is independent of our values and regard the production of 
knowledge as a collection of facts (objectivist view), the critical realists view 
knowledge as subjectivist and our access to the world as being conceptually 
mediated. Consequently, the production of knowledge is viewed as a social 
practice that relies on available theories, concepts, descriptions or 
discourses (Bhaskar, 1998; Sayer, 1992; 2004).  
Figure 7 combines the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
underlying critical realism. As expressed in Figure 7, the empirical domain 
of reality is considered as both observable and subjective, consisting of the 
events that are observable by human senses as experiences in the empirical 
domain. The actual domain, alternatively, is viewed to consist of the 
objective but only partially observable events, including those events that 
are unobservable to human senses but that may become partially 
observable, e.g., through scientific methods or data analysis. Finally, the 
real domain is considered as both unobservable and objective, consisting of 
the causal mechanisms, i.e., the processes that exist independently from our 
knowledge and by which causal powers or liabilities act and generate events 
in the actual domain (Morais, 2011).  
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Figure 7. Three Domains of Reality and Retroduction Logic in Critical Realism. Source: 
Morais (2011: 68, Adapted from Sayer, 2000:15) 
 
These ontological and epistemological assumptions have implications on 
views of causality, theorizing and generalization. As opposed to positivism, 
which searches for regularities between atomistic events, critical realists 
regard the regularity model of causation based on empirical observation as 
both deterministic and reductionist (e.g. Bhaskar, 1998). Instead of relating 
causal explanation to regularities, critical realists relate explanation to 
“transcendental”, i.e., unobservable causal mechanisms and treat causal 
processes as indication of causal powers whose outcomes depend on 
contextual factors (Sayer, 2004). Consequently, causal explanation relies on 
identifying not only the key events and the patterns amongst events, but 
also the causal mechanisms that underlie them and that are irreducible to 
events. As Figure 8 illustrates, these mechanisms reside in structures (S) 
and endow them with particular causal powers (p) and liabilities (l). Since 
the causal mechanisms are tendencies that may or may not actualize 
depending on contextual factors, the explanation needs to account for the 
conditions (c) under which causal mechanisms operate. These causal 
mechanisms are considered to endure even when they are not acting, and 
even when they act they may not generate events, because of the prevailing 
conditions or counteracting mechanisms, as expressed by Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Critical Realist Causal Explanation, Sayer (1992) 
 
The critical realist paradigm claims that there may also be differences of 
outcome that result from the context instead of the causal mechanisms 
involved (Ackroyd, 2004). Consequently, although agents may be endowed 
with causal powers that reside in the domain of ‘real’ as tendencies, it 
depends on the ability of the agents to create such conditions that translate 
these tendencies into specific outcomes (Tsoukas, 2000). Cause, then, is 
defined as the transformative potential of phenomena and therefore, 
understanding the liabilities and powers, as well as the contextual 
conditions, is key even in the absence of a causal relationship (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997). According to the critical realist view there are a multitude of 
causal mechanisms, or causal configurations with particular tendencies, in 
operation that converge in a spatio-temporal context (Fleetwood, 2004) and 
give rise to emergent powers. Critical realism also distinguishes between 
two types of relationships, contingent and necessary. Contingently related 
entities may modify one another whereas necessarily related entities will 
cause changes in one another by necessity (Easton, 2010). Emergent powers 
are created when necessarily17 related entities or objects converge to form a 
structure (Tsoukas, 2000). 
A critical realist causal explanation builds on the retroduction logic (Sayer, 
2004) and stems from the ability to proceed from the experiences in the 
empirical domain into the causal mechanisms and structures in the real 
domain (see Figure 7). Within Figure 7, retroduction means moving down, 
across the different domains, or ontological levels of reality. In practice this 
signifies moving “retroductively from actor’s accounts of experiences in the 
empirical domain to the postulation of plausible structures of entities and 
respective causal mechanisms in the real domain” (Morais, 2011:77). 
                                                   
17 If the entities are contingently related, their powers are not modified (Tsoukas, 
2000:30). Moreover, the contingently related conditions are not inert, but instead 
have their own causal powers and processes (Sayer, 1992). 
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However, this perspective holds that accounts provided by the social actors 
involved cannot be equated with reality since the causal structures and 
mechanisms may be unknown by these actors or their conceptions may be 
erroneous (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Faria, 2004). Therefore, due to 
both the concept-dependency of social phenomena and double-
hermeneutics in social science, the researcher needs to reconcile causal 
explanation with interpretive understanding (Sayer, 2004). 
In terms of generalization, critical realist accounts rely on abstraction and 
retroduction, and rather than statistical generalization critical realists argue 
for transfactual generalization (Elger, 2010; Morais, 2011) and seek to 
unravel the causal mechanisms and their complex interaction. Likewise, 
Sayer (2004) distinguishes between generalization that determines how 
extensive certain phenomena are, and abstraction or retroduction that 
“explain what produces particular states and changes, but do not 
necessarily indicate their distribution, frequency and regularity” (Sayer, 
2004:11). This also resonates with the idea of analytical generalization in 
case study research (Yin, 2009) that involves generalizing to theory rather 
than to populations as in quantitative research. Critical realist accounts are, 
by definition, explanatory, and the predictive capacity of a theory is 
regarded as unlikely because mechanisms operate in an open system 
(Ackroyd, 2004). Because explanation and prediction are considered as 
asymmetrical, the quality of a realist explanation relies on identifying causal 
mechanisms that govern events, instead of on the ability to predict events or 
patterns of events, shifting the focus from predictive to explanatory criteria 
for theory assessment (Lawson, 2004). Pawson and Tilley (1997) question 
even the possibility of generalization in social science because of continuous 
social change, and promotes specification within various contexts, rather 
than generalization as a key aspect of research.  
               
Critical Realism and Capabilities 
Critical realism has been argued to be better adapted than positivism to 
acknowledge human properties or capacities, as well as human tendencies 
that these capacities give rise to, such as learning, or collective 
achievements based on these capacities, e.g., institutions (Ackroyd, 2004). 
Critical realists also argue for the possibility of conceptualizing firms in 
terms of their competences, and regions as systems of competences, which 
are reproduced through human action (Lawson, 2004). 
Following the ontological and epistemological assumptions discussed 
above, I also adopt a relational (critical realist assumption) in contrast to an 
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atomistic ontology (positivistic assumption) with regard to capabilities18. 
This perspective holds that a capacity, or capability, may be either active 
and to generate an action, or passive, as an object of change. A capacity is 
relational in the sense that an active capacity requires a passive capacity and 
action occurs when these two capacities meet, and there are no external 
inferences. In line with this holistic perspective, an individual is considered 
not to have the perfect capability, but instead, the capability of an individual 
is considered to be dependent on complementary capabilities. A capacity is 
also assumed to exist even when not activated and may also refer to a 
status, i.e., the ability to reject change and remain unchanged even when 
being subject to change. Capabilities are also regarded as capable of 
generating causes that may lead to a particular effect when activated (in line 
with Kakkuri-Knuuttila and Vaara, 2007).  
Instead of viewing competencies or capabilities as fixed or given 
properties that reside within particular organizational members or units, 
and that can be utilized in various contexts, I perceive capabilities as being 
‘enacted’ properties that are “constituted everyday in the ongoing and 
situated practices of the organizations’ members” (Orlikowski, 2002: 207) 
and organizations as structures that are reproduced by the actors within 
them (Ackroyd, 2004). According to Ackroyd (2004), collectivities (such as 
social groupings or organizations) are constantly reproduced and 
transformed through human action and consequently, collectivities, groups, 
institutions and organizations have properties that emerge from interaction, 
e.g., networks of firms may have emergent causal powers above and beyond 
those of simple aggregation (Easton, 2000) leading to “emergent properties 
that are more than, and different from, the sum of their constituent parts” 
(Easton, 2010: 121). Similarly, entering into new relations may provide 
actors with new powers that counteract or augment each other, as well as 
modify existing powers (Fleetwood, 2004). 
Moreover, with this perspective I assume that capabilities or powers 
cannot be detached from their contexts, or rendered into measureable form 
(atomistic ontology).  Instead, I assume that capabilities are both spatially 
and temporarily context dependent. This perspective also questions the 
possibility of identifying and transferring ‘best practices’ from one context 
to another (in line with Orlikowski, 2002, and Levinthal, 2002). With this 
approach I follow Levinthal’s (2002) claim that such a perspective 
disregards both external contingencies and internal relations, as well as his 
preoccupation about whether ‘best practices’ are separable from the set of 
organizational processes to which they belong.  
                                                   
18 This is also in line with Aristotelian philosophy (see Björklund, 2008), regarding 
capacities as characteristics that actualize according to a teleological plan. 
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In short, in line with a critical realist perspective, with this study I seek to 
provide a more holistic account on capability development within MNCs 
that recognizes the impact of the context19. Harrison and Easton suggest 
that the key challenge in applying the critical realist ontology has been 
“bridging the gaps between philosophy, epistemology and research 
methods” (2004:207). To address this challenge, recent literature has given 
guidelines on how to conduct empirical research, e.g., case research, in line 
with the critical realist paradigm (e.g. Ackroyd, 2004; Harrison and Easton, 
2004; Easton, 2010; Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyinnaki, and Paavilainen-
Mäntymäki, 2011). Critical realists reject variance methods, as they are 
considered to capture change only at the level of the empirical and actual 
domains of reality, without necessarily identifying the causal mechanisms 
that operate at the level of the real domain. Instead, critical realist studies 
aim at capturing the experiences, events and mechanisms at the different 
levels of reality, through a theory-grounded analysis on relationships 
between mechanisms, contexts, and outcomes (Elger, 2010; Morais, 2011). 
Towards this end, Harrison and Easton (2004) have proposed the context-
mechanism-outcome (CMO)- analysis (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) as a way to 
operationalize critical realism in organization and management studies. 
This approach to analysis is also applied to this study, as explained earlier. 
This approach is also in line with a research strategy labeled 
‘contextualized explanation’ (Welch et al., 2011:16) that seeks to reconcile 
contextualization with solid explanatory power. This mode builds on critical 
realist assumptions and regards causality as “a complex and dynamic set of 
interactions which are treated holistically” (Welch et al., 2011:754) 
accounting for both history and process in developing a causal account. 
Inherent in this method of theorizing is the idea of ‘equifinality’ (Ragin, 
1987) or multiplicity of causation, meaning that the there are multiple 
causal pathways to the same outcome, i.e., different combinations of factors 
can lead to the same outcome. Within this study and in line with the 
aforementioned approach, I adopt process research and longitudinal case 
study as the research strategy that will be elaborated on next.  
 
4.1.2 Longitudinal Multiple Case Study and Process Research 
 
Within this study I undertook processual research by means of a 
longitudinal comparative case study. Van de Ven and Poole (2005) argue 
that process research requires methods, such as multiple case studies, that 
                                                   
19 Morais (2011) has suggested that in the pursuit of regularity and law-like 
generalization, research has abstracted itself from context, which has led to an 
undercontextualized simplification of reality. 
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can illustrate temporal linkages between events and identify temporal 
patterns, as well as account for multiple time scales present in a process. 
Piekkari, Welch and Paavilainen define case study as a research strategy 
that “examines, through a variety of data sources, a phenomenon in its 
naturalistic context, with the purpose of ‘confronting’ theory with the 
empirical world” (2009:569), while Easton defines case study as a “research 
method that involves investigating one or a small number of social entities 
or situations about which data is collected using multiple sources of data 
and developing a holistic description through an iterative research process” 
(2010: 119). A longitudinal case study, then, involves an examination of the 
case over a long period of time by investigating processes in context across 
multiple, interrelated levels of analysis in order to link patterns of events to 
analytical frameworks (Pettigrew, 1990; 1997). This, Pettigrew (1990; 1997) 
suggests, enables including multiple sources and links of causation and 
thereby to identify and explain patterns and their underlying mechanisms 
in the process. Moreover, he points out that when adopting a multiple case 
design, it also allows comparison of the characteristics of patterns, the 
underlying mechanisms and the outcomes between the different cases in 
order to develop more holistic explanations within and between cases. 
Following Welch et al. (2011), my focus with the case study method was to 
examine, not only the causal mechanisms in operation, but also the 
contextual conditions20 under which they work. Harrison and Easton 
(2004) suggest producing either ‘deep’ explanations across a single or 
narrow range of contexts, or ‘shallower’ explanations across a larger range 
of different contexts. Consequently, a case study may involve studying a 
similar context across cases to produce a detailed understanding of the deep 
structures, processes and underlying mechanisms involved, or it may 
incorporate different contexts, when the context is the key determinant in 
explaining how these processes lead to particular outcomes. Instead of 
embedding cases cross-sectionally or vertically, these authors suggest 
embedding cases temporally, where the sub-cases within each case consists 
of different temporal units. Within the present study, investigating context-
mechanism-outcome (CMO) configurations across multiple cases and 
combining this analysis with periodization provided a means not only to 
ensure replication but also to explore the impact of a variety of contexts on 
outcomes in a systematic way both within and across cases, following 
Harrison and Easton (2004). 
                                                   
20 Welch et al. define context as “the contingent conditions that in combination 
with a causal mechanism, produce an outcome” (2011: 741). Easton (2010) instead 
refers to context as ‘relevant circumstances’. He also claims that the difference 
between context and contingency is that the latter provides a more articulated and 
elaborate account of the former (2010:121). 
   
 70 
Following the recommendations by Pettigrew (1990), my analysis drew on 
phenomena at both vertical and horizontal levels of analysis and the 
interplay between those levels over time, as illustrated by Figure 6 
presented in the previous section. The vertical level indicated the 
interdependencies between the different levels of context, e.g., the impact of 
the macro-level context on the micro-level, such as organizational context 
and behavior, whereas the horizontal level indicated the temporal 
interconnectedness between phenomena. As the findings will indicate that 
this approach is well adapted to the study of co-evolutionary phenomena 
(Lewin and Volberda, 1999) as it enables incorporating both micro and 
macro levels of analysis, and investigating possible interactions between 
firm-level and the industry-level processes. 
With the objective to understand the underlying logics in the processes of 
change, I used data on events, but I also included the interpretations that 
the interviewees gave of patterns in those events, and searched for logics 
that may explain the particular chronological sequences, following the 
recommendations by Pettigrew (1990). Moreover, in addition to identifying 
the patterns and underlying mechanisms involved, Pettigrew (1997) 
recommends linking these analyses to outcomes in order to have a focal 
point of investigation and to be able to understand how variations in 
context and process impact the observed outcomes across cases. This 
objective was achieved using the CMO-analysis, which links data on context 
and mechanisms to specific capability outcomes. 
 
4.2 Research Design 
 
4.2.1 Research Setting 
 
As discussed earlier, this multiple case study was part of a multi-year 
project funded by the national agency for technology and innovations 
(TEKES) with the purpose to study the impact of globalization on firm 
competitiveness, focusing on leading technology- and knowledge-intensive 
companies in Finland. I acted as a full-time researcher in the project, which 
also involved a project leader and three other researchers with their 
respective focus areas. Having multiple researchers offered the opportunity 
to rapidly acquire data on the global context gathered across multiple case 
firms simultaneously before proceeding into the more specific research 
areas. This study, as part of the research project, benefited from negotiated 
access to the case firms, as well as from the motivation of the company 
representatives to participate and deliver data. After the end of the project, I 
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pursued a more focused study on capability development within the case 
firms. 
 
4.2.2 Case Sample 
 
The present multiple case study involved an intensive examination of a 
limited number of cases. Out of the five firms involved in the research 
project, four included global firms operating in technology intensive fields: 
Nokia, in the field of mobile phones, Wärtsilä, a global metal engineering 
firm, Kone, an elevator and escalator firm and Perlos an electromechanical 
component manufacturer. Iittala, a homeware and design company was 
part of the research project owing to the high level of knowledge intensity of 
its operations. Although operating in different industries, all five firms 
under study can be classified as being highly technology- and/or 
knowledge-intensive. Second, in all the firms there was evidence of recent 
business environment and/ or business strategy change as a response to the 
impact of globalization and they had some activity in or concern for 
capability development. Contextual analysis was performed for all of these 
case firms, and the impact of globalization on capability development and 
management was examined in the five firms. The examination was 
extended to a specific market context (China) for the firms that had 
operations in that specific market (Nokia, Kone, Wärtsilä and Perlos).  
In order to determine the final case sample, I did not have a pre-
determined idea on a prescribed number of cases (as recommended by 
Harrison and Easton, 2004). Instead, the nature of the researched 
phenomenon, the emphasis on context and the research questions 
determined the number of cases to be studied as the final sample. The five 
case firms initially studied differed as to the intensity of their capability 
development activities and/or the dynamism within their respective 
industries. The mobile phone and electromechanical component 
manufacturing industries were assessed as high-velocity (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000), with unstable industry structures, fuzzy market boundaries, 
as well as non-linear and unpredictable changes. The shipbuilding, and 
elevator and escalator industries, in contrast, were defined as being 
moderately dynamic (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) with relatively stable 
industry structures and clear market boundaries, and where changes 
occurred frequently but along relatively predictable and linear paths. The 
homeware industry was clearly stable. Although all firms had activities in 
capability development, Nokia, Kone and Iittala had explicit processes in 
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capability development21 and these firms, although operating in different 
industries, had all identified design as a strategic capability that enabled the 
examination of a similar capability across different firms. As the 
development of design capability within the case companies was fairly 
recent, it was both information-rich and enabled setting boundaries to this 
development process.  Based on this analysis, I selected these three firms 
(Nokia, Kone and Iittala) as the final case sample for more in-depth and 
temporally extensive examination on capability development. Therefore, 
while the initial case sample was determined by project access, further case 
selection was based on theoretical sampling and replication (Yin, 2003; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), using criteria related to 
industry dynamism and intensity of design capability development, as 
indicated in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. The Criteria for Case Selection 
 
Consistent with critical realism, entities may be analyzed at different levels 
of aggregation (Easton, 2010). Within the three case firms, Nokia, Kone, 
and Iittala, the capability development process was first analyzed at the 
level of the capability base and subsequently narrowed to the level of a 
single capability for more fine-grained analysis. Design capability was 
chosen for this analysis as these three firms had identified it as a strategic 
capability that enabled investigating this particular capability across 
different firms. Moreover, as a fairly narrow capability it was feasible to 
collect the key events and activities with regards to this capability, and the 
key informants were both identifiable and available for interviews.  
Within the final sample of three firms, Nokia served as the primary case 
because of the intensity of the phenomenon within the company. Moreover, 
                                                   
21 These included ‘capability strategies’ at Nokia, ‘must-win battles’ at Kone as well 
as the DDI-, UPL- and retail capability development process at Iittala. 
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owing to the significance of Nokia to the Finnish economy, the firm has 
received extensive amounts of public and press attention and consequently, 
a large number of public documents were available for the company, which 
included among others, a very extensive historical analysis22. Both the 
retrospective and real-time secondary data available for the company 
complemented the primary data acquired through negotiated access. 
Despite the fact that various scholars point out that one case may be 
enough to produce an explanatory account on the research phenomenon, 
and to enable analytical generalization (e.g. Tsoukas, 1989; Siggelkow, 
2002), a multiple case study has been argued to provide a stronger base for 
theory building (e.g. Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki, 2011; Buck, 2011). Moreover, 
the rationale for adopting a multiple case study design was to be able to 
study the research phenomenon across a variety of contexts as well as to 
look for potential contrasting patterns within data or to specify variation in 
the main patterns. This approach also enabled to trace equifinal patterns, as 
“the typical case-oriented inquiry does not assume or even anticipate causal 
uniformity across positive cases. On the contrary, the usual expectation is 
that different combinations of causes may produce the same outcome" 
(Ragin, 1997:36). 
Moreover, several scholars have advised against ‘sampling on success’23. 
As will be later discussed in more detail, the case time within each firm was 
divided into successive phases, following the recommendations by Langley 
(1999) 24 This diminished the potential bias caused by ‘sampling of success’ 
because the individual periods could be classified as ‘success’ and ‘non-
success’, or as producing ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ outcomes. For example, 
during one of the case periods Nokia was faced with radical changes in the 
external environment and witnessed a loss of competitiveness, with 
negative outcomes. This was considered to further enrich the case sample as 
case research enables investigation of both positive and negative, or non-
conforming, cases for the purpose of theory development (Ragin, 1997). 
 
 
                                                   
22 The historical documents included an in-depth study on Nokia history (975 
pages) focusing on the period between late 1970s until 2002 based on interviews 
and unlimited access to documents in the Nokia's files performed by an academic 
researcher Martti Häikiö over a period of five years, as well as two other volumes by 
the same researcher 
23 The author would like to thank Jean-Francois Hennart and Udo Zander for 
raising this point during doctoral tutorials. 
24 According to Langley (1999), if the data can be decomposed to several phases 
that can be used as units of analysis for the internal replication, even one or two 
cases are sufficient for the purpose of theory generation. 
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4.2.3 Levels and Units of Analysis 
 
Within each case firm the case time was sub-divided to temporal units in 
order to operationalize questions about 1) capability development, and 2) 
the impact of context (MNC/globalization) within the case firms. The 
temporal units are illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.  The Periodization Used for both Within- and Cross-case Analyses 
 
First, to study the process of capability development, I constituted the 
temporal units out of periods involving relatively stable and linear patterns, 
whereas a discontinuity marked the beginning of a new period. This 
subdivision drew on the retrospective accounts and key events reported by 
the interviewees as well as secondary sources that traced the case histories 
and the characteristics of the context. Often these phases were demarcated 
by clearly identifiable transition events, such as a new strategy, change of 
the CEO etc. Consequently, and following Harrison and Easton (2004) 
multiple periods within a single case firm (Case1, Period1; Case1, Period2; 
Case1, Period3…) were analyzed in order to trace various mechanisms and 
the stability of these mechanisms over time, followed by cross-case analysis.  
Second, to study the impact of globalization, the division was based on 
context and involved the same period for all the case firms that 
corresponded to the time of the research project (2006-2009). At this stage, 
a single period was compared for multiple cases (Case1, Periodn; Case2, 
Periodn; Case3, Periodn…) This analysis provided a comparison of different 
CMO-configurations for the same period that represented various responses 
or capability outcomes to the impact of globalization at a certain period of 
time. This enabled tracking for the similarities and differences in patterns 
involving contexts, mechanisms and outcomes.  
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Finally, Figure 11 illustrates the various levels of analysis that were put 
forward in the previous section. This model served to depict the sequential 
and simultaneous organizational activities with the corresponding 
contextual and environmental factors at the multiple levels and periods 
under examination. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The Different Levels of Analysis 
 
4.2.4 Case Time 
 
Blazejevski (2011) identifies four different temporal dimensions within 
longitudinal case studies: case time, research time, temporal research 
perspective and temporal data perspective. Within this research, the 
beginning of the case time (i.e. period under analysis) was set at a major 
shift in firm strategy involving changes in its capabilities and consequently 
the case time varied per firm from 9 to 20 years. The analysis was extended 
up to 20 years when data and key informants were available to deliver 
reliable accounts of the past. The research time (the period during which 
data are gathered) included a period of four years. The research combined 
both retrospective and real time data (see Figure 10) and consequently, the 
research perspective was both simultaneous and ex post. The research 
design could be characterized as simultaneous/multiple shot-design 
(Blazejevski, 2011) as the case periods before, in between and after company 
visits were analyzed by using secondary sources. 
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4.3 Data Collection 
 
Data collection was conducted over a period of four years. The first stage of 
data collection focused on analyzing the context and the global business 
environment, using both highly structured and detailed frameworks on the 
globalization drivers (market, cost, competitive and government) (Yip, 
2003), industry structure and value chain analysis (Porter, 1980, 1985), as 
well as a semi-structured elaboration on firm strategies. At this stage the 
interview guide was constructed based on a preliminary literature review 
and a descriptive framework, rather than on one specific theory. Using 
interview guides that include several theoretical perspectives enables 
‘testing’ different approaches by analyzing data using various theoretical 
lenses (Andersen and Kragh, 2011). 
The latter phases were more theory driven and focused specifically on 
capability development by looking both at the overall patterns of capability 
development within the firms, as well as the impact of the MNC context and 
globalization on capability development. The empirical analysis sought to 
avoid conceptualizing the MNC as a ‘unitary actor’, and to incorporate a 
subsidiary and market context into the analysis and subsequently, 
interviews were conducted in China. Focusing on MNCs implies studies that 
are resource demanding and complex as they require multiple-level analysis 
across various units (Lervik, 2011) and often need to be limited in 
geographical scope. China was chosen as the specific market context owing 
to its influence in the global economy and its central role as a driver of 
globalization identified during the first round of interviews conducted 
within the case companies.  
In order to examine the capability development process, data was first 
collected by organizing focus group discussions with key informants in the 
case firms, the number of informants varying between 4 and 8. In these 
discussions the researchers acted as facilitators to generate a discussion on 
a focused and predetermined topic with a prepared interview guide 
(Wibeck, Abrandt Dahlgren and Öberg, 2007). According to Wibeck et al. 
(2007), focus groups discussion is ideally supported by a clear introduction 
to establish a common ground and to ensure that the participants 
understand and accept the framing of the focus group discussion. In these 
specific focus group discussions this approach enabled a common 
understanding of the key constructs, such as resources, operational 
capabilities and dynamic capabilities, to emerge as they were explained to 
the participants and discussed jointly at the beginning of the focus group 
sessions. The rationale for choosing this research method was that a focus 
group discussion, similar to a workshop situation enables “an interactive 
   
 77 
dialogue at a richer and higher level than is normally possible from data 
gathering with individual respondents” (Pettigrew, 1990: 279) and is likely 
to generate “rich data in which the participants explore the chosen issue in 
depth” (Wibeck et al., 2007). Other benefits of focus groups as research 
methods have been associated with the use of group interaction to produce 
data and insights that would not be attained through individual interviews 
as the participants engage in a process of collective sense-making, learning 
and construction of knowledge by both activating prior knowledge and 
generating new knowledge (Wibeck et al., 2007).  Moreover, it allows doing 
so in a fairly limited amount of time (Morgan, 1997). Finally, the focus 
group approach enables resolving the possible discrepancies immediately 
rather than having to rely on the interpretation made by the researcher. 
This type of collective resolution, where the participants themselves probe 
and clarify each other’s assumptions has been argued to represent a key 
benefit of this particular research method (Evans and Kotchetkova, 2009). 
The fact that the focus group participants were constituted out of either top 
management team members (two firms) or strategy experts (1 firm) 
generated fairly homogenous groups that were used to working together, 
which helped to avoid problems that could result from unstable and 
unpredictable group dynamics (Farnsworth and Boon, 2010; Halkier, 2010; 
Wibeck et al., 2007) as the participants were both able and willing to share 
their ideas in this particular group setting. The high quality of the focus 
group discussion was ensured by both the presence of knowledgeable 
informants, enable to view the research phenomena from diverse 
perspectives (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) as well as by their 
willingness to engage in collective sense-making and learning. To 
complement the headquarters perspective, individual interviews related to 
the Chinese market context were conducted both at the headquarters and at 
the subsidiary level.  
Finally, I conducted very focused interviews on capability development 
with key individuals and established an event chronology by performing an 
in-depth and temporarily extensive analysis for the three case firms that I 
had chosen as the final sample. This involved tracking key events and 
contextual factors by carefully analyzing secondary sources such as 
company histories, case studies, annual reports, company web pages, 
articles, and press releases. A chronology of the capability development 
process, including the transition points in the process was constructed 
based on this analysis and the interviews with the key individuals. While the 
analysis based on secondary sources provided rich data on key events, the 
retrospective reports from key informants served as the primary method for 
obtaining information about the interpretation of events, processes and 
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contextual factors in the processes of change. During the interviews key 
informants described the key events and processes grounded in their own 
experiences and language. This provided information about the 
interpretation of the events and processes including their antecedents. The 
interviews were semi-structured, in that each respondent had been 
provided with a list of key questions before the interview. These interviews 
were supplemented whenever possible with internal firm documents or 
other secondary material that related to the events or processes that the 
respondents were describing. The aforementioned approach is in line with 
critical realist research tradition that advocates collecting data through 
multiple collection techniques, and relying on retroduction logic and double 
hermeneutics when interpreting data (Easton, 2010).  
The focus group discussion lasted 2-3 hours and the individual interviews 
1-2 hours. All the interviews were transcribed verbatim25. The table below 
summarizes the data collection stages, including the respective case firms, 
data sources and key informants in the final case sample26.  
                                                   
25 Most interviews were transcribed by a professional transcription agency, some by 
project members present in interviews. 
26 This table displays only the interviews that were conducted with the firms in the 
final case sample although all the interviews conducted during the research project 
contributed to the overall understanding of the research phenomenon. 
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Stage Focus Case firms Data sources Key informants 
1 
Nov06-
Jan07 
Analysis on the MNC context: 
globalization drivers, industry 
structure and value-chain analysis, 
firm strategies 
Nokia, Kone, 
Iittala27 
Semi-
structured, 
individual 
interviews, 
secondary 
sources 
(12/17 in 
person) 
17 top executives 
(CEO to director) 
selected by company 
representatives for 
their expertise 
2 a) 
Nov07-
June08 
Capability development patterns 
during firm internationalization and 
globalization 
Identification of the impact of 
globalization on global capability 
development 
Nokia, Kone, 
Iittala28 
Semi-structured 
focus group 
interviews 
(3/3 focus 
group 
discussions in 
person) 
19 informants involved 
in 3 focus group 
discussions: top 
management team 
(TMT) members (2 
firms) or strategy 
experts (1 firm) at the 
HQ level 
2 b) 
(Apr08) 
Examination of the global capability 
development and management 
subject to a market context 
Nokia and 
Kone:  
Headquarters 
and Chinese 
subsidiaries 29 
Semi-
structured, 
individual 
interviews, 
secondary 
sources 
(5/5 in person) 
5 informants: 1 
informant at the HQ 
level, 4 informants at 
the subsidiary level 
(subsidiary top 
management, 
managing director to 
director) 
3 (Jan08-
Feb11) 
 
Identification of the overall 
mechanisms and processes of 
capability development within the 
case firms and examination the 
development of a single strategic 
capability 
Nokia, Kone, 
Iittala 
Secondary 
sources, semi 
structured 
interviews 
(11/11 
interviews in 
person) 
11 informants (CEO to 
director), including an 
external industry 
expert 
 
Table 2. The Data Collection Stages 
 
4.4 Data Analysis 
 
The key objective of process analysis is to generate patterns requiring 
explicit methods in order to build synthetic models out of complex, 
multilayered and temporarily embedded data (Langley, 1999). However, 
several characteristics of this type of data make it difficult to analyze and to 
theorize from, as pointed out by Langley (1999): First, it may be difficult to 
identify the sequences of ‘events’ that constitute appropriate conceptual 
entities. Secondly, it may be difficult to determine the boundaries between 
multiple levels and units of analysis. Thirdly, it may be difficult to interpret 
                                                   
27 14 additional interviews were conducted at Wärtsilä and Perlos but these firms 
were excluded from the final case sample. 
28 Three additional focus group discussions were conducted at Wärtsilä and Perlos, 
but excluded from the final sample. 
29 Five additional interviews were conducted at Wärtsilä and Perlos but excluded 
from the final sample. 
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the temporally embedded data because of the differences in retrospective 
vis-à-vis real-time data. Finally, it may be difficult to theorize from this type 
of complex data. Consequently, she proposes alternative but 
complementary generic approaches for the analysis of process data and 
generation of theory, namely narrative, quantification, alternate template, 
grounded theory, visual mapping, temporal bracketing and synthetic 
strategies. Whereas Langley characterizes the narrative and visual mapping 
approaches more as ‘organizing’ strategies, the temporal bracketing 
approach serves as a ‘replicating strategy’ for the purpose of theory 
generation. Within this study I used narratives and temporal bracketing 
(Langley, 1999) along with context-mechanism-outcome-analysis (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997) as approaches in data analysis in order to generate the 
patterns and identify the mechanisms underlying capability development.  
First, I used narratives to construct an analytical chronology for 
preliminary pattern recognition and subsequent analysis30. In parallel, the 
event chronology was decomposed into successive periods for the purpose 
of temporal bracketing (Langley, 1999). Although this kind of 
decomposition does not presume any progressive developmental logic as 
advised by Langley, it enabled identification of comparable periods for 
further analysis. According to Langley (1999), this approach is particularly 
suitable for the study of non-linearity within organizational processes, and 
can incorporate both complex and multilayered data. The decomposition of 
data into successive periods also enabled an explicit examination of how 
actions in one period led to changes in the context that then affected action 
in the subsequent period etc. and was therefore particularly suitable for the 
analysis of co-evolutionary effects between the external environment and 
firm action.  
Second, I constructed detailed CMO-configurations by incorporating the 
capability outcomes and various mechanisms and contexts (internal and 
external) involved. In line with Harrison and Easton (2004), the impact of 
the context was assumed to be dependent on the interaction of various 
contextual factors. Likewise, in line with their perspective, I considered the 
influence of each mechanism as dependent on a set of contextual factors in 
operation during that period. This resulted in multiple CMO- configurations 
for each company presented in a tabular format by period. Within the 
context of the present study this CMO- representation enabled identifying 
1) to what extent the key events identified during data collection originated 
from the external or the internal selection environment of the firm; 2) what 
                                                   
30 In the Nokia case, because of the large amount of key events, data were also 
visually mapped in order to allow for representation of different levels of context 
and the temporal sequences of events within these different levels simultaneously. 
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were the interdependencies between the external and internal events, and 
between the different levels of analysis; 3) the co-evolutionary dynamics, 
i.e., to what extent firm action preceded changes in the external 
environment and vice versa; and finally 4) the relative time lag between 
changes in the external environment and firm action, as an indication of the 
firm’s ability to change, i.e., its dynamic capabilities. Constructing the 
CMO-configurations also served to identify the component parts of the 
various the mechanisms, following the recommendations by Pajunen 
(2008). 
The following Figure 12 illustrates how this multiple case study evolved 
over time from the case as analytical chronology, to a diagnostic case, 
further to an interpretive/theoretical case and finally to a meta-level 
analysis across cases, and illustrates the respective data analysis approaches 
employed at various stages. The purpose of the ‘analytical chronology’ was 
to outline a narrative, across the different levels of analysis. Constructing 
narratives involves placing multi-level data into a ‘spatial and temporal 
continuum’ to form a ‘story’ that then lends itself to theory development 
(Mir, 2011). The ‘diagnostic case’ involved the focused CMO-configurations 
and served for preliminary pattern recognition by means of within-case 
analysis. The purpose of the ‘interpretive/theoretical case’ was CMO-
configuration abstraction based on cross-case analysis of the focused CMO-
configurations and narratives. At the final stage, the empirical findings, 
emergent concepts and theory were compared with extant literature for the 
purpose of extending theory by providing causal explanations, which 
corresponds to a kind of ‘meta-analysis’ as research output.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 12. The Research Output from Longitudinal Comparative Case Study Research and 
the Respective Data Analysis Approaches Employed (Adapted from Pettigrew, 1990; 
Langley, 1999; Pawson and Tilley, 1997) 
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4.5 Theorizing from Case Evidence 
 
In order to theorize from case evidence and process data, critical realists 
suggest to proceed through a process of retroduction and systemic 
theorizing, referring to a theoretically guided analysis on relationships 
among mechanisms, contexts, and outcomes (Elger, 2010; Morais, 2011) 
which, in this study was undertaken by building CMO-configurations as 
discussed earlier31. While conjectured CMO configurations may serve as the 
basis for empirical investigation, at this stage the refined CMO 
configurations specify the regularities or outcome patterns as well as the 
mechanisms and contexts involved32. This involves explaining how the 
interplay between structure and agency may constitute a mechanism (M), 
which in the presence of certain conditions and contingencies (C) produces 
an outcome (O) in the form of an event or regularity (R) (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997). Following Ragin (1987), this process needs to acknowledge the 
presence of multiple contingencies that may produce a particular outcome. 
Moreover, akin to the idea of equifinality, and as pointed out by Harrison 
and Easton (2004), similar patterns of context-mechanisms may be capable 
of producing a variety of causal outcomes, i.e., C1+M1=O1 or C1+M1=O2, 
and different context-mechanism configurations may be capable of 
producing an equal outcome, i.e., C1+ M1=O1 and C2+M2=O1. In case of 
the present study, this analysis involved building explanations about why 
and how the research objects (MNCs) having structures (network of 
affiliates and associates) and necessarily possessing causal powers (to build 
new capabilities or modify existing capabilities by means of dynamic 
capabilities) and liabilities (complexity of the environment internal and 
external to the firm) will under specific conditions produce an outcome 1 
(new capability) or alternatively under other conditions produce an 
outcome 2 (no capability). 
                                                   
31 This approach is also similar to process tracing (e.g. George and Bennet, 2004) 
aimed at generating cause-of-effect explanations by working backwards from 
events, considered as capable of producing contextualized explanations (Welch et 
al., 2011). 
32 Miller and Tsang (2010) advocate the use of critical realist research methods for 
the purpose of testing hypothesized causal mechanisms. Likewise, Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) recommend deriving theory-driven propositions prior to empirical 
work and to put them into empirical test for further specification. Within the 
present study, CMO-analysis was applied for the purpose of data analysis and 
theory building with an objective to put forward such middle-range theory that 
provides an analytical framework for further specification. Therefore, from a 
critical realist perspective a limitation of the study is that it did not put ex ante 
conjectured CMO-configurations as propositions through empirical testing but the 
CMO-configurations presented in the study were instead derived from the data ex 
post. 
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Rather than following deductive or inductive approaches33, the research 
process was ‘iterative and ongoing’ wherein data analysis was guided by 
theory, and where theory and data analysis together aimed at unraveling the 
causal mechanisms and contingencies involved. As Easton argues, 
“retroduction is the key epistemological process that critical realists 
recognize” (Easton, 2010: 124) referring to “a metaprocess the outcome of 
which is the identification of mechanism that explain what caused 
particular events to occur” (Easton, 2010: 124). In practice, he argues, the 
process is likely to be iterative and closely related to abduction suggested by 
Dubois and Gadde (2002) for case study research.  
Within the present study, I aimed at deriving more abstract configurations 
from the focused CMO-configurations in order to produce middle-range 
theory able to “travers[e] between general theory (abstract configurations) 
and empirical case (focused configurations)” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997:116), 
as illustrated by Figure 13. The idea of ‘cumulation as theory development’ 
as opposed to ‘cumulation as empirical generalization’ (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997: 127) involves continuous laps of abstraction/specification cycle where 
one moves between general theory and the case. The purpose of the 
empirical part, symbolized as α and β in Figure 13 is to produce both 
focused CMO-configurations as well as to look for empirical uniformities, 
not as empirical generalizations but rather as regularities between cases to 
be explained by the resulting middle-range theory. In practice this meant 
iterating between theory on capability development (dynamic capabilities 
and the evolutionary perspective) and the data (the focused CMO-
configurations) with an objective to produce middle-range theory on 
capability development in the MNC context.  
 
  
                                                   
33 Critical realists question the possibility of theory development being strictly 
inductive or deductive (see e.g. Welch et al., 2011: 748). 
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Figure 13. The Elements of Realist Cumulation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997:121) 
 
This mode of theorizing is also in line with what Welch et al. (2011)34 have 
labeled “contextualized explanation’. This method, grounded in a critical 
realist ontology and epistemology, seeks to reconcile explanatory rigor and 
contextualization through  “a more complex understanding that recognizes 
the contingent nature of cause-effect relationships” (Welch et al. 2011: 750). 
It relates causal explanation to understanding the constituent nature of 
objects, i.e., what the objects are capable of doing under specific conditions 
and contexts, and regards causality as a complex and dynamic set of 
interactions (Welch et al., 2011: 754).   
Finally, according to the critical realist view, due to the open system 
character of the social system and the recurrent nature of social change, 
causal mechanisms are considered to be provisional, and therefore, should 
be subject to continuous theoretical development (e.g. Pawson and Tilley, 
1997). Therefore, knowledge obtained from any particular study should be 
put through further theoretical development that may proceed either 
                                                   
34 Piekkari and Welch (2011) also argue that case study should not only be used as 
research strategy and call for a greater understanding of the role of the case study 
in the theorizing. For further elaboration, see Piekkari and Welch (eds), 2011, 
Welch et al., 2011. 
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through further specification or by investigating the suggested mechanisms 
across a variety of contexts to see how widely the theory is applicable 
(Harrison and Easton, 2004). My objective with this study was to produce 
middle-range theory that embodies relatively abstract configurations and 
consequently, these fairly aggregate-level mechanisms and configurations 
should be put though empirical testing in various contexts for further 
specification. Testing the aforementioned mechanisms by quantitative 
methods would also help to understand how widespread the mechanisms 
and logics put forward in this study are. Further research involving large 
samples would also elucidate the contingencies that might explain variance 
in the capability outcomes across different types of organizations and 
environments. 
 
4.6 Quality of the Study 
 
In this section I evaluate the quality of the study using the concepts of 
validity and reliability. Validity, in general, reflects the strategies and 
procedures taken by researchers to establish the credibility of their study, 
while reliability refers to the replicability of the study with the same 
outcomes (Yin, 2009; Creswell and Miller, 2000) Although paradigmatic 
assumptions have been considered as inseparable from the assessment of 
research quality (e.g. Amis and Silk, 2008), both positivist and quantitative 
criteria have been dominant when judging case study research, and the 
positivist notions of validity and reliability have been commonly used 
without justification (Piekkari et al., 2009). Despite the fact that the 
concepts of reliability and validity derive primarily from positivistic 
epistemological tradition, they have also been utilized in non-positivistic 
research to reflect a commitment to rigor (e.g. Mir, 2011) or to convince 
traditional reviewers (e.g. Szulanski and Jensen, 2011). In the absence of 
consensus around evaluation criteria for qualitative research in general (e.g. 
Pratt, 2008) or for critical realist studies in particular, I assess the quality of 
the present study using the traditional measures of reliability and the three 
traditional measures of validity, including construct validity, internal 
validity and external validity (Yin, 2009). However, in addition to these, I 
use two complementary criteria, namely ontological appropriateness, and 
the integration of multiple perceptions in the study (Healey and Perry, 
2000) that are not explicit in Yin’s set of criteria for case research but are 
justified from the paradigmatic assumptions adopted in the study. 
Moreover, the traditional criteria of validity and reliability are discussed 
with related criteria adapted to realist and critical realist studies. 
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The following table (Table 3) indicates the criteria that I will discuss. I will 
conclude this section by summing up the various procedures that I took in 
the study to ensure high-quality research. 
 
 
Criteria for 
case 
research 
(Yin, 2009) 
Description and 
key concern 
Criteria for case study 
research within the 
realist paradigm (Healey 
and Perry, 2000) 
Description and key concern 
  Ontological 
appropriateness 
Characteristics of the research 
problem 
Internal 
validity 
Causal relationship 
between variables 
and results 
Contingent validity Focus on generative 
mechanisms rather than on 
direct cause-and-effect 
  Multiple perceptions of 
participants and of peer 
researchers 
Value-awareness, supported 
by triangulation between 
multiple informants and 
sources of evidence, self-
awareness and peer reviews  
Reliability Replicability of the 
study with the same 
results 
Methodological 
trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness guaranteed by 
case study protocol: case study 
database, use of quotations 
and tables that summarize 
data, description of procedures 
External 
validity 
Generalizability Analytic generalization  Focus on theory building and 
analytical generalization rather 
than theory testing and 
statistical generalization 
Construct 
validity 
The compatibility 
between key 
concepts and 
operational 
measures (quality of 
conceptualization 
and 
operationalization of 
the key concepts) 
Construct validity Same 
 
Table 3. Quality Criteria for Case Study Research, Including Case Research within the 
Realist Paradigm, Adapted from Healey and Perry (2000) and Yin (2009). 
 
Ontological appropriateness 
Healey and Perry (2000) suggest making ontological assumptions explicit 
and put forward a quality criterion of ontological appropriateness. In the 
case of realist or critical realist case studies, they suggest that ontological 
appropriateness refers to addressing a research problem that investigates 
complex social phenomena with reflective actors. Likewise, Easton (2010) 
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suggests that a critical realist case study is well adapted to approach a 
complex and dynamic phenomenon, or when addressing research questions 
on causal mechanisms, or the necessary and contingent relations among the 
objects or entities under investigation. As my objective was to explain the 
capability development phenomenon that entails both processual and 
multi-level elements, and to address both the underlying mechanisms and 
the related conditions, critical realism was considered as ontologically 
appropriate for the research question under study. 
 
Internal validity/ contingent validity 
Internal validity, another quality criterion, relates to explanatory studies 
and refers to establishment of causal relationship, i.e., making apparent 
how x leads to y, without the interference of another factor z (Yin, 2009). 
The concern for internal validity can be addressed, e.g., by performing 
pattern-matching and explanation building during data analysis, and 
further enhanced by ruling out alternative explanations (Yin, 2009). 
Gibbert et al. (2008) also advice using a research framework derived from 
literature and theory triangulation, i.e., using a variety of theoretical lenses 
and literature streams, either as research framework, and as means to 
interpret findings. 
Owing to the complexity and dynamism involved in the research 
phenomenon, illustrating a causal relationship in a form of x -> y is 
problematic. Instead, in line with the paradigmatic assumption adopted in 
the study, I have treated causality as “a complex and dynamic set of 
interactions which are treated holistically” (Welch et al., 2011:754) and 
approached it in the form of CMO-configurations. Consequently, the 
internal validity of the study relied on explanation building during data 
analysis. First, the focused CMO-configurations illustrated how certain 
mechanisms (M), operating in specific contexts (C), produce particular 
capability outcomes (O) in the case companies. Second, these focused 
configurations served as a basis for CMO-configuration abstraction. These 
more abstract and aggregate-level configurations specify how the interplay 
between structure and agency may constitute a mechanism (M), which in 
the presence of certain conditions and contingencies (C) produces an 
outcome (O). This is also consistent with the quality criteria put forward by 
Healey and Perry (2000) who suggest the use of ‘contingent validity’ in the 
place of the more positivist internal validity. Contingent validity is closely 
related to the internal validity criterion but is concerned with the validity of 
generative mechanisms and the related contexts that make them 
contingent, rather than on direct cause-and-effect relationships. 
Establishing contingent validity therefore involved specifying the 
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mechanisms that made things to occur beyond mere description, as well as 
integrating the context into the analysis. 
Scholars have also suggested that the relative strength of an explanation 
can be reinforced by testing and evaluating it against other alternative 
explanations (Szulanski and Jensen, 2011; Yin, 2009). The idea of testing 
and ruling out alternative explanations resonates well with critical realist 
ideas. To take into consideration alternative explanations in the present 
study, I used competing theoretical lenses (the evolutionary perspective and 
the dynamic capabilities view) during data collection and data analysis. 
Despite this effort to integrate alternative lenses for the best interpretation, 
I agree with the critical realist claim that because causal mechanisms are 
not observable, any explanations (or theories) that put forward causal 
mechanisms should be subject to a critical evaluation, e.g., via academic 
presentation and critique (Easton, 2010: 123). From this perspective the 
mechanisms that I have postulated remain provisional and contestable and 
subject to competing interpretations and explanations, as well as to further 
specification enabled by future studies. 
 
Multiple perceptions of participants and of peer researchers 
Another quality criterion that differs from the more established validity and 
reliability criteria relates to the fact that due to the epistemological 
assumptions of critical realism, research should be able to take into account 
multiple perceptions of a single reality (Healey and Perry, 2000). They 
suggest that this type of plurality of perceptions can be ensured by 
triangulating between multiple informants and sources of evidence, by 
expressing self-awareness, and by exposing triangulations to peer reviews. 
Likewise, critical realists argue that the inclusion of multiple perceptions 
and interpretations is necessary in order for the best, current interpretation 
to be chosen (Easton, 2010). In the present study, I performed triangulation 
across data sources, theories and different informants, along with reflexive 
accounts that acknowledge potential biases. I also exposed my analysis to 
several company informants and peers for feedback. 
 
Construct validity 
Construct validity reflects the quality of conceptualization and 
operationalization of the key concepts (Gibbert et al., 2008). It implies 
setting correct operational measures for the concepts under investigation, 
and can be addressed by triangulating between multiple sources of 
evidence, establishing clear chains of evidence and having peers or key 
informants to review case study reports, as well as by indicating the data 
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collection circumstances and the data analysis procedures applied (Yin, 
2009; Gibbert et al., 2008). Within the present study the concerns of 
construct validity deal with the key concepts of organizational capabilities. 
Moreover, it implies that the key events related to the phenomenon under 
study were accurately identified and that the context of the study was 
correctly assessed.  
First, during data collection and relating to the organizational capabilities 
construct, the key the concepts of resources, organizational capabilities and 
dynamic capabilities were explained to the interviewees prior to each 
interview or focus group discussion. This proved to be particularly fruitful 
during focus group interviews as the key concepts were discussed in a group 
setting allowing for a common understanding to emerge. Moreover, the 
focus group approach enabled collective resolution to take place without 
having to rely on the interpretation made by the researcher. When using 
secondary material organizational capabilities were identified through the 
use of explicit vocabulary, such as design, technology, logistics, customer 
understanding, strategic foresight etc.. For the purpose of the study, these 
words related to both the resources possessed or available to the firm, as 
well as to the underlying capabilities.  
Second, construct validity within the present study implies that the key 
events relating to capability development were carefully identified and 
selected. To achieve this, multiple sources of evidence were used to collect 
data on key events, namely interview data and secondary material including 
company histories, case studies, annual reports, company web pages, 
newspaper articles, press releases and internal documents (a detailed list of 
secondary material can be found in Appendix 2). Moreover, several 
informants were interviewed on the same phenomenon (see list of 
interviewees in Appendix 1) and triangulation was performed amongst 
various informants and data sources. 
Finally, to rigorously analyze and understand the context, the study used 
both highly structured and detailed frameworks on the globalization drivers 
(market, cost, competitive and government) and levers (Yip, 2003), 
industry structure and value chain analysis (Porter, 1980, 1985), as well as a 
semi-structured elaboration on key factors in the external environment. 
Moreover, 4-8 informants were interviewed in each case firm on the MNC 
context and globalization phenomenon and the results were triangulated 
between various informants. Furthermore, there were at least two 
researchers present in these interviews and the results were jointly 
discussed and evaluated. However, due to the complexity of the 
globalization phenomenon and the fact that it does not lend itself to 
objective assessment, the research relied on the reflective views and 
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perceptions that managers have on globalization, rather than studying the 
globalization phenomenon per se, e.g., interdependencies between markets 
and actors.  
In addition, a clear chain of evidence was established through having all 
the interviews tape-recorded, transcribed verbatim35 and restored in a 
central database. Further, during the course of the study findings of the 
research were disseminated to the case companies in the form of company 
reports and presentations, and they were discussed with the company 
representatives at project steering group meetings and workshops. 
According to Pettigrew (1997), action workshops lead to higher quality data 
as they provide a validity check on the data and interpretations made by the 
researcher during the research process. All publications, including 
conference and research reports were forwarded to the case companies 
prior to publications to ensure that they did not contain factual errors, and 
at least two representatives in each case company reviewed the final case 
study analysis in this thesis. Finally, to enhance construct validity, a special 
focus has been on indicating the data collection and data analysis 
procedures applied in the present work (Yin, 2009; Gibbert et al., 2008). 
 
External validity / Analytic generalization  
The external validity measure expresses the generalizability of research 
findings. Yin (2009) has suggested that the external validity is primarily 
dependent on the research design and builds on replication logic in multiple 
cases studies. Moreover, he suggests that a nested approach, in which a case 
can be divided up to multiple cases, is likely to enhance the external validity 
of the study. Gibbert et al. (2008) call for making case selection and 
sampling choices explicit for the assessment of external validity. According 
to this perspective, case studies, provided that replication logic has been 
applied, allow for analytical generalization that involves generalizing to 
theory rather than to populations as with quantitative research (Yin, 2009). 
According to Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004) generalization also entails that 
case selection is informed by theory.  
Within this study the complexity and depth of the process data limited the 
number of cases that can be collected within a reasonable time thereby 
potentially affecting the generalizability of the results. However, the 
presence of multiple periods within each case enabled a more extensive 
replication (Langley, 1999). According to Langley (1999), if the data can be 
decomposed to several phases that can be used for internal replication, even 
                                                   
35 Most interviews were transcribed by a professional transcription agency, some by 
project members present in interviews 
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one or two cases are sufficient for the purpose of theory generation, and 
accordingly, the replication criterion is considered as fulfilled. It could be 
also assessed that a case sample of firms originating from a single economy 
is a limitation to the transferability of the result and that a case sample of 
Finnish MNCs may bias conclusions towards certain type of activities. 
However, this approach was deliberate rather than a limitation, but should 
of course be acknowledged when assessing the transferability of the results 
to other settings.  
Finally, reflecting on quality criteria, the main issue between traditional 
and emergent perspectives seems to deal with the status of case studies and 
the generalization of findings based on case studies and on idiographic 
research more generally. First, the case study has been argued to have low 
external validity meaning that the case study is only appropriate to 
investigate local causality and is not legitimate for generalization, and 
second, that case study as a method has been considered suitable for the 
exploratory or pilot phase of the research process to enhance the 
understanding of the research phenomenon (Tsoukas, 1989). Within the 
realist and critical realist paradigms, these views are rejected. Instead, 
Tsoukas (1989) argues that even idiographic studies can be regarded as 
epistemologically valid and capable of producing explanatory knowledge 
because they clarify the structures and generative mechanisms involved in 
the research phenomena that are contingently capable of producing the 
observed outcomes. Second, he claims, this obtained knowledge is 
considered as externally valid because generality is a property of the 
necessary relations in structures, rather than a property of the empirical 
domain. Therefore, in order to contribute to a more generalizable theory, 
the focus of this study was on understanding the logics behind the 
researched phenomenon and identifying the generative mechanisms in line 
with the critical realist assumptions. 
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Reliability and methodological trustworthiness 
Finally, the reliability measure demonstrates that the study, e.g., data 
collection, can be repeated, with the same results. Although scholars, for 
example Pratt (2008), have questioned whether qualitative research is truly 
replicable in any case, he suggests that transparency, extensive and detailed 
accounts of the data collection and data analysis phases together with a 
careful documentation should enable the reader to assess the potential 
replicability of the study. Likewise, Yin (2009) emphasizes transparency 
and careful documentation, e.g., by developing a case study database and by 
using a case study protocol to minimize errors and biases. Healey and Perry 
(2000), following realist assumptions, suggest evaluating methodological 
trustworthiness in the place of reliability. Methodological trustworthiness is 
closely related to the reliability measure but it does not imply replicability of 
the results that the critical realists consider unlikely because of the open 
nature of social systems. However, similar procedures underlie 
methodological trustworthiness as reliability.  
In order to enhance methodological trustworthiness, hence the reliability 
of the study, I followed the following procedures. First, I documented and 
reported in detail how the methods were used and conclusions drawn. 
Second, I also sought to provide such detailed description of the data 
collection, data analysis and research findings that enable readers to judge 
both the quality and the transferability of results to other contexts. Third, I 
extensively used quotations and indicated the case firms’ actual names that 
have been claimed to further enhance the reliability of a study (Gibbert et 
al., 2008). Finally, in order to enhance the quality of the study and 
following Welch et al. (2011), I sought to conform to methodological rigor 
not only in the selection of methods and research designs that fit the 
research question of the study, but also in the theorizing process, e.g., being 
explicit and transparent by expressing methodological self-awareness, and 
carefully reporting the process.  
As with many longitudinal studies, I had to rely in part on retrospective 
accounts by managers that may be subject to post-rationalization and 
therefore potential biases. However, I took several precautions to avoid 
erroneous results as recommended by Golden (1992) and Miller, Gardiner 
and Glick (1997). First, I used retrospective data to investigate past facts 
and behaviors rather then beliefs and intentions, focusing on the key events 
and most important processes. Second, informants were selected due to 
their lead position in the organization or development process under 
analysis, and I interviewed multiple informants on the same periods to 
avoid informant bias. Informant bias was further reduced by the fact that 
the key informants (top management team members and strategy experts) 
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can be considered as highly knowledgeable, able to view the focal 
phenomenon from different perspectives (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) 
and to identify the key overall contextual factors and events. In addition, the 
negotiated access was likely to raise the motivation of the respondents to 
deliver reliable data. However, it should be acknowledged that as the 
interviewees comprised mainly of top management team members and 
strategists, this might slightly emphasize teleological patterns as opposed to 
more evolutionary patterns in firm behavior, as well as deliberate rather 
than emergent capability processes. Part of the data was collected and 
discussed by multiple researchers, which is likely to enhance the richness of 
and the confidence in the data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007). Finally, I performed triangulation both among different interviewees 
and data sources to ensure high reliability and trustworthiness of the data. 
The following table indicates the measures that I took in order to enhance 
the quality of the research, as determined by the traditional criteria of 
validity and reliability, as well as the two complementary criteria that relate 
to the critical realist ontology and epistemology. 
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Quality criterion Key concern Procedures taken 
Ontological appropriateness Characteristics of the 
research problem 
Selection of the research problem 
and questions 
Internal validity/  
Contingent validity 
Causal relationship 
between variables and 
results 
Theory triangulation (two different 
theoretical lenses used, both as 
theoretical approach and as means 
to interpret findings)  
CMO-configurations to build 
explanation during data analysis 
Multiple perceptions of 
participants and of peer 
researchers 
Value-awareness Triangulation between multiple 
informants and sources of evidence, 
self-awareness and peer reviews 
External validity/  
analytical generalization 
Generalizability Cross case analysis 
Multiple case studies/ nested 
approach, three case studies 
divided up to 14 temporal units for 
analysis 
Rationale for case study selection 
(explanation why this case study 
was appropriate in view of research 
question) 
Details on case study context 
Focus on generative mechanisms 
Reliability/  
methodological 
trustworthiness 
Replicability of the study 
with the same results 
Case study protocol  
Case study database 
Organization’s actual name given, 
quotations used 
Precautions to avoid post-
rationalization and biases in 
retrospective data, e.g. triangulation  
Construct validity The compatibility between 
key concepts and 
operational measures 
(quality of 
conceptualization and 
operationalization of the 
relevant concepts) 
Multiple sources of evidence and 
informants.  
Key concepts explained in 
interviews and focus group 
discussions. Triangulation between 
data sources and informants  
Clear chain of evidence 
Detailed descriptions of data 
collection and data analysis 
procedures 
Reviews by case companies and 
key informants 
 
Table 4. Quality Procedures Taken in the Study 
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5. Findings 
 
The findings will be structured as follows (see Figure 14). I will first outline 
the capability-related processes within each of the three case firms in the 
form of narratives. I will discuss each case across three dimensions: 1) 
background and context, 2) content of strategy and organizational change, 
and 3) the subsequent capability development. Capability-related processes 
will be discussed both at the level of the capability base and at the level of a 
single capability. These narratives will put emphasis on the interplay 
between context and capability development across multiple interconnected 
levels of analysis (Pettigrew, 1997). Combined with temporal bracketing 
(Langley, 1999), they lend themselves to initial pattern recognition and 
subsequent empirical analysis.  
Second, I put forward a within-case analysis based on the narratives and 
focused context-mechanisms-outcome configurations. The focused CMO-
configurations display a variety of mechanisms, contexts and outcomes 
related to capability development and highlight various internal and 
external factors to enable an analysis on how the mechanisms were 
activated and the consequent outcomes produced within each particular 
case and time period (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Moreover, this 
representation illustrates the interplay between internal and external 
factors, central to the co-evolution logic. These focused CMO-configurations 
are summarized in Tables 5, 6 and 7. The subsequent within-case analysis 
then discusses the key contextual factors, capability development 
mechanisms, as well as the impact of the internal and external selection 
environments within each case firm. 
Third, the cross-case analysis that I put forward in the last part of the 
chapter identifies various mechanisms operative in organizations, 
comparable between cases. Moreover, it enables discussion on the 
necessary and contingent conditions that relate to the identified capability 
mechanisms and outcomes. These analyses then contribute towards 
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identifying higher-level mechanisms, or logics that provide more abstract 
accounts of MNC capability dynamics that I elaborate on last. 
This findings chapter will be followed by a discussion chapter where I will 
compare the empirical and theoretical findings from this study with extant 
literature on organizational capabilities and MNCs. 
 
 
Figure 14. The Structure of the Findings 
 
5.1 Nokia: From Internally Developed Capabilities to 
Acquisitions and Partnerships 
 
5.1.1 Background and Context36   
 
Nokia operates in the field of mobile communications with annual net sales 
of 38,659 M€ in 2011. Established in 1865 and having been a conglomerate 
involved in a various number of industries, including forestry, power plants, 
cables, and rubber products, Nokia decided to focus on mobile devices and 
networks in 1994. This decision was preceded by the rise of the 
telecommunications industry, as well as structural changes within the case 
company, such as the establishment of telecommunications and mobile 
phones as separate business units, which had significant influence on the 
development of the entire company and the underlying capabilities. Nokia 
became the global market leader in mobile telecommunications in 1998, 
                                                   
36 The retrospective analysis has largely benefited from the 3-volume (975 pages) 
Nokia history by Martti Häikiö (2001a, 2001b, 2001c) and two additional volumes 
by the same author (2002 and 2009), which is gratefully acknowledged.  
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maintaining this position for over a decade despite substantial changes in 
its operating environment. 
The rise of the telecommunications industry in the early 1990s was 
enabled by both institutional and technological development. First, the 
deregulation of operators, previously controlled by national telecom 
monopolies, opened up the competition in the field of telecommunications 
equipment. Second, analog technology was replaced by digital technology, 
enabling new services and subsequent market growth, and leading to the 
development of a consumer market. Third, the GSM standard (Global 
System for Mobile Communications) gained geographical coverage and was 
subject to intense technological development (Häikiö, 2001c). Nokia 
contributed to industry emergence both as a supplier of the infrastructure, 
i.e., the networks and systems, and as a manufacturer of mobile phone 
handsets to consumers. The advantages that Nokia had at this stage have 
been related, on the one hand, to the early development of the market in the 
Nordic countries, including early deregulation and openness of the 
market37, and on the other hand to the early entry of Nokia into the 
business38. Moreover, the small size of the home market prompted Nokia to 
internationalize rapidly in order to grow. 
Owing to Nokia's foresight and early entry into the business, it was able to 
build the required capabilities prior to its competitors. As an outcome, 
Nokia was at the forefront in network equipment and devices development 
when the market opened up, and was able to capitalize on its early lead and 
growing demand both in Europe and globally. Nokia had established a 
Nokia Cellular Systems division in 1987 with an objective to develop GSM 
infrastructure four years prior to the establishment of the first network. 
Resources, such as experienced personnel, had also been directed towards 
this division when the trade with the Soviet Union collapsed drastically in 
1991 and Nokia was forced to reorient its operations within the 
telecommunications business (Häikiö, 2001c). These early insights proved 
to be determinantal to Nokia’s development, as indicated by an industry 
expert:  
 
                                                   
37 The first cellular network (NMT) opened in the Nordic Countries in 1981, and the 
first GSM network was established in Finland in 1991 (Häikiö, 2001c: 78) 
38 Nokia began cooperation with Salora, a radiotelephone operations company, 
already in 1963 and they established Mobira Oy, a wireless communications 
company, as a joint venture in 1979. Nokia had already started to build telephone 
networks and exchanges in the 1970s. In 1984 Nokia and Tandy, a US-based 
distributor, established a joint venture to start manufacturing mobile phones in 
South Korea, and this cooperation enabled Nokia to already gain a foothold in the 
US market in the 1980s. In 1991, Nokia acquired Technophone, Europe's second-
largest mobile phone manufacturer that occupied a strong position in the US car 
phone market.. Through this acquisition, Nokia became the third largest mobile 
phone manufacturer in the US and the second largest in Europe (Häikiö, 2001c). 
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So it was four years before the first deal was made. It was really strategic, to be 
able to anticipate that the market will open up, that there will be deregulation, 
that it will digitalize, to be able to foresee the big trends, make the big decisions 
and reorganize the resources within the firm. 
 
At the same time, mobile phone devices were designated a separate 
division, enabling focusing on different kind of capabilities. Nokia had been 
involved in the consumer electronics industry, which provided Nokia with 
some experience related to the consumer business as opposed to its main 
competitors Ericsson and Motorola who had been involved in business-to-
business industry. Owing to the early management insight and the building 
up of the necessary capabilities, Nokia gained an advantage vis-à-vis its 
main competitors, as the external industry expert put it: 
 
The starting point for Nokia was richer and wider in order to understand the 
significance of design or brand. So in a way it had a richer legacy as a firm than its 
competitors in telecommunications because of its history. 
 
According to this industry expert there were primarily three strategic 
decisions that contributed to Nokia’s success in mobile phones. First, the 
establishment of Nokia Cellular Systems and Mobile phones as separate 
divisions; second, the listing at the New York Stock Exchange, which laid a 
foundation for a global corporate culture; and third, the insight to start 
driving a consumer paradigm within the industry, previously dominated by 
an engineering paradigm with products aimed at professional users. The 
former head of strategy at Nokia recalls a meeting at the beginning of the 
1990s: 
 
So at that time all the estimates said that mobile phone penetration could at 
maximum reach ten percent. Pekka [Ala-Pietilä] challenged this thinking. Being 
just nominated as the MD [Managing Director] of Mobile Phones he announced 
at an event in London that mobile phone penetration could be 25% and that it can 
be made into a consumer good if the design and the brand were in place. 
Everybody laughed at that time, thinking that the young fellow is speaking 
nonsense, but at Nokia we believed in it. […] Without that insight, investment 
and building up of the necessary capabilities, the market growth in the 90s would 
not have realized for Nokia, it would not have been able to respond to it. 
 
Nokia’s strategy was global from the beginning and it was able to capitalize 
on its position and early lead for nearly two decades. It established global 
supply-chain management and manufacturing systems to allow for 
incomparable operational efficiencies and a rapid time to market. 
Moreover, as the areas of rapid growth shifted to emerging markets such as 
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China, India and Latin American countries, Nokia’s early entry into these 
growth markets enabled it to develop a strong market position and the 
required capabilities. Furthermore, Nokia was able to drive unparalleled 
economies of scale to its benefit, and combine the manufacture of low-cost 
handsets with good profitability. In parallel, Nokia sought to build on the 
convergence of the mobile telephony and Internet services. However, as an 
outcome of radical changes in the external environment and competitive 
landscape, Nokia had to witness a loss of competitiveness in the smart 
phone segment and a drop in its market share and market value39. To re-
establish its competitiveness, Nokia started a strategic renewal of the 
company and established a strategic alliance with Microsoft in 2011 to 
upgrade its software capabilities. 
The beginning of the case time was set at 1991, when Nokia started 
building the capabilities required for the strategic shift into a focused 
telecom company. The focus will be limited to mobile telephone operations 
and the network operations of the case company are excluded from the 
study. Capability dynamics within the case firm will be discussed at an 
aggregate level and at the level of a single capability, design. Design attained 
a strategic position within the company in the early 90s when Nokia started 
to drive the development towards a consumer-focused direction and it has 
been assessed as one of the core capabilities, playing a key role in building 
its breakthrough products (Pulkkinen, 1997).  
 
5.1.2 Capability Development at Nokia (Analytical Chronology) 
 
During the case time, Nokia went through major transformations, first 
transforming itself from an industrial conglomerate into a consumer-driven 
mobile phone company in the early nineties, then into a global market 
leader with globally aligned operations in the late nineties, and more 
recently, it has sought to transform itself to an Internet company, as an 
evidence of intense co-evolution between Nokia and the industry. According 
to an industry expert, Nokia’s lead in the industry can be explained by its 
distinctive capabilities, required in the transformation of the industry in the 
early 1990s:  
 
The engineering world defines the Nokia success as a GSM success, but Nokia was 
not any better in GSM-technology, but good enough. The competitive advantage 
and differentiation came explicitly from the fact that it positioned this business as 
                                                   
39 Between 2008 and 2011, within a period of 3 years Nokia lost 15 percentage 
points of market share, which declined from 40% to 25% (Kauppalehti May 20th, 
2011) and its market value dropped by nearly 70% (Helsingin Sanomat, January 
31st, 2011) 
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a consumer business from the beginning and it started building the capabilities 
before the others. It was those capabilities that gave Nokia the lead it has 
maintained until these days. 
 
1991-1994: Transition into a focused telecom company 
Following the strategic insight to drive the industry towards a consumer 
goods industry at the beginning of 1990s, new capabilities such as design, 
marketing and brand management started to be built into the company 
along with the decision to focus on a single brand name, Nokia. Instead of 
acquiring new capabilities to address the new telecommunications industry, 
the strategy at Nokia at the beginning of 1990s was to proceed through 
organic growth and build the required capabilities internally40. Owing to the 
early management insight and the building up of necessary capabilities, 
Nokia gained an advantage vis-à-vis its main competitors, as acknowledged 
by a Nokia senior vice-president and head of corporate strategy: 
 
So the whole industry was in this kind of engineering phase until the beginning of 
the 90s, because of the technology restrictions, market size and the business 
models that were in place. So then, based on a good vision, strategic realignment 
and excellent implementation Nokia was able to make the transition [to a 
consumer focused firm].  
 
Prior to 1992 mobile phones were expensive, technical objects accessible 
mainly to professional users. The emergence and development of mobile 
phones as a mass-market product was enabled by expanding network 
coverage as well as by increasing scale and the subsequent drastic drop in 
cost. Nokia was a forerunner in product design, usability and innovations, 
and contributed heavily to the product evolution in terms of size, 
transportability and design, and by putting forward an enlarged product 
portfolio starting from mid 90s41. In order to allow for a rapid time to 
market, Nokia put in place a cross-functional product development process, 
concurrent engineering, which signified a programmed way of operating in 
order to make various corporate functions and disciplines, such an 
engineering, design, sourcing and logistics to work in parallel. This signified 
a shift in the way of functioning as the following quote from a senior vice-
president substantiates: 
 
                                                   
40 With the exception of the acquisition of Technophone, Europe's second-largest 
mobile phone manufacturer in 1991 (Häikiö, 2001c: 21). 
41 The turning point can be placed to 1992 when more consumer-driven products 
started entering the market, such as the Nokia 101-model. 
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The whole engineering- and product development culture came to a turning 
point. […] In practice it [concurrent engineering] is manifested in a certain 
programmed way of operating, with its own program manager, responsible for it, 
like an MD for his program. [...] Maybe the core is a very strong milestone-based 
way of functioning, where a certain degree of preparedness must be met in order 
to reach the milestone. If you don't reach it, the whole justification to the 
program's existence is terminated and the resources are reallocated, unless you 
are able to present corrective measures.  
 
Although design had existed within the company from the 1970s, it had not 
developed into an organizational level capability and was, to a large extent, 
dependent on certain key individuals (Valtonen, 2007) and tacit knowledge. 
Linking design to core organizational processes, such as concurrent 
engineering signified that new milestone requirements were set for design, 
which acted as a catalyst for the formulation of a systematic design process. 
In 1995 Nokia hired a design director and started building up a design 
organization. As opposed to technology-related capabilities that originated 
to a large extent from Finland, the design function was initially US-based. 
The design function was later brought to the headquarters, which enabled 
to position design more visibly at Nokia, while at the same time maintaining 
various design units in different geographical locations. The following quote 
from a Nokia senior vice-president in strategy indicates how capability 
development was driven by the corporate vision: 
 
This strategic decision [to drive the consumer paradigm into the industry], and 
the insight that industrial design is an important competence in that vision, if we 
implement it like brand management capability or consumer understanding 
capability, was an important enabler, maybe the most important. 
 
The consumer focus had implications on other capabilities of the firm as 
well, and led to high investments in R&D, with an emphasis on user 
understanding and user interface, which became part of Nokia’s core 
capabilities. To support the consumer focused positioning, Nokia created a 
global market segmentation model to address the relevant consumer 
segments and cover all significant business areas within the high-growth 
market. The consumer segmentation model was to become one of the key 
success factors, as expressed in the following quote from the Nokia head of 
strategy: 
 
The segmentation models today form, to a large extent, the basis of our 
consumer-based operations, including the categorization models, which are 
formed on the basis of them. So if the segmentation is from outside in, then the 
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categorization is always from inside out, based on how the firm uses that 
information, what kind of models and capabilities it builds. 
 
At the same time, the technology platforms put in place enabled Nokia to 
maintain a large product portfolio, and allowed for a rapid time to market to 
support growth, assessed as critical in order to meet the consumers’ 
demand for new products. Nokia’s cross-functional product programs, 
supported by these technological platforms, dramatically improved its 
competitiveness, speed, and cost efficiency and enabled a product renewal 
rate that was out of competitors’ reach. The external industry expert recalls: 
 
So Nokia was the first to understand the significance of platform thinking. Even 
in the ICT-world it was quite rare to talk about platforms but Nokia grasped it. 
[...] When Nokia realized that speed, the creation of new products and time to 
market were important criteria, it started using a renewal measure. […] Such a 
product renewal path was impossible without creating a basic technology 
platform, the so-called engine, with a changing next level that was differentiated. 
So for example if the life cycle of the engine was three years, than several tens of 
products were built on that, that's how the renewal path was created. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned capabilities, standardization formed a 
key focus area within R&D. Nokia’s objective was to influence the 
standardization in the industry and it took a lead role in the many 
developments (e.g. GSM2.5, voice codecs) (Häikiö, 2001c). This formed part 
of Nokia’s competitive advantage as the establishment and selection of 
international and global standards proved to be an important force 
promoting globalization and shaping the industry. Nokia continued to 
refrain from acquisitions in the early 1990s, but was establishing a number 
of alliances and partnerships especially in the fields of standardization and 
product development, with an objective to influence and access the 
emerging technologies (Häikiö, 2001c). 
 
1995-1997: Crisis to meet the requirements of global scale 
Another strategic change process that had a strong impact on capability 
development originated from the severe crisis that Nokia faced in 1995-
1996 and was related to the management of volatile growth, and the 
balancing between growth and profitability. Nokia’s manual supply-chain 
and production systems were unable to adapt to the rising and 
unpredictable demand. The firm’s operating margin fell and its stock 
market value declined by 30%. The crisis led to a re-evaluation and 
reorganization of many critical functions, and to an establishment of a new 
global supply-chain management concept with an optimized demand-
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supply chain cross its supplier network, enabling Nokia to address growth 
opportunities better than its competitors, as an industry expert 
retrospectively asserts:  
 
And in '97 and '98 the growth only accelerated and [without the new system] 
Nokia would never have been able to respond to the absurd global demand.  
 
This crisis and the subsequent operating principles enabled Nokia to re-
establish its competitiveness and reach global leadership in mobile phones 
in 1998. The same year, Nokia, taking advantage of its expertise in the 
digital technology, was able to make a breakthrough in the US market and 
within one year its market share surged by 15 percentage points to a record 
high of 36% of this market. The aforementioned solution of the ‘logistics 
crisis’ laid the foundation for many of the strategic capabilities and 
practices, such as logistics and supply-chain management that Nokia is still 
able to exploit today, as the industry expert contends:  
 
Still today, nobody beats Nokia in logistics. 
 
Contrary to the general trend of increasing outsourcing, Nokia chose to 
maintain some 80% of mobile phone manufacturing in-house to ensure 
both production efficiency and quality (Häikiö, 2001c). Nokia’s superior 
product development processes combined with cutting edge operational 
systems, enabled it to lead the market evolution with an enlarging product 
portfolio. This ‘time-paced’ product strategy enabled the firm to maintain a 
product renewal rate that the competitors had difficulties in catching upon. 
The following quote from Nokia’s former head of strategy indicates how the 
company’s vision and strategy led the way in the mobile phones market: 
 
Nokia adopted a strategic concept, it was launched in a strategy meeting in '96 or 
'97. We started talking about time-paced competition […] it was about setting the 
market pace so that new products were launched at a certain pace that the others 
were obliged to adapt to. Nokia determined the pace and the others never really 
caught up. So that was also a certain type of strategic insight. 
 
1998-2000: Entering the Internet era as a global leader of mobile phones: 
strategy and capability development at crossroads 
The emergence of the Internet towards the end of 1990s brought about 
radical changes in the operating environment of Nokia. The top 
management acknowledged the upcoming shift from a voice-based cellular 
paradigm to digital content and Internet-based paradigm. In 1998, CEO 
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Jorma Ollila declared the company to be at the crossroads in terms of its 
strategic development: The strategic choice involved either remaining 
predominantly a wireless player focusing on wireless solutions and third 
generation technologies, or expanding into new markets related to the 
Internet protocol (IP)- technology (Häikiö 2001c: 189). At that time the first 
option seemed to provide the company with substantial short-term growth 
prospects, while the second was estimated to offer a better outlook in terms 
of long-term growth. However, the second option, requiring acquisitions 
and a strong presence in the United States in order to penetrate the IP-area, 
was associated with greater risks.  
To embrace the upcoming paradigm shift Nokia set up a new convergence 
‘Life goes mobile’-strategy based on digital technology and the Internet. In 
1998, the company established the Nokia Ventures Fund with an objective 
to search for growth opportunities outside the existing businesses, followed 
by Nokia Ventures Organization (NVO) in 1999. At the same time Mobile 
Phones (NMP) undertook its own initiatives to look for new business 
development and established the Digital Convergence Unit. The new 
ventures organization, located in California, consisted of Nokia Internet 
Communications, Nokia Home Communications, including multimedia 
terminals, and New Growth Businesses. With the new organization Nokia 
aimed at creating a ‘third business’ beyond networks and cell phones, while, 
at the same time keeping the core business viable (Doz and Kosonen, 
2008:152). However, this unit failed to meet the expectations at that time. 
As stated by its former director (in Doz and Kosonen, 2008: 153): 
 
The success of NVO was not fully appreciated at the time, for at least two reasons. 
First, even mature people in mature organizations suffer form NIH [not invented 
here]. […] Second, almost necessarily, the very function of ventures emphasizing 
long-term business development means that we were pushing against 
conventional wisdom. So naturally, you have few allies in the organization, and 
your success may become visible only way down the road.  
 
Consequently, NVO did not gain a strong foothold in the company, and the 
Digital Convergence Unit, with the support of the core business 
organization, undertook most of future development.  
At this stage, the strategy to focus on organic growth was fundamentally 
revised as the top management realized that it had to proceed with 
acquisitions in order to develop the corporate structure and to obtain the 
capabilities required in the new Internet era42. The acquisitions were related 
to the IP protocol as well as to content providers, games, or entertainment, 
                                                   
42 A memo from CEO Jorma Ollila to the Board in Sept., 1997, Source: Häikiö 
(2001c: 167). 
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where Nokia lacked the required capabilities.  Moreover, the company 
entered into several partnerships and alliances, including co-opetitive 
partnerships, the most important of which was Symbian, a joint venture 
formed by Nokia, Ericsson and Motorola with the British firm Psion PLC to 
develop a new operating system and platform to be used in the new 
generation phones. The objective of a joint software platform was to impede 
Microsoft from taking the lead in software development and to prevent 
value capture shifting from mobile phone manufacturers to software 
companies. 
During the same time period, Nokia gained a strong position in the Asian 
market, which became attractive with the high growth of emerging markets 
such as China and India. The company was able to capitalize on its presence 
and brand, partly because of its early entry into these markets, as explained 
by a director in strategy: 
 
I think that one key decision that we made was ‘let’s enter China’. It was several 
years back. And being the first mover in that kind of a situation gives you huge 
advantages. Or ‘let’s invest in India’. Now 70 percent market share there. When 
you are the first mover then in people’s minds the mobile phones are Nokia. […] 
It is these kinds of things that have enabled us to have this position. To have the 
understanding that there is huge growth in these markets, and to invest there. 
 
Moreover, Nokia’s efficient operational systems enabled it to combine scale 
with complexity and to build low-cost phones at a higher margin than its 
competitors, and consequently to convert the high demand in emerging 
markets into a profitable business. 
 
2001-2005: Redefining the business to meet the diversified demand  
In 2001 the telecom companies witnessed a decline in the industry because 
of economic slowdown that was reinforced by the events of September 11th, 
2001. At the same time, the growth in emerging markets and increased 
mobile phone penetration led to a more diversified demand. Following 
changes in its operating environment and to support market expansion, the 
next strategic change was initiated in 2002 when Nokia sought to identify 
the future focus areas. The firm estimated that the move to 3G technologies 
was insufficient to ensure future growth (e.g. Doz and Kosonen, 2008:158), 
and put in place a ‘variation-categorization’ business model to address the 
full market potential and to identify upcoming key areas. Nokia defined 
several value domains requiring different type of capabilities, including 
basic phones, entry phones, business phones, imaging phones, 
entertainment and media, CDMA, TDMA, wireless appliances and wireless 
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services. This renewal was initiated by a ‘creative destruction’ process at 
Nokia, as the following quote by Nokia’s senior vice-president and head of 
strategy reveals: 
 
We realized when we made our own creative destruction exercise that we need 
variation. In practice we created 7-8 business units, including business phones, 
imaging phones, different kinds of enhancements, ramping down the CDMA, the 
entry phones. 
 
The variation-categorization matrix included a functionality dimension 
with different application areas, including voice, entertainment, imaging, 
media and business applications, while the other, style dimension, included 
different styles such as premium, fashion, classic, active, expression, and 
basic. Value domains included various life-style concepts, requiring 
focusing on the user experience, and in a more holistic thinking in branding 
and design, labeled as total experience design. The design organization had 
already taken a key role in building the Nokia brand and this new strategy 
gave design an even more important role in the corporate development as a 
Nokia senior vice-president explained: 
 
And then bringing to the market design-driven, design-intensive business 
concepts, which gave design for the first time a business development role. […] A 
business unit built extensively on design-based differentiation included the Life 
Style products category, Nokia's 5000-, 7000-, and 8000-series products.  
 
At this stage the focus of design turned increasingly from operational tasks 
to strategic ones, involving design roadmaps, segmentation models, as well 
as design for future concepts (Valtonen, 2007: 236). Concurrently, design 
was linked with corporate development processes, the variation-
categorization business model and portfolio management. With its enlarged 
product portfolio, with several products built on the same technological 
platforms, design became the primary source of differentiation. As stated by 
the head of strategy: 
 
A clear positioning of design as an enabler of competitive advantage and 
differentiation. In practice this was linked to the process of market expansion, a 
more efficient segmentation and taking advantage of design as a lever to 
differentiate between the different segments. 
 
The development of design capability was also related to Nokia’s market 
expansion and the growing impact of the emerging markets on Nokia’s 
strategy and performance. Consequently, central to design in the 2000s was 
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building up the design presence in different geographical locations and the 
enlargement of the product portfolio. At the maximum there were nine 
design studios globally, some of which were for temporary purposes.  
Along with the new ‘variation-categorization’ business model, Nokia set 
up a multidimensional organizational structure in 2004 based on the 
former value domains, including basic phones, multimedia and enterprise 
solutions divisions. The objective was to cover all the relevant global 
consumer tastes, geographies, and price points, which led to a proliferation 
of the product offering. Nokia’s product portfolio grew to comprise 40-50 
new products per year with some 400 new product variants. Although the 
company generally succeeded in addressing user needs and preferences 
with its large product portfolio, it failed to estimate the upcoming success of 
clamshell phones in 2004, followed by Motorola’s victory with its thin 
phone, Razr, in 2005. Although clamshell phones were becoming 
mainstream, product design choices related to a circuit design for a key 
handset subsystem, hampered Nokia’s ability to respond to this trend (Doz 
and Kosonen, 2008: 20). This led to imitative behavior from Nokia while 
previously it had been leading the innovations within the field.  
 
2006-2008: Facing a paradigm shift and repositioning the company as an 
Internet company  
Nokia pursued a strategy to maintain a large product portfolio to cover all 
the relevant global consumer tastes, geographies, and price points. In 2006, 
the company performed a consumer study comprising a total of 60 000 
interviews and developed a consumer segmentation model based on a 
database with 10 billion data points. The head of industry intelligence 
explains: 
 
Nokia has always considered it a fantastic potential to be able to tap the market of 
those billions of people that don’t have telecommunications. That has been part 
of the strategy for a long time already, understanding what it takes to sell 
hundreds of millions of handsets to people in India whose average income per 
year is very limited. 
 
At the same time, Nokia benefited from scale advantages because of a 
strong global presence, and because of superior operating systems that 
enabled it to maintain the complexity of the offering without compromising 
scale benefits. Being vertically integrated, the firm was able to draw on 
economies of scale in sourcing, production, brand and distribution better 
than its competitors. In addition, compared to its competitors, it was able 
put into market low-cost handsets with a good profit margin and 
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consequently to combine high growth with good profitability rates. The 
head of industry intelligence continues: 
 
I would say that Nokia is able to squeeze profits out of relatively low price points 
with roughly a 15 percent operating margin at 100 or even sub 100 ASPs [average 
selling price]. It is the sum of many things. There is certainly a good supply chain, 
and I mean supply chain in the broad sense, I mean in the sense of production, 
efficiency in sourcing of components, distribution, and customer interfaces. 
 
The aforementioned strategy and the variation-categorization business 
model generated substantial growth and gave the company great 
momentum between 2002-2008. As an outcome, Nokia reached a record 
high 40% market share in 2008, with an operating margin close to 16%, a 
figure well above the industry average. The brand was rated amongst the 10 
most valuable brands in the world, and it registered 1,1 billion phone users 
globally. Moreover, due to its global dominance, Nokia had managed to 
deter horizontalization within the industry that it feared to pave the way for 
new entrants and affect product margins. When the financial crisis hit the 
markets in September 2008, Nokia thought that it was better equipped than 
the other incumbents, because of its superior consumer understanding and 
ability to manufacture low-cost handsets profitably.  
At the same time, as there were significant changes approaching the 
industry, Nokia sought to maintain the lead in the telecommunications 
development. The management acknowledged that the increasing 
convergence of mobile phones, the Internet and services would cause value 
creation to move from handsets to software and services. Moreover, Nokia 
estimated that the increasing convergence could potentially lead to either 
operators or software companies together with component manufacturers 
taking the lead in mobile telecommunication, leading to a further 
commoditization of the mobile phone handsets, as stated by the head of 
industry intelligence in 2006: 
 
Well, the hypothetical worst case would be that the phone would be 
commoditized so that the Internet experience would come to the phone and the 
device would be reduced as a platform that carries the user interface of the 
Internet players. I think that is a challenge.  
 
Consequently, Nokia pursued development in both software and services, 
and positioned itself as an Internet company, effective from 1.1.2008. The 
company renewed its business strategy with an objective to transform itself 
to an Internet company without compromising its position in the handset 
market, as expressed by a strategy director:  
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The question mark in the long term is how do we differentiate business strategy-
wise, in terms of the business focus that we have. We have been embracing the 
Internet paradigm change, for example, with these kinds of multi-media 
computers that nobody else really has and how far we can stretch that? Will 
Nokia be powerful enough to be a Google of the Web 3.0?  
 
This strategic change process was accompanied by several significant 
changes including the restructuring the company into 4 divisions: mobile 
phones, services, markets and corporate development office (CDO)43, and 
establishment of the Nokia-Siemens Networks joint venture. The strategic 
capabilities became hosted in the CDO office with an objective to “optimize 
Nokia’s strategic capabilities and growth potential”44. To meet the business 
objectives and to develop the required capabilities, Nokia started managing 
its capabilities more systematically and set up specific ‘capability strategies’ 
as part of the corporate strategy, owned by various forums, as explained by 
Nokia strategists in the focus group discussion:  
 
So the way we try to drive the capability strategies is that we look at the business 
strategies […].  So the business strategies only address the business opportunity. 
For example, there are people in India with no phones, and then we develop the 
business case saying how many people, what kind of phones, how could we 
address that? […] Then we translate them into capability strategies. 
 
Moreover, in line with the strategic repositioning of the company, Nokia 
acknowledged a gap in its capabilities and proceeded with a number of 
acquisitions to support the new strategy. The acquisitions were related to 
navigation, music, marketing and social networks, and included Navteq in 
order to attain capabilities in navigation systems to be built into mobile 
phones45. The repositioning brought about significant changes to both 
Nokia’s offering, such as the Ovi services platform. This implied radical 
changes in the capability development processes, as stated by a strategist in 
the focus group: 
 
We have made some big acquisitions [...] and that has not been the traditional 
way to develop capabilities at Nokia. But we have seen that we are lacking 
capabilities and it would take too much time and we couldn’t develop them 
internally so quickly. So in that sense, the capability development has also 
changed. 
 
                                                   
43 Announced on June 20th, 2007, Nokia Press Release 
44 Source: Nokia Press Release, June 20th, 2007 
45 Announced on October 1st, 2007, Nokia Press Release 
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Regardless of a number of acquisitions, the delay and slow pace in the 
development of new software capabilities and services did not come without 
cost and Nokia had to witness the strengthening of its new competitors 
from the US that had arrived with new services and content. These 
competitors included e.g. Research in Motion (RIM) in enterprise market 
with its advanced e-mail services, and the Apple iPhone, launched in 2007. 
The Apple iPhone, which provided a superior user experience, touch screen, 
and a large number of applications marked a move to a new generation of 
smart phones and the beginning of a severe crisis for Nokia, the magnitude 
of which did not come apparent until two years later. At the same time, 
Google established Android, an open handset alliance around an open-code, 
Linux-based operating system. A Nokia strategy expert commented in 2008 
during the focus group discussion: 
 
We try to cover all the price points from very low-end to very, very high-end, it’s 
very true. But it’s like more in these services and solutions angle where we have 
had significant gaps and where others have been able to come in. […] So I don’t 
think we need to be afraid of somebody who takes over Russia, for example. It’s 
more like somebody looks at the whole pool and sees that there’s a lot of 
unaddressed potential, and then they focus on that and grab that market. So RIM 
and Apple are these types of competitors. 
 
Despite its global leadership position, Nokia lost both presence and market 
share in the US market. The operator-driven US market with different 
standards (CDMA) would have required a high level of product localization 
that differed from Nokia’s global strategy. However, the US market had 
become a lead market in software and service development, as the following 
quotes from Nokia head of insight and innovation and strategy director 
substantiate: 
 
The US is obviously the hotbed for Internet innovation. It is very hard to be 
competitive unless you have the right kind of competence and ability to be 
competitive in that business in that marketplace. 
 
The USA is the key country in changing the rules of the industry.  
 
Despite the fact that the role of the US as a lead market in software 
development was acknowledged within the firm as the above quotes 
indicate, its implications on business strategy remained underdeveloped. 
Consequently, the weak presence seems to have hampered Nokia’s ability to 
foresee the magnitude and global reach of the upcoming changes in the 
industry and subsequent capability development.  
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2009-2010: Capability development through partnerships  
Although top management had estimated Nokia to be better equipped for 
the 2008-2009 downturn than its competitors because of its ability to 
manufacture low cost phones with a good margin, Nokia had to witness a 
decline of its market share as a result of the triumph of its new competitors 
in the smart phone segment. While still maintaining the global leadership in 
the global cell phone market and managing to keep a strong position in 
Asia, its market share started to drastically decline both globally and 
especially in the US. 
The drop in Nokia’s turnover and operating margin, coupled with 
fundamental changes in the business models and user habits forced the firm 
to accelerate development at many fronts. To re-establish its 
competitiveness, a ‘Solutions’ division was established to enhance the 
customer focus in the product development and reinforce the convergence 
of mobility and services. Moreover, it set up specific boards responsible the 
user experience that involved expertise from various functions, including 
design. The company contended that usability and content, e.g., services, 
were playing an increasing role to be able to provide a differentiated user 
experience, requiring more partnerships and ability to draw on external 
innovation, as a strategy director substantiated: 
 
And now we’re getting into the next stage, it’s not even about the device anymore; 
it’s about the device experience.  And it’s not about this whole hardware part, it’s 
about how you do your services […] then it becomes a question of how well you 
manage the partnerships and how you pull all this together and how you manage 
this innovation pipeline of things. 
 
The move to the new generation smart phones also put more emphasis on 
the operating systems and the compatibility with computers, the Internet 
and the most common applications. The operating system had become the 
key competitive parameter in the market and Nokia wanted to keep it an 
internal capability, maintaining several technological platforms, to address 
the largest possible target group. The CEO stated in an interview in 2009:  
 
Our strategy is to support several platforms, to satisfy the needs of different 
consumers. At the same time we operate increasingly with our partners to add 
value to the end-users.46 
 
Nokia acquired full ownership of Symbian and opened it up for open source 
development and, set up an alliance with Intel on a new MeeGo  operating 
                                                   
46 Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, Helsingin Sanomat, Sept.4th, 2009 
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system based on Linux open code, and opted for the Windows OS for its 
computers. The objective was to apply the MeeGo47 operating system in its 
high-end products while using Symbian for its medium and low-end 
product range.  
At the same time, the competitive situation in the market had dramatically 
changed and had also come to involve a variety of different business 
models, as an outcome of which the incumbents increasingly outsourced 
key capabilities. Nokia sought to maintain all the key areas of the value 
chain internal, although it did opt for outsourcing and cooperation with the 
US Qualcomm on chipsets, formerly a key capability at Nokia. Along with 
the redefinition of the industry value system and blurring industry 
boundaries, the competitive dynamics changed rapidly, forcing the actors to 
look for new collaborative and co-opetitive arrangements. A strategy 
director described the changing landscape and blurring industry boundaries 
during the focus group discussion: 
 
So the complication is that it’s not as clear-cut as it used to be, like okay, we 
compete with LG and Samsung and Motorola. Now with Microsoft, well, we 
cannot compete because they have a mobile OS but we would like to use their e-
mail solutions for our phones, and Microsoft might be happy if we made some 
phones with their OS and so on, so everybody has common enemies. And 
probably Microsoft and Nokia are both worried about Google’s foray into the 
business, and then we sort of compete with Apple but it’s a good thing that they 
are pushing the operators to start doing more revenue share with their devices, 
which is good for us […] Google and they’ll disrupt the market and we can benefit 
from it. So the difficulty is actually defining the areas we want to compete in and 
the areas we want to collaborate in. 
 
In order to gain access to new capabilities and to support new developments 
in services, Nokia started entering increasingly into several partnerships 
with third party companies, operators, developers and content providers48. 
The focus group discussants explained: 
 
Nowadays the ability to manage this ecosystem and play with different 
stakeholders and bring in external innovation and that kind of things has been 
much more important […] And related to that, a very important asset going 
forward is that you grow a system around the software, so that all the developers 
who build software benefit you as well. […]  If you look at the industry probably 
those who have been able to partner the most are the most successful.  
                                                   
47 This platform combined Nokia’s Maemo and Intel’s Moblin, announced in 
February 2010 (source Helsingin Sanomat, Feb. 16th, 2010). 
48 Such as cooperation with Facebook announced on Sept 2nd, 2009, Source: 
Helsingin Sanomat, September 2nd, 2009 
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The competition had increasingly moved to one between ecosystems, and 
the objective of Nokia was to grow an ecosystem around Symbian, 
comparable to that around Apple iPhone OS and Google Android. To attract 
the developer community, the company had acquired Trolltech in 2008 to 
support the development of Qt-technology that would facilitate extending 
various applications to different platforms. However, Symbian did not 
manage to attract support from other mobile phone manufacturers that 
seemed to fear Nokia’s dominance. The initiatives of the developer 
community amounted to hundreds of thousands, but were mainly built to 
be compatible with the iPhone OS and the Android operating systems49. 
Apple kept the iPhone OS proprietary, but Google Android was gaining 
popularity amongst many mobile handset manufacturers as it enabled them 
to rapidly upgrade their operating systems, and gain access to a large 
number of services and applications. As an outcome, the Android OS 
quickly attained a large installed base of users, critical in the software 
business. Without a viable ecosystem, Nokia had difficulties in establishing 
itself as an Internet service provider or even to maintain its position. In 
September 2010, the CEO Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo was replaced by Stephen 
Elop, a former Microsoft vice-president. 
 
2011-Strategic alliance with Microsoft 
Initiated by the launch of the Apple iPhone, which provided a superior user 
experience, touch screen, and a large number of applications, and fueled by 
the launch of Google Android OS, the mobile phone industry had gone 
through a major transformation and paradigm shift during a period of 2-3 
years. The incumbent companies’ internal capabilities were insufficient to 
maintain competitiveness in the smart phone segment and consequently 
these companies had to increasingly rely on the capabilities that resided 
within the so-called eco-system, such as those of the developer community. 
Several mobile phone manufacturers adopted the Android OS that enabled 
them to rapidly upgrade their software capabilities. 
Despite several initiatives undertaken by Nokia to prepare itself for the 
paradigm shift, such as acquiring full ownership of Symbian and opening it 
up for open source development, the development of the MeeGo operating 
system with Intel, new partnerships and the acquisition of Navteq, the 
results at the beginning of 2011 proved that the above measures had been 
                                                   
49 At this stage Apple Store had in total 350 000 applications, Android Market 150 
000 applications, the Ovi store 35 000 applications and Microsoft Windows 
Marketplace 11 000 applications. Source: company information, Helsingin 
Sanomat, March 23rd, 2011 
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insufficient to equip the company for the future development of the 
industry. Nokia’s market share50 had dropped to the lowest since 1997. 
Despite Apple’s relatively low market share in volume51 it became the 
largest mobile phone manufacturer in turnover and market value52. Android 
surpassed Nokia’s operating system, Symbian53. At this stage, the Apple OS 
and the Android OS were assessed as superior both in terms of user 
experience and in providing access to a larger number of services and 
applications. In contrast, the initiatives taken by Nokia were too slow to re-
establish competitiveness in the transformed environment and it continued 
to lose market share, especially in the smart phone segment. The top 
management had to acknowledge that Symbian was not sufficiently 
advanced to support future developments, while the development of MeeGo 
was too slow. The options to replace Symbian included either adopting the 
Android operating system, or Microsoft Windows, or continuing to develop 
the Symbian and MeeGo operating systems. However, top management 
estimated the time span to extend MeeGo to its entire product portfolio to 
take several years. On the other hand, adopting the Android operating 
system would have put Nokia on the same line or behind the other 
incumbents. To respond to this development, Nokia announced a strategic 
alliance with Microsoft in February 2011, and decided to apply the Windows 
operating system to its future product development in place of both 
Symbian and MeeGo operating systems. Symbian was outsourced to 
Accenture and MeeGo was continued until the ongoing product 
development of its N9 model was concluded.  
Although the problems relating to Symbian had become apparent in 2009, 
it was not until the financial results in 2010-11 and the subsequent change 
of CEO that prompted the company to change the operating system. The 
new CEO compared the situation to a burning platform: A man had to 
choose whether stay on board, and get burned, or jump to the ice-cold 
Atlantic. He chose the latter, which enabled him to tell his story54. Jorma 
Ollila, the Chairman of the Board, on the other hand, compared the 
situation to an ice-hockey game. Nokia had won the first round, did not do 
so well in the second, but was now heading for the third round, with an 
objective of making it to the play-offs55.  
                                                   
50 25.1% in 1-3, 2011. Source Kauppalehti May 20th, 2011 
51 3.9% in 1-3, 2011. Source Kauppalehti May 20th, 2011 
52 8.2 billion Euros as opposed to 6,5 million Euros for Nokia phones, Source: 
Strategy Analytics, Kauppalehti, April 26th, 2011 
53 With market shares of 36% and 27% respectively during the period 1-3/2011, 
Source: Gartner, Helsingin Sanomat, May 19th, 2011 and Kauppalehti May 20th, 
2011 
54 An internal Nokia memo, Helsingin Sanomat, Feb 9th, 2011 
55 Interview with Jorma Ollila, Chairman of the Board and former CEO Helsingin 
Sanomat, March 23rd 2011 
   
 115 
As the performance measures indicate, Nokia had not managed to stay on 
par with the changes in the external environment. According to the 
Chairman of the Board the performance in 2006-07, comparable to that in 
1998-2000, had brought about a ‘level of comfort’ in the company and false 
conviction in the competitiveness of Symbian56 despite the fact that it was 
acknowledged within the company that the value creation within mobile 
phones would increasingly shift to software and services. Jorma Ollila, the 
Chairman of the Board commented in 2011 in the general meeting with 
Nokia shareholders: 
 
We did not see the development that sprang off the US West Coast in software 
technology, services, mindset and strategy. 57 
 
It can be concluded that Nokia failed to respond to changes in the external 
environment or to transform itself into an Internet service provider without 
the required capabilities, especially a viable operating system, and without 
ecosystem-related co-specialized assets. Consequently, the company had to 
reach outside its own boundaries for complementary assets, and to opt for a 
strategic alliance with an objective to build an ecosystem around the new 
Nokia-Windows alliance comparable to that around Apple OS or that of 
Google Android. At the same time, Nokia sought to retain its core 
capabilities and transfer them to the smart phone segment while 
continuously looking for new sources of value creation and differentiation, 
such as augmented reality services. Simultaneously, the patent portfolio 
enabled it to generate substantial revenues from the new industry entrants 
turning IPR management into a key capability. As to the development of 
design, it continued to play a key role in the company and was granted a 
more prominent role in the new organizational structure58 as a horizontal 
capability that cuts across multiple functions. 
 
5.1.3 Summary of the Focused CMO-Configurations and Within-Case 
Analysis (Diagnostic Case) 
 
The following table (Table 5) summarizes the case periods and CMO-
configurations by highlighting key factors in the internal and external 
contexts and capability development.  
 
 
                                                   
56 Interview with Jorma Ollila, Chairman of the Board and former CEO, Helsingin 
Sanomat, March 23rd, 2011 
57 A meeting with shareholders, Kauppalehti, May 4th, 2011 
58 Announced in February 2011 
   
 116
 1991-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011 (Feb.) 
Ex
te
rn
al
 c
on
te
xt
  (
C
) 
(e
xt
er
na
l) 
Ongoing 
deregulation and 
digitalization. 
Expanding 
GSM coverage 
and technological 
development.  
Rise of the 
consumer-market: 
consumer models 
and new 
services. Consum
er models 
increase the need 
for design. 
High-volatility 
market growth. 
Requirement to 
manage global 
scale.  
 
Expanding 
scale and scope 
increase the 
need for design. 
High market 
growth because 
of growth in 
emerging 
markets. 
Multimedia 
technology and 
emergence of the 
Internet.  
Growing role of 
software firms. 
Digitalization of 
the US market.  
Emergence of 
the 3G 
technology. 
Convergence of 
the Internet and 
mobility.  
Growth of 
emerging 
markets and 
diversification of 
demand. 
Success of 
clamshell and 
thin phones 
(Motorola Razr) 
Polarization of demand: 
smart phones and 
Internet-based services 
and applications in 
developed markets. 
Ultra-low cost phones in 
developing markets.  
New industry entrants: 
Apple iPhone, Google 
with Android OS, RIM.  
Financial crisis in 2008. 
Growth of the smart phone 
segment with touch-screen 
technology and Internet-
based services and 
applications. Key role of 
the operating system and 
developer community. 
High growth of Apple 
iPhone and the Android 
OS, adopted by many 
incumbents. Build-up of 
ecosystems around 
IPhone and Android. The 
success of Apple IPhone 
puts emphasis on design 
and usability. 
In
te
rn
al
 c
on
te
xt
 (C
) 
(in
te
rn
al
) 
Focusing on tele-
communications 
and divesting 
other businesses. 
Transition into a 
consumer-focused 
firm in mobile 
phones: need for 
an enlarged 
product portfolio 
and design. 
Adopting a single 
brand name.  
Listing at the 
NY Stock 
Exchange. 
Taking a lead role 
in standardization.  
Nokia’s supply-
chain and 
production 
unable to adapt 
to volatile 
demand: 
‘logistics crisis’.  
Sharp decrease 
in Nokia’s 
operating 
margin and 
market value. 
Need to 
balance growth 
and profitability.  
Global leadership 
in mobile phones 
in 1998, market 
expansion. 
Convergence of 
mobile phones 
and portable 
devices. 
Identifying 
opportunities 
related to the 
Internet. Digital 
Convergence 
Unit (DGU), 
Nokia Ventures 
Organization 
(NVO). Life goes 
mobile- strategy. 
Identification of 
9 value 
domains and 
restructuring the 
company. 
Building up a 
variation-
categorization 
based business 
model.  
Growing role of 
emerging 
markets.  
Lag in the 
development of 
clamshell and 
ultrathin 
phones. 
Strategy to maintain a 
large product portfolio. 
Restructuring the 
company to mobile 
phones, services, 
markets and Corporate 
Development office 
(CDO). Repositioning 
the firm as an Internet 
company (1/2008) to 
prevent 
horizontalization and 
commoditization of 
handsets.  
Record-high market 
share and market value 
at mid-2008. Financial 
crisis puts focus on low-
cost phones. 
New Solutions Division 
and solutions-based 
strategy. Efforts to renew 
the Symbian OS by 
opening it for open source 
development. 
Development of the 
MeeGo OS (with Intel).  
Drastic drop in turnover, 
operating margin and 
market share in the smart 
phone segment.  
Change of CEO in 
10/2010. Strategic alliance 
with Microsoft on the 
Windows operating system 
announced in Feb.2011 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
(M
) 
Building up 
internally the 
capability base for 
a consumer-
focused 
positioning.  
Building up and 
consolidating 
GSM capabilities. 
Establishing key 
organizational 
processes (e.g. 
concurrent 
engineering) 
Establishing 
partnerships to 
access emerging 
technologies. 
Establishing 
new processes 
to adapt to 
market growth 
and global 
scale.  
Renewal of 
capabilities 
related to 
logistics and 
other support 
functions. 
Extending 
capabilities for 
global scale. 
Replicating 
capabilities in 
new geographic 
markets. Building 
up internal 
capabilities for 
the digital 
convergence. 
Acquiring new 
capabilities 
related to the 
Internet Protocol 
(IP). Symbian OS 
as a joint venture.  
NVO: search for 
new growth 
businesses 
Capability 
redeployment: 
Exploiting 
existing 
capabilities to 
address new 
market 
opportunities.  
Capability 
trimming: 
Ramping down 
CDMA, TDMA.   
Identification of 
capability gaps related 
to services, acquiring 
new capabilities e.g. 
Navteq. CDO to 
develop str. capabilities, 
realigning internal 
selection criteria with 
strategy.  
Maintaining key 
capabilities in-house to 
support vertical 
integration, e.g. 
manufacturing. 
Incremental renewal of 
capabilities e.g. 
operating system. 
Acquisitions and 
partnerships with third-
party companies, 
operators, developers and 
content providers to gain 
access to new services 
and applications. Internal 
development and 
upgrading of Symbian until 
2/2011. Capability 
development with Intel until 
9/2011. 
Recombining Nokia and 
Microsoft capabilities 
(02/2011): Objective to 
build an eco-system 
around the Windows-Nokia 
alliance.  
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 o
ut
co
m
es
 (O
) 
Capabilities in 
brand 
management, 
market 
segmentation, 
design, technology 
platforms. Strong 
growth in product 
portfolio, with 
enhanced product 
renewal rate and 
time- to-market. 
GSM 2.5. voice 
codecs. 
Redesigned 
support 
functions. 
Optimized 
demand-supply 
chain across 
Nokia’s supplier 
network. Nokia 
to maintain 80% 
manufacturing 
in-house. 
Capabilities to 
address various 
market needs 
and more efficient 
segmentation. 
Enlargement of 
product 
development to 
multimedia 
phones. New 
capabilities 
related to the 
IP protocol, 
content providers, 
games and 
entertainment. 
Symbian OS as a 
joint venture. 
Capabilities to 
address new 
market 
opportunities 
(e.g. lifestyle 
segments). 
High growth in 
product portfolio 
to cover various 
consumer, 
geographies 
and price 
points. 
Capabilities well 
adapted to the 
emerging markets, low 
adaptability to the US 
market. Superior 
economies of scale and 
operational excellence: 
ability to offer low-cost 
handsets with a good 
profit. New internal 
capabilities in software 
and services (e.g. 
navigation, music, 
social media). Ovi 
platform. Lag in the 
development and 
renewal of the 
operating systems.  
Access to new capabilities 
via partnerships.  
Symbian operating system 
obsolescent, the 
development of MeeGo 
OS too slow  
Capability retirement: 
Symbian outsourced to 
Accenture in 02/2011, 
MeeGo discontinued in 
09/2011.  
Smart phone development 
puts emphasis on 
IPR management. 
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1991-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011 
(Feb.) 
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 (M
) r
el
at
in
g 
to
 
de
si
gn
 
Identification of 
design as a key 
capability in the 
consumer focused 
vision.  
Capability building 
using an external 
consultant. 
Integrating design to 
main corporate 
processes (e.g. CE). 
Recombination of 
internal/external 
design. 
Identification 
of design as a 
contributor to 
competitive 
advantage. 
Consolidation 
of design 
capability.  
Identifying 
design as a 
key success 
factor.  
Diffusion of 
design 
capability by 
building up a 
design 
presence in 
different 
geographical 
locations. 
Diversification 
of design 
requirements. 
Linking design to 
the corporate 
development 
process, 
variation-
categorization 
business strategy 
and portfolio 
management. 
Reconsolidating 
and exploiting 
design capability 
to new business 
opportunities.  
Design to 
have a 
business 
development 
role: design-
intensive 
business 
concepts and 
total 
experience 
design.  
Rebuilding 
design DNA. 
Design 
involved in 
business and 
strategy. 
Designers 
involved in 
boards 
responsible for 
the user 
experience. 
Enhanced role 
in the new 
organization 
structure 
announced in 
Feb.2011. 
 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 o
ut
co
m
es
 (O
) 
re
la
tin
g 
to
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es
ig
n 
 
Design established 
as a key capability 
and integrated into 
main organizational 
processes. Design 
process. 
Hiring a 
Design 
Director. 
Building up 
the design 
organization, 
and a global 
design 
culture. 
Enlargement of 
the product 
portfolio. 
Proliferation of 
design 
capability. 
New business 
models and 
products based 
on differentiation 
and design. 
Design 
roadmaps, 
segmentation 
models, future 
concepts. 
Design 
capabilities 
related to 
‘total 
experience 
design’. 
Convergence 
of the physical 
and digital 
design, total 
experience 
and solutions 
design.  
 
Table 5. Summary of the Case Periods and Focused CMO-Configurations at Nokia 
 
As the narrative pointed out, during the case time the major events (or 
sequences of events) in the evolution of the telecommunications industry 
with a significant impact on firm strategies and capability development 
included 1) digitalization, and the simultaneous deregulation of operators at 
the beginning of 1990s; 2) transformation of the industry into a consumer–
focused business at the beginning of 1990s driven by Nokia and other 
actors; 3) market growth in the mid-1990s further amplified by 
globalization and emerging markets such as China and India in the 2000s; 
4) multimedia technology, and the convergence of mobile phones and 
personal appliances at the beginning of the 2000s; 5) the arrival of the 
Internet, and following convergence of mobile phones and the Internet; and 
finally, 6) the recent paradigm shift into user-focused and Internet-based 
services and solutions, driven by new industry arrivals, Apple and Google. 
While the institutional and technological drivers, namely deregulation and  
digitalization, and the transformation to a consumer business were initially 
the key drivers shaping the telecommunications industry, more recently the 
emergence of the Internet, and the related user trends and actions driven by 
industry entrants have been increasingly influencing the selection criteria 
and the subsequent capability development. Moreover, continuous product 
innovations have characterized the mobile phone industry (Giachetti and 
   
 118
Marchi, 2010) and as an outcome, mobile phones have evolved from voice-
based cellular phones (with SMS), to multimedia phones incorporating such 
features as camera, music player and GPS, and finally to Internet-phones 
with a number of services and applications59. Moreover, with the move from 
voice communication to multimedia, the emphasis has shifted from 
hardware to software, and along with new industry entrants there has been 
a move from operator-dependent business models to more diverse models. 
While cell phones have increasingly become commodities and basic 
consumer electronics, so-called smart phones with superior product 
margins have come to dominate the mobile phone market and its 
development. In terms of capability requirements, the emergence of the 
telecommunications industry and digitalization put emphasis on R&D 
capabilities, while the transformation of the industry into a consumer 
business demanded new capabilities from industry actors, such as brand 
management and marketing capabilities, as well as design. The 
subsequent market growth required an ability to adapt to the new global 
scale and operational efficiencies, e.g., efficient logistics, and the growth of 
the emerging markets (e.g. China and India) necessitated a capability to 
manufacture and deliver low cost handsets. The convergence of the Internet 
and mobility, and the following shift from a voice-based cellular paradigm 
into the Internet-based services paradigm, put emphasis on managing the 
user interface through software capabilities and applications. Consequently, 
the operating system, that determines the quality of the user interface, 
became a key underlying capability along with a services and applications 
compatible with it. 
Accordingly, as the basic cell phones became commoditized, the key 
capabilities to support this activity became operational efficiency and 
economies of scale in sourcing, production, distribution and brand. 
While, at the same time, smart phones increasingly demanded a focus on 
the quality of the user interface enabled by the underlying operating system 
and the access to a large number of applications and services. Both the 
required software capabilities and the need to integrate a large variety of 
services and applications in mobile phones for an enhanced user experience 
prompted ecosystem thinking and led to individual firms seeking 
complementary, co-specialized capabilities within the eco-system.  
Moreover, as brought up by Burgelman and Siegel (2008), success in a 
horizontal, or open model of industry organization involves ‘increasing 
returns to adoption’ referring to the fact that a technological platform, such 
                                                   
59 Hyöty (2011: 55-66) assigns the following time periods for the various technology 
phases:  voice-based cellular phones (-1999), multimedia phones (2000-07) and 
internet-phones (2008-). 
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as the operating system, becomes increasingly valuable the more users it 
has and therefore, achieving a high installed base becomes key. A large 
installed base attracts independent software developers60 and sets in 
motion a ‘virtuous circle’, as the value of the operating system is augmented 
with an increasing amount of software, likely to further increase the 
installed base and attract more software developers. The success of Android 
can be explained by its systematic efforts to attain a high installed base by 
providing the mobile phone companies free access to the operating system 
and to its applications. This was mutually beneficial because, at the same 
time, the adoption of Android enabled the incumbents to rapidly upgrade 
their operating systems. The situation changed, however, as Google 
acquired Motorola in 2011, creating tensions and anxiety amongst the 
incumbents.   
Apple, alternatively, offered superior earnings to independent software 
developers along with its state-of-art operating system and managed to 
draw the developer community even when the number of users was small 
and despite that fact the Apple kept its operating system closed. Nokia 
Symbian, in contrast, did not manage to sufficiently attract the developer 
community despite its base of a billion users globally, probably because of 
the inferiority of its operating system that did not provide an optimal 
platform for applications, and its weak presence in the USA, where the 
developer community primarily resided. 
Table 6 highlights the differences in capability requirements that relate to 
the voice-based cellular, and the Internet- and services-based paradigms. 
First, as the table indicates, related to voice-based cellular phones, 
capability management revolved around balancing between internal 
capability development and outsourcing, whereas smart phones have 
required actors to rely more on external capabilities and to combine their 
internal capabilities with those provided by the ecosystem. Second, related 
to voice-based cell phones, the required capabilities have related mainly to 
technology platforms, operational efficiency and supply-chain management, 
scale and brand, while new smart phones have put emphasis on the 
operating system, services and applications, brand, and user experience 
design. Whereas cellular phones were differentiated primarily based on 
product features, such as usability, design and the extent of product 
portfolio, smart phones are mainly differentiated through the user 
experience, including the extent of services and applications. In terms of 
design, basic cell phones put emphasis on the more traditional industrial 
                                                   
60 See Burgelman and Siegel (2008) for findings on high-technology ventures, they 
also claim that Apple Computer remained a niche player in the computer industry 
because it failed to acknowledge the increasing returns to adoption (2008:165). 
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design, while smart phones have required an emphasis on user-experience 
design. In terms of external partners, the management of cellular phones 
has relied more heavily on operators and suppliers, putting emphasis on 
power management, while the development and management of smart 
phones have involved the developer community and relied more on 
partnership than power management. As an outcome, whereas the internal 
selection regarding cell phones related to differentiation based mainly on 
product features and cost, with an objective to create internal innovation, 
the development of smart phones involved criteria that related to 
differentiation based on user experience, and required an ability to access 
external innovation. 
 
 Voice-based, cellular paradigm (basic 
phones) 
 
Internet-and services-based paradigm 
(smart phones) 
Capability 
approach 
Internal vs. outsourcing (global 
specialization/horizontal actors) 
Internal and ecosystem capabilities (e.g. 
developer community) 
Required 
capabilities and 
resources 
R&D (mechanical, radio technology) 
Technology platforms 
Operational efficiency, supply-chain 
management 
Scale (sourcing, production, distribution) 
Brand 
Industrial design, usability 
Patent portfolio 
R&D (Software- and multimedia technology) 
Operating system/software platform 
Services and content 
 
Scale (software), installed base of users 
 
Brand 
User experience design 
Open-code development/ 
IPR management 
Key differentiator  Usability, design,  
product portfolio 
Differentiation through product features 
Price/quality ratio  
User experience (touch-screen and 
operating system) 
Differentiation through services and 
applications portfolio  
Price/experience ratio61 
Design Industrial design User experience design 
Customization Large product portfolio Large portfolio of applications and services  
Partners Operators and suppliers (power 
management) 
Developer community (partnership 
management) 
Internal selection 
criteria 
Differentiation/cost, internal innovation Differentiation, ability to exploit external 
innovation 
 
Table 6. Differences in Capability Configurations between the Voice-Based Cellular 
Paradigm (Basic Phones) and the Internet- and Services-Based Paradigm (Smart Phones) 
 
Capability mechanisms and logics within the case firm 
As the narrative pointed out, both the business environment and business 
strategy changes occasioned intensive capability development within the 
case firm. During the case time, Nokia went through major transformations, 
first transforming itself from an industrial conglomerate into a consumer-
driven mobile phone company in the early nineties, then into a global 
market leader with globally aligned operations in the late nineties, and 
                                                   
61 This idiom was adopted from Hyöty (2011)  
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recently the firm has been going through a major transformation in order to 
adapt to changes within the industry. While the two former transformations 
were successful as an indication of the firm’s dynamic capabilities, the firm 
has encountered significant difficulties in adapting itself to the changes in 
the business environment that relate to the emergence of the new ‘smart 
phone’ segment and subsequent paradigm shift. The analysis also indicates 
that Nokia’s case history includes both periods of active internal capability 
development and shaping the external environment, as well as adaptation 
and reacting to the external environment.  
First, the analysis informs that many of Nokia’s initial advantages related 
to its ability to anticipate and consequently to capitalize on major changes 
in the market place, e.g., digitalization, deregulation and later the rise of 
Asia as a key market. Owing to managerial foresight, Nokia was able to 
anticipate the development of the industry and related opportunities, 
driving it to divest its other businesses and to focus on telecommunications. 
Moreover, it was able to undertake organizational restructuring, reorganize 
its resources and to build the capabilities prior to its competitors. Because 
of its limited resources at the beginning, Nokia had to build the 
development of the company on a few select capabilities. These included 
GSM technology, as well as capabilities to support consumer-focused 
positioning, such as brand management, design and market segmentation. 
Although these capabilities seem self-evident ex post, given the evolution of 
the telecommunications industry, the decisions to focus on these 
capabilities were undertaken in an uncertain market situation dominated by 
the engineering phase, professional models and with multiple co-existent 
technical standards. Consequently, related to mobile phone handsets, and 
to a large extent influenced by individual level insights and vision, Nokia 
was able to internally select and develop the required capabilities, such as 
brand, design, product development processes and technology platforms to 
support the development of a large product portfolio and rapid time to 
market, and to influence the external selection criteria to a consumer-
focused direction. Nokia’s capabilities brought about an important variation 
to the market and it was able to benefit from the resultant co-evolutionary 
advantage. Second, the firm was able to build up an efficient supply-chain 
management system prior to the substantial market growth, giving it a 
sustainable advantage vis-à-vis its competitors. With its large product 
portfolio and efficient operating systems, Nokia was able address full 
market potential and to leverage scale benefits in sourcing, production, 
distribution and brand to its advantage.  
Having built its initial success and market leadership position on select 
capabilities, Nokia shifted its capability strategy to embrace more variation 
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in its capabilities. Agitated by industry slowdown and motivated by 
emerging market development, Nokia chose not to rely simply on 3G 
technologies for future growth, and initiated a strategic change process to 
explore multiple growth prospects. In 2002, the company put in place a 
‘variation-categorization’ business model in order to be able to address the 
full market potential and to embrace future growth areas. Nokia defined 
nine different value domains and started building new capabilities with an 
objective to generate future growth and to create value by inventing new 
application domains. The different application domains required different 
capabilities and a larger scope of different capability development 
mechanisms to address multiple selection criteria. These included 
developing and acquiring new capabilities (e.g. wireless appliances and 
services, media and entertainment), renewing its existing capabilities (basic 
phones and business phones), recombining capabilities for new product 
offerings (imaging phones), scaling up extant capabilities (entry phones), or 
retrenching capabilities (CDMA, TDMA) and establishing cooperative 
arrangements for these capabilities (CDMA with Qualcomm). The move to 
the new value domains was supported by a multidimensional organization 
structure. As an outcome of the new business model, the product renewal 
rate multiplied and came to comprise 40-50 new products annually with 
some 400 new product variants. Nokia was able to constantly renew its 
large product portfolio to cover all the relevant global consumer segments 
as well as to find new application domains that did not require radical 
changes in existing technology. With this time-driven product development, 
the company was able to maintain a lead in mobile phone development for a 
relatively long time. 
Moreover, through retention processes, such as replicating, leveraging and 
scaling its capabilities globally, Nokia was able to collect full benefit from its 
variety-generating activities. Its core capability became the ability to 
generate a high product renewal rate as well as to manage the complexity 
without compromising scale benefits in sourcing, production, distribution 
and brand because of its perfected sourcing, production and logistics 
systems. Staying vertically integrated, Nokia was able to take full advantage 
of its indigenous capabilities and reap superior scale benefits compared to 
its competitors resulting in above industry average profitability rates.  
Furthermore, Nokia gave its suppliers access to its roadmaps and advance 
information about its future products and consequently the supplier 
network was able to provide the firm with complementary capabilities to 
support its growth. Moreover, due to Nokia’s superior size, it received 
preferential treatment from suppliers, e.g., during component shortages. 
Consequently, and as opposed to other incumbents, Nokia was able to 
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integrate and to control the entire, albeit transforming, value chain to for 
their own benefit. A capability logic based on variation and retention fueled 
the company into substantial growth and enabled it to attain a record-high 
40% market share of the global wireless telephony market. 
Nokia was still able to benefit from its industry position and leverage its 
existing capabilities during the era of the multimedia phones. However, the 
firm’s ability to collect full benefit of its variation- and retention-based 
capability logic was, to some extent, limited by its insufficient attention to 
emerging trends or local specificities, and by a limited scope of capability 
development mechanisms. Instead of drawing on local environments to 
generate variation or building capabilities to address local needs, Nokia 
aimed at addressing all relevant consumer tastes, geographies, and price 
points with a global product portfolio and capabilities. For example, the US 
market, characterized by high operator dominance and based on the 
CDMA-standard would have required a substantial amount of product 
localization that differed from Nokia’s global strategy. Likewise, although 
the company managed to comprehensively identify the existing global needs 
and to segment these needs into relevant categories, they failed to 
sufficiently address emerging trends from key markets. These included the 
clamshell and ultrathin phones, but first and foremost, they failed to 
acknowledge the magnitude of changes related to the emergence of the so-
called smart phone segment with distinct and fundamentally different 
external selection criteria. The lack of managerial foresight to identify the 
upcoming changes in software and service development originating from 
the US can, at least partly be attributed to its weak presence in this market 
and its neglect to optimally use the capabilities from its country or regional 
organizations. Moreover, as Nokia estimated that the industry had become 
mature, its capability activities shifted towards retention and incremental 
variation, and it refrained from embracing more radical, potentially 
competency-destroying variations and innovations.  
As an outcome, Nokia’s variation- and retention-based capability logic 
became challenged by the fundamental changes in the external 
environment. The emergence of the new application domain related to 
Internet-based services and applications had generated a radical shift in the 
external selection criteria. Consequently, related to the development of the 
industry increasingly from a device to software and services business, other 
actors in the field drove the development and the company was obliged to 
catch up in the required capabilities. Although the data indicates that it had 
been able to foresee the convergence of the Internet, services and mobility, 
it seems that it failed to estimate the arrival of new actors and changing 
business models, and the subsequent leap in capability configurations. 
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Paradoxically, the user interface that had constituted one of Nokia’s core 
capabilities and provided an advantage vis-à-vis the other incumbents 
became its core weakness as the external selection criteria changed.  
Owing to the leap in capability requirements, the incumbents’ internal 
capabilities became insufficient to maintain competitiveness in the smart 
phone segment. Instead, both the required software capabilities and the 
need to integrate a large variety of services and applications in mobile 
phones for an optimal user experience prompted ecosystem thinking and 
led to individual firms seeking access to complementary capabilities within 
the eco-system. As an outcome, many of the incumbents upgraded their 
operating systems to Android and relied increasingly on the ecosystem 
capabilities such as those of the developer community.  
As the value creation within mobile phones increasingly shifted from 
handsets to services and applications, Nokia also proceeded with 
acquisitions to obtain capabilities in these domains. At the same time, 
however, as the operating system had become the key competitive 
parameter in the market the company persisted in maintaining it as an 
internal capability, and pursued development on both Symbian and MeeGo 
operating systems even when it became apparent that Symbian was unable 
to support a user interface comparable to its competitors. Despite its efforts, 
and mainly because of the long capability development times, Nokia was 
unable to close the capability gap between its capabilities and those of the 
new industry arrivals. Nokia’s problems became manifest in its inability to 
introduce a competitive smart phone with a user experience comparable to 
products from industry rivals. In order to adapt to the new external 
selection criteria, the firm had to decide which capabilities to retain to be 
transferred to the new application domain and which capabilities to rely on 
partners for. To respond to the radical shift in the external selection criteria, 
Nokia announced a strategic alliance with Microsoft with regard to the 
Windows operating system, with an objective to build an ecosystem around 
the Microsoft-Nokia alliance comparable to those around iPhone OS or 
Google Android.  
Although the industry evolution remains obscure, it is likely that the two 
divergent trends of smart phones and more affordable phones will converge 
and there will be use for Nokia’s retained capabilities within the smart 
phone segment to support the global diffusion and accessibility in prices. An 
industry expert reckoned: 
 
More generally speaking, there may be a capability combination that is born, for 
example, maybe at Nokia, the combination of its internal capabilities with the 
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more responsive capabilities that are building now in the US. Maybe they 
together make up a game-changing thing in Asia. 
 
The analysis of Nokia’s evolutionary fitness indicates that related to the 
voice-based cellular and multi-media mobile phones, Nokia possessed 
capabilities that were above the prevalent fit, contributing to both the 
competitive advantage of the firm and market evolution. However, related 
to the emergence and development of the smart phone segment, a number 
of Nokia’s capabilities were inferior to other industry actors, and 
consequently it was forced to adapt to external changes. It can be concluded 
that the company’s strategy build on the variation-retention capability logic 
became weakened by radical changes in the external environment but also 
by its inability to embrace radical innovations, by its inadequate selection 
criteria and resource allocation to support the smart phone development, as 
well as by its insufficient efforts to exploit external capability networks to 
complement its internal capabilities with co-specialized assets. As a 
consequence, changes in the external environment forced Nokia to adopt 
another capability logic to access the required capabilities and to close the 
capability gap between its internal capabilities and external selection 
criteria. 
 
Internal and external selection environments of Nokia 
The above analysis provides ample evidence on the capacity of Nokia to 
drive the evolution of the mobile telephony industry. As the analysis 
conveyed, Nokia’s success was based on its ability to recognize the 
opportunities related to the mobile telephony and to respond to these 
opportunities with a large product portfolio and rapid time to market. With 
‘time-paced’ product development, coupled with highly efficient operations 
and scale advantages, the firm was able to direct development in the mobile 
telephony market and maintain a co-evolutionary advantage vis-à-vis the 
incumbents. With its variation-categorization business model, Nokia’s 
capability development was directed towards creating and exploiting new 
application domains for its capabilities. Moreover, through retention 
processes, such as replicating, leveraging and scaling its capabilities 
globally, the company was able to collect full benefit from its variety-
generating activities. With this capability logic the firm was able to direct 
the evolution of the market and maintain a co-evolutionary advantage in 
both technology and market development. However, as the data indicates, 
Nokia failed to maintain and capitalize on its lead in the new smart phone 
segment that had severe implications on its performance. By discussing 
contextual factors that had an impact on capability outcomes within the 
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case firm, the objective of this section is to illustrate how Nokia’s capability 
development became constrained by various factors in the environments 
internal and external to the firm. The data analysis indicates that a number 
of factors can be attributed to the complexity of the environment originating 
from multinationality. 
First, the arrival of the Internet and new industry entrants brought about 
far-reaching changes in the external environment. However, the data 
reveals that most of Nokia’s variety-generating activities were directed 
towards application domains that were consistent with its extant business 
logic and did not challenge the prevailing selection criteria. The emergence 
of a new application domain related to services and applications based on 
the Internet, fueled by the launch of the Apple iPhone, instead, represented 
a new ‘speciation event’ (Adner and Levinthal, 2002) that led to a whole 
new segment of ‘smart phones’. This emergence of the smart phone 
segment was preceded by only minor changes in technology but led to 
significant changes in the external selection criteria and set off subsequent 
technological development. Even though Nokia had a ‘Life goes mobile’ 
vision and strategy in place targeted at the convergence of the Internet and 
mobility, it failed to foresee the upcoming ‘speciation event’ or estimate the 
speed and magnitude of the changes it brought about. It seems that this 
was, as least partly a consequence of a lack of sufficient managerial 
attention to the US that had become a lead country in software and service 
development but did not represent significant weight in terms of turnover. 
A Nokia strategy expert commented:  
 
I think in the past when we have had success cases, they have been to some extent 
dependent on some great individuals in management positions, in top 
management positions. And I'm afraid that they are not processes that we could 
easily repeat. I’m not equally confident that whenever there is change we are 
always seeing that in advance and being able to prepare for that. It’s more like 
okay, we’ve had some successes there in the past, maybe those guys who were 
able to see and react quickly, they are already gone or not, and let’s see if we are 
able to repeat that or not. 
 
Moreover, the financial crisis in 2008-2009 seems to have further obscured 
the visibility as it directed managerial attention towards low cost segments, 
existing application domains, and Asia as a key market. Furthermore, there 
was a strong strategic belief at Nokia that the mobile phone devices had 
reached maturity that put emphasis on retention and incremental variation 
in capability development, and on cost as the selection criterion. 
Secondly, the analysis points out that the external selection criteria started 
diversifying in the 2000s when the growth of the emerging markets, such as 
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China and India, put emphasis on different capabilities than the industry 
evolution in the Western economies. Within the case firm this led to the 
coexistence of different types of capability requirements and internal 
selection criteria. On the one hand, the management identified the 
upcoming shift into a new paradigm driven by the Internet and requiring 
new capabilities. On the other hand, the growth of the emerging markets 
enabled the company to gain substantial revenues and profits by applying 
its existing capabilities to these markets putting emphasis on capabilities 
related to brand management, channels, supply chain management and 
scale. While industry evolution in the developed countries would have 
required the case firm to upgrade its capabilities, e.g., software capabilities, 
and to develop new capabilities to meet the external selection criteria driven 
by evolving user trends, the growth of the emerging markets enabled it to 
gain substantial revenues and market share by exploiting and leveraging its 
existing capabilities. Consequently, the internal selection criteria became 
biased by incorrect strategic beliefs and the prevailing performance in the 
emerging markets and led to a misalignment of internal selection criteria 
with strategy, which officially was directed towards the convergence of 
mobile phones, the Internet, and services. As the industry expert reasoned:  
 
Even though 'Life goes mobile' vision has been always talked about since 1997, 
the capabilities have not been built systematically. Instead, a lot of money has 
been invested in logistics, rapid product development, R&D of the basic phones 
and the basic processes. Actually it seems that Nokia has continued to develop the 
key capabilities it defined in design back in -92, in the product processes in -93-
94, and later in the logistics function. 
 
Consequently, the Nokia case indicates a difficulty in foreseeing and 
acknowledging that certain capabilities are becoming obsolete if there are 
regions or markets where these capabilities are still applicable. The Nokia 
data also indicates that positive corporate performance may obstruct the 
management from acknowledging the limitations in its own capabilities. 
Moreover, when changes in the external environment became apparent, 
Nokia managers identified the need and proceeded with acquisitions to 
acquire service capabilities, but failed to identify the pivotal role of the 
operating system capabilities or to acknowledge the limits to their own 
operating system, Symbian, which had been a core capability at Nokia and 
which was still viable in the low cost segments targeted at high-volume 
markets especially in the emerging economies. 
Thirdly, the data also reveals that Nokia had taken several initiatives in 
the ‘smart phones’ prior to its competitors. However, even though new 
initiatives related to the smart phones emerged, they did not achieve 
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sufficient internal support. Therefore, in the absence of adequate selection 
criteria Nokia’s capability development was hampered and consequently, 
smart phone development was affected by the extant internal selection 
criteria related to basic phones, further reinforced by the fact that smart 
phones and basic phone were regrouped into a single business unit in 2007. 
As an outcome, Nokia continued to rely on its internal capabilities and on 
the internal selection criteria aligned to meet the requirements of affordable 
phones, rapid time to market, large-scale production and efficient logistics, 
instead of realigning the internal selection criteria to meet the requirements 
of the new generation of smart phones. Consequently, despite a ‘Life goes 
mobile’ strategy in place to address the convergence of mobility and 
Internet, there was a disconnect between the top-down strategy and 
bottom-up initiatives that failed to meet the internal selection criteria, e.g., 
in terms of cost, and as a consequence managers failed to recognize the 
potential in the initiatives that emerged. The analysis also indicates that the 
variation-based capability development led to an ambiguity in resource 
allocation. As the company needed to support multiple product lines and 
variants to address existing product needs, insufficient resources were 
available for future developments. Instead of supporting smart phone 
development with high albeit uncertain future potential, resources were 
dispersed between a large number of product variants corresponding to the 
existing business and application domains.  
Fourthly, it seems that Nokia did not sufficiently extend the scope of its 
capability development mechanisms. On the one hand, it renounced 
outsourcing capabilities that were considered as ‘core’ to deter value capture 
slipping from mobile phone manufacturers to other actors. On the other 
hand, the negative economic consequences of acquisitions made in the 
television business in 1980s, made Nokia cautious with acquisitions and 
promoted the slower internal capability development. In cellular phone 
development, the firm was good at taking advantage of external capability 
networks to access complementary capabilities on a global basis and 
consequently its capabilities became augmented with those of its supplier 
network. However, Nokia failed to do the same with smart phone 
development and the developer community that resided primarily in the 
US. The adherence to internal mechanisms created a ‘lock-in’ and slowed 
significantly the process of upgrading the required capabilities. For 
example, the technological platforms, prerequisites for rapid product 
development and time to market, were slow to build and rigid, making 
radical changes difficult62. Finally, however, faced with radical changes in 
                                                   
62 Even though the visibility within the industry was perceived as approximately 18 
months, and the length of product life cycles a year, development time of new 
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the environment and due to the long development time of internal 
capabilities, Nokia was forced to seek key capabilities outside its boundaries 
to accelerate capability development. These included both acquisitions in 
services and applications, as well as the strategic alliance with Microsoft for 
the Windows operating system. 
As an outcome, although industry convergence and the arrival of new 
industry entrants generated a shift in the capability configurations and 
prerequisites within the industry, the firm continued to rely on its core 
business logic that was based on continuous product renewals, world-class 
operations and mainly on internal capabilities. Nokia’s internal selection 
environment, including its resource allocation, had become optimized for 
this core strategy execution. Having put in place the capabilities and 
processes to support a variation-categorization strategy, the internal 
selection environment also became aligned to this type of approach, 
hampering it from embracing potentially competency-destroying variations 
and innovations. Moreover, it can be contested that the Nokia’s 
organizational culture registered a high level of internal orientation that led 
it to overestimate the value of its extant capabilities and to neglect potential 
competitors, as well as preventing it from acknowledging the augmented 
role of the external selection environment relative to the internal selection 
environment. Nokia had been able to drive the development of the mobile 
telephone market for nearly two decades that had generated a conviction 
that it could maintain this position based on internal capabilities despite 
radical changes in the external environment. Moreover, the company had 
opted for a capability development process that was based on incremental 
changes, optimizing the exploitation of existing capabilities and shifting the 
focus on leveraging and protecting its capabilities globally, rather than on 
building capabilities that challenged its existing business logic or extant 
selection criteria. Consequently, Nokia’s capability development became 
increasingly determined by its current position within its product and 
geographic markets.63   
It can be concluded that the strategy to support a large product portfolio 
on a global basis and the mechanisms put in place had set the company on a 
path that enabled fast responses to evolving market needs that were in line 
with its extant capabilities. If the mobile telephony market had continued to 
develop in an evolutionary manner based on incremental changes, Nokia’s 
ability to introduce new variations to address the emerging opportunities 
with a large product portfolio, affordable prices and rapid time to market 
                                                                                                                                 
capabilities was estimated at 6-10 years (Häikiö, 2009:131, Doz and Kosonen, 
2008:103). 
63 See Burgelman’s (1996) similar findings on how Intel’s strategy making became 
tied to its existing product market position 
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would probably have enabled it to stay ahead of its competitors. However, 
this capability logic hampered its ability to respond to radical changes in the 
environment, reinforcing its strategic focus and lock-in to basic phones. 
Finally, the Nokia case points to the difficulties of aligning internal selection 
environment with strategy within the multinational firm. Even when Nokia 
recognized the need for strategic renewal, the complexity and coexistence of 
diversified selection criteria within the MNC context made realignment 
difficult to accomplish. 
  
5.2 Kone: From Engineering- to Customer- and User-Focused 
Capabilities 
 
5.2.1 Background and Context 
 
Kone operates globally in the business of designing, manufacturing, 
installing, maintaining and modernizing elevators and escalators, and had 
annual net sales of 5,225 M€ in 2011. In addition, it provides services for 
automatic doors. Kone has been transforming itself from a Finnish, family-
owned conglomerate to a globally aligned corporation with subsidiaries in 
some 50 countries, and at the same time, from an engineering-driven into a 
customer-focused elevator and escalator company, and has recently 
repositioned itself in the field of ‘people flow’. Despite its global presence, 
some 50% of its turnover still comes from its home continent, although this 
figure has been decreasing in favor of a stronger share of Asia. 
Established in 1910, the history of Kone is closely related to the Herlin 
family64. Having been involved in various industries including textiles, 
clinical chemistry analyzers (Kone Instrument), hydraulic piping systems 
(GS-Hydro Group), marine cargo handling (MacGregor-Navire), industrial 
and dockside material handling (Kone Cranes), wood handling in pulp and 
paper mills (Kone Wood), and a steel foundry, Kone decided to divest its 
other divisions at the beginning of 1990s and focus exclusively on the 
elevator and escalator business starting in 1994. Amongst Finnish 
companies, the Kone Corporation has been an icon for internationalization: 
                                                   
64 The Harald Herlin family purchased Kone from its parent company Strömberg in 
1924, and it was headed first by Harald and then his son Heikki. Heikki Herlin’s 
son Pekka Herlin served Kone as president (1964-1986) and as board chairman 
(1987-2003), and initiated Kone’s strong international development that took Kone 
to its position as the world’s 4th biggest elevator and escalator company. In 1997 
Antti Herlin was nominated deputy chairman of the board and CEO, and in 2003 
he became the chairman of the board after his father. In 2000, the authority over 
Kone shares was transferred from Pekka to his son Antti Herlin that resulted in a 
severe conflict within the Herlin family. The clash led Kone to acquire Partek in 
2002 and divesting it soon thereafter to resolve ownership and authority 
arrangements. 
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it was the first Finnish company to internationalize in the late 1960s, a 
process it aggressively pursued mainly by acquiring foreign companies, 
sometimes larger than itself, such as the acquisition of the Swedish Asea-
Graham in 1968 that tripled Kone’s volumes. Other significant acquisitions 
include the purchase of the European subsidiaries of Westinghouse in 1975, 
as well as Montgomery Elevator Company, the 4th biggest elevator 
company in the US in 1994, with an objective to strengthen its elevator 
operations and market position in North America and to increase the share 
of North American operations from 10% to 30% of total sales. However, the 
acquired companies were only loosely integrated to the headquarters. This 
international expansion based on an aggressive acquisitions strategy, 
atypical of Finnish companies at that time, gave Kone the status of the first 
Finnish multinational and fueled the firm’s development into a global 
corporation with operations in some 800 locations globally. 
The beginning of the case time was set at 1994 when Kone divested its 
material handling divisions to focus exclusively on the elevator and 
escalator business. The elevator and escalator business is divided between 
new equipment, on the one hand, and maintenance and modernization, on 
the other. The approximate shares of the turnover are 45% and 55%, 
respectively. The focus of this study is on the new elevators and escalators 
side, although service activities will be considered to the extent that they 
have an influence on the new equipment business. 
During the case time the fairly traditional and moderately dynamic 
elevator and escalator industry went through fundamental changes. The 
converging global megatrends, such as urbanization, ageing of the 
population, increasing safety norms, environmental issues, and the ageing 
of buildings were reshaping the industry, further stimulated by the rise of 
the Asian markets, notably China. Asia, with its urbanization and the 
subsequent high level of construction, grew to represent the greatest market 
and with the most growth potential, the Chinese market on its own 
representing approximately 30% of the global elevator and escalator 
business. Therefore Asia, and particularly the market environment in China 
had a significant impact on Kone’s business operations.  
The elevator and escalator industry used to be characterized by a large 
number of locally operating companies because products are closely linked 
to the highly local and regulated construction industry. However, four 
companies including the US-based Otis, and the European Schindler, 
Thyssen, and Kone had been driving the consolidation of the industry, 
dominating some 60% of the global market. In addition to these European 
and US-based corporations, Japanese companies, such as Hitachi and 
Mitsubishi had gained a foothold in the global market as an outcome of the 
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increasing share of Asia in the elevator and escalator business. In addition, 
new Chinese companies started to emerge benefiting from the size of the 
home market. Consequently, competition seemed to be intensifying both 
between the incumbents as well as from the part of Asian competitors, and 
the company representatives firmly believed in a further consolidation of 
the industry, which they considered to lead in a ‘survival game’ if the market 
growth was to slow down. While the new equipment business had become 
increasingly global, the maintenance business continued to be more 
favorable to local service providers. Like industry consolidation, the high 
level of industry globalization can be regarded as an outcome of co-
evolution between the incumbents’ actions and the growth of markets in 
Asian countries, China in particular.  
The shift from a multi-local to a global industry, and the related firm 
globalization processes put first emphasis on the incumbents’ acquisition 
capability and then on the ability to integrate and reconfigure these 
companies’ operations globally. The consolidation of the industry has led 
the main companies to pursue similar strategies and business models, 
putting emphasis on implementation capabilities and operational 
efficiencies. Furthermore, the maturation of technology has led to 
technological innovations becoming less frequent. Having access to the 
same component manufacturers, differentiation based on technical 
attributes has become more difficult and easier to replicate, forcing 
companies to look for new sources of value creation, and to build up new 
capabilities. 
 
5.2.2 Capability Development at Kone (Analytical Chronology) 
 
During the case time (1994-2010), Kone continued to pursue growth both 
through acquisitions and organic growth, and sought to transform itself 
from a traditional engineering-driven elevator and escalator company into a 
more customer-focused and solutions-oriented company. Consequently, 
during the case time capability development related to the reorientation of 
the company and was supported by corporate wide programs and processes. 
While maintaining its role as the technology leader, the objective was to 
find new sources of value creation and differentiation as well as to attain 
significantly better profitability rates as theirs were well below the industry 
leader’s.  
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1994-1997: Innovation and reorganization mark a turning point: Kone 
becomes the technology leader in the industry  
At the beginning of the case time, the firm’s operations were largely 
centered in Europe, which represented 60% of its turnover. 
Internationalization had been driven by acquisitions and characterized by 
market and efficiency-seeking operations, as expressed by Kone’s managing 
director:  
 
When I think of the Kone case, we internationalized by buying markets, or we 
sought to cut costs. Then there were a few very specific cases, where we really 
bought capabilities, consciously bought new capabilities. 
 
However, at the beginning of 1990s Kone found itself in a difficult market 
situation as Europe had registered a 40% decline in the demand for new 
elevators. Despite its strengthened position in the US with the acquisition of 
Montgomery Elevators Ltd, the US market was traditional, based on 
hydraulic elevators, with little growth potential. Asia, in contrast, with large 
infrastructure projects and economic growth in southern China was 
registering substantial growth. Consequently, the focal point of elevator and 
escalator demand was increasingly shifting from Europe and North America 
to Asia, which represented already 50% of new escalator and elevator 
demand. Kone did not have a strong position in China, so to respond to the 
rising demand there, the company reinforced its customer service network 
and established maintenance branches in major Chinese cities, and 
acknowledged the need to further strengthen its market position through 
acquisition of companies and expansion of operations in Asian regions, 
including a decision to enter the Chinese local market with a greenfield 
investment. The shift of the focal point to Asia with high-volumes but at the 
same time customers who demanded the highest possible quality forced 
Kone to further strengthen its capabilities in quality management as well as 
to introduce new mid-range elevators to the market. 
At the same time, Kone realized that its cost structure had become too 
heavy for the new market context and had resulted in weakened 
profitability. Starting from 1994, becoming effective in 1996, it performed a 
major reorganization to cut down costs by harmonizing and streamlining its 
production and supply processes, enabled by the establishment of the 
European Union and the removal of trade barriers. Having had 
manufacturing in several countries in Europe, North and South America 
and Asia, Kone started concentrating manufacturing in fewer production 
centers capable of attaining higher volumes and economies of scale. In 
parallel, a number of existing product families were being reduced first in 
   
 134
Europe and then on global basis. As an example of streamlining on a global 
basis, the North American and European escalator operations were 
integrated and provided with global product lines.  
Despite its quality improvement process and the initiatives to strengthen 
its product development output, these efforts were targeted mainly at 
standard, hydraulic elevators. At this stage, Kone’s products were not 
competitive and the company acknowledged the need to renew its product 
range and to strengthen its R&D resources. In 1996, the firm managed to 
introduce a major innovation that transformed the market, Kone EcoDisc, a 
flat disc-shaped hoisting machine located at the top of the elevator shaft 
that enabled the development of a machineroomless elevator, MonoSpace, 
as the control and drive cabinet could be situated on the top floor landing 
near the elevators entrance. This permanent magnet gearless motor 
innovation allowed for both space and energy savings and affected the 
entire industry by creating a completely new elevator segment of 
machineroomless elevators (MRL) and by becoming the new industry 
standard in many markets65. This almost accidentally born innovation 
revolutionized the industry, as described by Kone vice-presidents: 
 
If you take this traditional rope elevator, it used to be pretty much the same for 
30 years or something like that. Then it was Kone who actually shook the boat. 
Invented this MonoSpace, new kind of hoisting machines.  
 
In a way it was an accident, but not fully an accident, but enabled us then to 
create the machineroomless concepts. Nobody came to Kone and asked to 
develop a machineroomless elevator, but to package it [the hoisting machinery] 
in a small space and then when installing everything in the elevator shaft we were 
able to eliminate the machine room and so in a way use this kind of disruptive 
invention.  
 
In line with the on-going rationalization efforts in Europe, the objective was 
to create a standardized concept, which was challenging as the main 
countries all had their own product ranges, local designs and production 
units. To respond to this requirement of a pan-European product with a 
standardized visual outlook, Kone used an external design office, as 
described a senior vice-present in technology and R&D:  
 
It was quite a challenge at Kone because traditionally all the big countries had 
their own products, their own factories and local designs. It was like a Christmas 
tree with this and that. And then we wanted to create an entirely new concept that 
                                                   
65 The Kone EcoDisc was assessed as the most significant technology in decades and 
was rewarded as the most innovative product of the year award at a construction 
exposition in Paris in 1997. 
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would meet the visual requirements. So in the background was the need to have a 
good standardized concept that met the European requirements. A Finnish 
engineer was not able to say what kind of design France should have… So the 
starting point was to create a European-wide product concept and process, with a 
well thought-out design. 
 
This innovation marked a turning point for Kone by positioning it as the 
technology and innovation leader within the industry, with an 
approximately four-year advance vis-à-vis its competitors in 
machineroomless elevators. The future product development involved 
extending the product range incorporating this hoisting machinery to mid- 
and high-rise buildings as well as developing a 2nd generation 
machineroomless elevator with a more streamlined supply chain. The 
MonoSpace elevator, with a streamlined sales-order-delivery and an 
installation time of only two weeks represented not only a product 
innovation but also a process innovation. This was also the time when Kone 
took the first steps in design, as recalled by the senior vice-present in 
technology and R&D:  
 
It was this MonoSpace machineroomless elevator that forced us to understand 
design a little bit differently then, at the end of 1990s. But it was an individual 
thing and then it was in the background again.  
 
Since the ‘turning point’ in 1997, owing to new products and reorganization, 
Kone’s profit started to develop favorably, in an industry where 
profitability, however, remained poor due to fierce price and market share 
competition. By the end of the period Kone became the third biggest 
company in the elevator and escalator business66.  
 
1997-2001: Entry into China and harmonization of processes pave the way 
for global capability development 
Despite the intense market share and price competition between the 
incumbents in the pursuit of enhanced market position, industry evolution 
until this date had been fairly linear and predictable. However, at the end of 
1990s globalization of the business environment and customers had led to 
significant changes in the external environment, as stated in Kone’s 1998 
Annual Report: 
 
                                                   
66 In 1996, with the acquisition of the full ownership the O&K Rolltroppen, a 
German escalator company, Kone became the global leader in escalators. 
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Companies in the world are experiencing a period of tremendous change. The 
pace of globalization of the world’s economies is accelerating, with the result that 
competitive conditions are becoming increasingly open. This development is 
affecting not only us but also our customer base. Through continuous renewal, we 
must find to respond innovatively to our customers’ changing requirements.  
 
Having built extensive geographic coverage through acquiring 
independently operating country units, Kone started aligning its global 
operations for increased efficiency, building its strategy and 
competitiveness mainly on home-based capabilities, technological 
leadership and innovativeness. Customers in the construction and property 
development and management businesses were operating increasingly cross 
continental boundaries and seeking alliances with global partners. To 
respond to this trend Kone sought to transform itself into a global 
organization with uniform business practices and processes. In order to 
harmonize business practices and processes both internally and externally, 
Kone put in place the Kone Model, a business process model aimed at the 
standardization of systems, processes, tools and business practices 
throughout the organization. As part of this process and as an outward 
reflection of the harmonization process, the companies within the group 
adopted the Kone brand name. 
Concurrently, Kone strove to balance its resources geographically and 
defined growth in Asia as its key target. In 1997, Kone established a Chinese 
subsidiary, opened new regional offices and opened a new elevator and 
escalator factory in Kunshan to signal its entry into China’s domestic 
market that had become the world’s largest elevator and escalator market 
representing 30 000 units yearly and with high potential for growth. The 
greenfield manufacturing facility began production in 1998 with plans to 
supply products to all Asian markets from the Kunshan factory. Kone 
believed that the strongly developing preconsolidation markets, such as 
China, offered both high potential for growth and enabled it to achieve 
substantial economies of scale. At the same time, Kone found its customers 
in China to be very demanding in product quality and decided to introduce 
the latest technology to the Chinese market. While reinforcing its presence 
in Asia, Kone estimated growth potential in South America to be limited 
and sold its South-American operations, accounting for approximately 1% 
of the total turnover, to its competitor Thyssen during the autumn of 2001. 
This enabled Kone to channel resources into other growing markets. 
In order to further strengthen its global coverage and to improve its 
offering Kone entered into global alliances with other companies in the 
elevator and escalator industry, but also with suppliers and partners from 
other fields. The most important alliance was made with Japanese Toshiba 
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in 199867. In 2000, the strategic alliance was further deepened with close 
cooperation in R&D including a joint development of a global standard 
escalator and high-speed elevators. In December 2001, the two companies 
agreed to cross-ownership and an extension of Toshiba’s license68. The 
partners’ market shares combined, the alliance was the global leader in 
escalator sales and services, and occupied the third position in the elevator 
industry worldwide. Another alliance was with MacGregor on elevators 
suited for marine conditions and handling passenger traffic on modern 
cruise ships, allowing for a leading position in the highly specialized marine 
elevator market. In addition, Kone and Nokia agreed on a cooperation to 
develop a wireless voice and data transmission system based on GSM 
technology, to support elevator remote monitoring and emergency voice 
communication systems. 
As the elevator and escalator markets in many industrial countries had 
reached maturity, Kone decided to exploit its existing resources and 
capabilities through diversification and global expansion to automatic door 
service. At the same time, it continued a strategy of rationalization and 
outsourcing production, especially component manufacturing and products 
based on old technology, and sold several production units to external 
partners. Strategic component manufacturing was kept as an in-house 
priority. To maintain its position as the innovation and technology leader in 
the new industry, Kone’s R&D investments shifted increasingly from 
product development to research in order to develop the next generation of 
products and services, and to explore emerging technologies from other 
industries and disciplines in addressing changing markets and customer 
needs. These included development of computer software to be exploited in 
elevator and escalator control systems and remote monitoring. In 2000, the 
firm opened a global software development center in Chennai, India, as part 
of the global R&D organization. The company also aimed at gaining a 
stronger foothold in major construction projects.  
 
2002-2004: Strategy in flux 
In terms of industry development, the market and growth potential 
continued to shift even more clearly to Asia, especially China. As markets 
were stagnant in many industrialized countries, exploiting the growth and 
the economies of scale achievable in rapidly growing markets such as China 
offered the most interesting opportunity for the elevator companies. The 
                                                   
67 The alliance allowed Toshiba to sell products based on Kone’s MonoSpace and 
EcoDisc technology under its own Spacel brand in Japan, the sales of which 
amounted up to 10% of Japan’s total elevator market. 
68 License to manufacture and market elevators based on Kone’s MonoSpace 
technology in China for the Chinese market. 
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Kunshan factory in China was expanded in order to meet the rapidly 
growing local demand as well as to increase exports to other Asian countries 
and to Europe. As price competition within the escalator business 
accelerated, partly because of increasing imports from China, Kone 
concentrated its standard escalator production for the European and Asian 
markets in Kunshan and shifted its elevator production to more cost-
efficient locations. In addition to China, Kone expanded operations in other 
rapidly growing markets, India, Russia and the Middle East. In addition, 
Kone decided to re-insource part of the formerly outsourced capabilities to 
ensure production capacity in key product development areas. 
As part of the harmonization process, Kone put in place Kone Model II, a 
business-process model, as well as several structural changes. First, it 
combined the new elevator and escalator business into a single 
organization, and the service business to another. Second, it integrated all 
major new equipment production and supply units into a single unit, and 
service support production and supply facilities into another, with an 
objective to optimize synergies among the manufacturing units. Third, all 
R&D units were unified into a global R&D organization. Finally, to 
coordinate and build up marketing capabilities, Kone established a global 
marketing unit.  
During this period, in 2003, a group of R&D and marketing people started 
looking at how to improve the visual outlook of Kone products and to 
integrate design into R&D processes. The launch of MonoSpace with a 
standardized concept and outlook had provided the company with a positive 
experience and after a couple years, a meeting was held to discuss the 
possibility of integrating design into R&D operations to a larger extent, as 
recalled by the senior vice-president in R&D who organized the meeting:  
 
It was in 2003, when we had this group of marketers and R&D people that started 
thinking how to implement design on a larger scale. It was not strategic but we 
started to think how to take better control over it. So it was by no means a top-
down but a need-based process. Marketing and R&D started thinking whom it 
belongs to in order to make it more dynamic and to get more know-how. 
 
At this stage, R&D management defined short-term actions, such as design 
requirements for each product, including the operating panel, car designs 
and platform products, as well as long-term objectives, road maps, and the 
integration of design into the R&D processes. Within the organizational 
structure, design was planned as part of the R&D department. This process 
involved determining in-house capability requirements and ownership 
issues. Within the elevator and escalator industry or among Kone’s 
traditional competitors, Otis, Thyssen, and Schindler, design was not a key 
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competence or strategic focus, and the Kone managers identified an 
opportunity to develop and build design into a competitive advantage, as 
the following quote by the senior vice-president in R&D indicates:  
 
None of our competitors had invested in it, not Otis or the Japanese. They had 
these kind of individual products, done by individual designers. But they did not 
have this kind of holistic design and nobody had understood the value of design. 
So we saw the opportunity to change it [design] into a competitive advantage. 
 
The period under analysis was also strongly influenced by ownership and 
authority arrangements within the Herlin family and a consequent family 
conflict, which led to the acquisition, reorganization and divesture of Partek 
Corporation. After the resignation of Pekka Herlin from the board and 
operational activities, and after the demerger of the company into the Kone 
Corporation and Cargotec Corporation had been announced, Kone moved 
into a transitional period. In 2004, Matti Alahuhta, an executive vice-
president of Nokia Corporation, and the future CEO of Kone joined the 
board. At that time Kone estimated that the growth in Asia’s rapidly 
growing markets had not been sufficient and this led to several major 
acquisitions in the area including a joint venture in China (Giant-Kone) to 
expand the company’s sales network and to increase its production 
capacity, with an objective to target high-volume Asian markets. 
Acquisitions were also made in India, South Korea and Thailand. The firm 
also set out to develop its product range to better respond to the needs of 
different market areas and to access wider markets. During this period the 
company also faced difficulties in major projects and in 2004 Kone and 
Toshiba agreed to strengthen their alliance through long-term collaboration 
in the promotion of high-rise elevator technology, as well as in the bidding 
for and carrying out mega-projects around the globe on a case-by-case 
basis. The following year, 2005, can be considered a turning point that 
marked the beginning of a new era for Kone Corporation and initiated 
several change activities in order to generate faster growth and better 
profitability. 
 
2005-2007: Transition period: setting a new course for the company 
through ‘must-win battles’ 
Matti Alahuhta, a former vice-president of Nokia, became president of Kone 
Corporation in 2005 and CEO in 2006, which marked the end of the Herlin 
family reign in daily operations. Although Kone occupied the number four 
position in the global elevator market, with a 10% market share, it had 
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witnessed weakened growth and profit development, as stated in the 
following extract from the 2005 Annual report: 
 
Matti Alahuhta took over as President of KONE at a very challenging time, when 
pressure for change was created by both the global competitive environment and 
certain internal forces that had weakened our growth and profit development.  
 
The company headed for a new course with a development and 
restructuring program to transform Kone into a more global and customer-
driven company, adapted to the requirements of global competition. The 
strategy, revised in the spring of 2005, included increasing customer focus, 
broadening and improving the product and service portfolio, improving 
business processes and productivity, reinforcing sourcing power, and 
strengthening market position in Asia; these were defined as the five change 
programs or ‘must-win battles’ for the corporation. At the end of 2005, the 
company reported that the main actions of the development and 
restructuring program had been undertaken while the implementation 
continued during the ongoing three-year period. 
Kone estimated that an improved customer focus and understanding 
would enable it to drive structural changes within the industry, as expressed 
by a company vice-president in marketing and quality:  
 
We can serve our customers better if we understand their needs and 
requirements. And then we can actually change the structure of the business. So I 
think that’s really what’s going to be very core.  
 
In order to build up customer capabilities, a greater weight was given to 
regional customer requirements in the global decision-making processes. 
Other activities to build up customer capabilities included new customer 
processes, re-segmentation of the customer base, a new customer 
relationship management program (CRM), new e-business tools, as well as 
training for sales people and managers. 
At the same time, measures were taken to broaden and improve the 
company’s product and service portfolio to better respond to local customer 
requirements in Asia and North America, as well as to strengthen its 
competitiveness in both volume and high-rise sectors. Consequently, the 
objective was to address local market opportunities, and at the same time to 
enhance its economies of scale by deploying global product platforms, 
which entailed, however, adding more flexibility and adaptability to the 
global platforms. This objective was attained by putting in place ‘Preferred 
Offerings’ applied to the new release of the MonoSpace elevators. They 
consisted of a set of harmonized, predefined packages, which, at the same 
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time offered customers added value by providing more flexibility, variety in 
terms of visual outlook, improved performance features (e.g. a destination 
control system and more space) and shorter delivery times. The following 
quote indicates how the firm sought to combine adaptation and 
standardization as explained by the senior vice-president in R&D: 
 
So I think that’s sort of changing our thinking also, we are talking more about 
Preferred Offering but from the customer point of view, not from the supply point 
of view. But there behind you have to have this kind of global modular technology 
so you can in an intelligent way combine the elements that make it look very 
flexible from the customer point of view. 
 
Global competition in the new equipment business, combined with a shift of 
production to low-cost countries, had intensified price competition in the 
industry. In order to make its products more cost-competitive and to 
improve profitability, Kone completed the restructuring of the production 
network as well as continued to optimize logistics and centralize sourcing, 
and improve productivity in its installation and maintenance operations 
through industrialized modernization solutions and module-based 
maintenance methods. 
The Chinese market had grown to represent one third of the global 
elevator market, corresponding to 140 000 units annually, as opposed to 30 
000 units in 1997, and the Indian market was growing rapidly to 
representing 5% of global sales. The management of Kone realized that 
market position in China had significant implication on the global market 
position, as the managing director and the director of R&D in China put it: 
 
The one that wins here wins globally. So we have to beat the main competitors 
here. 
It’s kind of like either you are competitive in China, or you’re not competitive 
globally. 
 
In order to improve its position in Asia and to accelerate growth in China, 
Kone strengthened its local management team in China and transferred the 
management of major projects from Finland to China. Instead of just 
replicating existing capabilities, the company realized the need to upgrade 
its capabilities to succeed in the highly competitive environment, as 
expressed by the subsidiary managing director: 
 
As you extend in China I believe you have to expand your global capability. […] 
It’s not a zero sum. […] it has to be an extension, expansion, sort of win-win, kind 
of like expanding on both sides to keep up with the capability. 
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Related to the firm’s new strategy was the objective to broaden its capability 
and competence base geographically and in scope by building competence 
centers in different locations, as well as to identify the company’s ‘best 
practices’ and make use of them globally, as the following quote by a Kone 
vice-president explained in the focus group discussion: 
 
We have this “Kone way” which means that we are now bringing this process 
architecture and we are really looking at the best business practices. And then 
strongly pushing those to all the units… There is a drive to build competence 
centers that would be more [geographically] balanced than the current ones. 
 
Recent innovations included Kone MaxiSpace, a counterweightless elevator, 
a modernization solution that enabled to install a larger cabin in the same 
hoistway space, as well as a flat autowalk technology, InnoTrack. However, 
the maturation of technology and the fact that the incumbents had access to 
the comparable technology had led to commoditization of end products 
making product innovation harder to effectuate and easier to replicate, as 
depicted by the vice-president in R&D and technology: 
 
The competition is coming up with the new technologies, and I think technologies 
are becoming more and more similar. So having these big differences or big leaps 
is difficult. I think it’s easier and easier to imitate, there’s easier access to 
information and patents, and information is easily available today. And also the 
life cycle times are getting shorter. 
 
Kone intensified technological cooperation with its strategic partner, 
Toshiba, especially in double-deck elevators and new escalator products. 
Moreover, it strengthened its R&D operations in both China and India, in 
order achieve more input from these markets and to utilize local 
brainpower, as the senior vice-president in R&D and technology framed it: 
 
But this [R&D] is one of those areas where we cannot totally rely on one location 
and one team. So it has to be more global. This innovation is something that we 
are now trying to push, and get more input also from these emerging markets like 
China and also India. And sort of starting to gain also something from there 
because they have huge brain power potential and we have been pushing earlier 
because of it’s lower cost and cheaper labor. But now also the brainpower is a very 
important issue for us.  
 
During the same time period, design entered the top management agenda. 
A vice-president responsible for design was hired at the end of 2005. When 
integrating design at the strategic level Kone aimed at building the 
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capability mainly organically, by establishing superior internal processes, 
while, at the same time exploiting external networks to enhance its design 
leadership in the industry. Although design was at first a relatively small 
function in terms of resource investment, its position at the top of the 
company hierarchy put it into a position to contribute to the strategic 
transformation of the company. Design became an integral of the company 
vision, as the following quote from a Kone vice-president indicates: 
 
We are in a transition period. We are coming from a fully technology-driven 
company to a point that it doesn’t make sense anymore to be that kind of a 
company and we are now heading to a new direction. And part of that is this 
design thing. 
 
In 2006, a broad range of visual options for elevator car interiors, ranging 
from wall decoration to lighting, were launched in Europe. Related to this 
launch, Kone and the Finnish design company, Marimekko, signed an 
agreement to start cooperation under license, concerning the decoration of 
elevator car interiors. Building a design capability in an engineer-driven 
culture was challenging but the launch received large media coverage and 
large in-house acceptance, and consequently paved the way for the future 
development of design, as conveyed by the vice-president for design: 
 
It was a breakthrough in a way, and a driver and an opportunity window to show 
what design can do in a traditional business like this. 
 
Design capability was built through three dimensions: the traditional 
industrial design, design management and design leadership. Building up 
the design capability involved establishing key design processes in a short 
period of time and with limited resources and personnel. The vice-president 
in design recalled: 
  
So we have built up our strategy and capabilities at the same time. And processes. 
So it’s been quite an effort to do everything from scratch. Without models or 
manuals. Design leadership is still kind of inexistent as a field or profession. 
 
Design contributed significantly to the harmonization of the product 
portfolio. It was soon recognized that design creates value through 
optimized market adaptation that is likely to improve product acceptance in 
different markets without compromising the harmonization of technology, 
global efficiencies or speed to market. The harmonized product offerings, 
labeled Preferred Offerings, were built on a global design concept, the Four 
Seasons, that was then adapted to the local market context through a 
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limited number of local designs that take into account cultural differences, 
needs and preferences identified through a culture scan and a trend 
analysis. 
The rise of the Asian market had enhanced the global position of the 
Japanese companies and the presence of the Japanese companies in the 
Chinese market had contributed to the rise of high quality into an important 
purchase criterion within the industry. Kone responded to this trend by 
rapidly introducing new interior designs to the Chinese market and by 
adapting the Four Seasons concept to the Chinese context as the Four 
Festivals. Second, the global concept was adapted to the Indian context, 
with 24 different car interiors that reflected India’s four seasons – spring, 
summer, monsoon, and winter. The adaptation to these contexts entailed 
defining a global design process, as depicted by the vice-president in design: 
 
How we ended up with this was that we did first a kind of culture scan, going back 
to the roots of the Chinese culture and also the Chinese architecture, historically, 
but also understanding how the year runs in the Chinese culture. They have their 
festivals and they have their highlights, like we have, but they are different. And 
according to those, we created a sort of idea how to reflect the differences in 
China. And the next step is that we are going to develop that further and do the 
same exercise in India. 
 
However, shifting the focus from a technology-driven company to a 
customer-focused company required both a capacity of the firm to modify 
its resources and capability base as well as both cultural change and 
organizational learning to take place. The executive vice-president reflected 
upon the change in 2006: 
 
It will take a painful change. You need to train your people to think differently 
and that is always painful. You need to have a new way of doing and new skills 
and new blood, new people and this kind of things. 
 
The objective was to build the new capabilities on superior internal 
processes, supported by shared corporate values. Consequently, the end of 
2005 also saw the initiation of a process aimed at defining corporate values 
in order to support the strategy revision and to promote the more customer-
oriented operating methods. Moreover, steps were taken to actively support 
communication of the strategy in the various countries and business units, 
including internal material and a facilitator’s network. Strategy discussions 
were organized during the year at unit, department, and working group 
levels to promote adoption of the corporate goals and understanding of how 
they affect the work of each employee. Strategic renewal was also supported 
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by large-scale human resources programs, e.g., in 2005, approximately 300 
managers from different countries were trained to upgrade their customer 
relationships and to identify Kone’s strategic customers.  
 
2008-2010: Embracing the megatrends through repositioning the 
company 
While the aforementioned corporate development programs were 
accomplished or well underway, with significant and positive impact on 
performance, Kone redefined its vision and development programs at the 
end of 2007 to better address the new business opportunities generated by 
the global megatrends. A vice-president estimated that in a constantly 
changing business environment, organizational changes were bound to be 
recurrent:  
 
Once you grasp something and for example now we have found a model that has 
taken us past two or three years. We’re entering a new phase now; we’ll get a new 
one. And once we start feeling a little bit comfortable with that one, we’ll notice 
that something else has changed again. 
 
An analysis of global megatrends indicated an estimated rise in the urban 
population from 3 to 5 billion on global basis and an increase of megacities 
(>10 million inhabitants) to 29 by 2025. The rapid urbanization was 
expected to put more emphasis on efficient people flow management 
requiring higher vertical travel, higher speeds, improved space-efficiency as 
well as enhanced capacity and services to run equipment without 
interruption. At the same time, increasing demands for energy efficiency, 
services and tighter safety standards and regulations were directed towards 
the industry. New equipment sales continued to be heavily concentrated in 
Asia, while the European market was driven by safety and accessibility 
upgrades of existing elevators and escalators due to changing demographics 
and regulations, as well as by increasing requirements for energy-efficient 
technologies resulting from climate change. 
To reflect the aforementioned megatrends and to reinforce its 
competitiveness, Kone refined its vision and repositioned the company in 
the field of people flow, with an objective to have a competitive advantage in 
user experience while having an equivalent performance with its 
competitors in other key areas. At this time, customer focus, including user 
experience, people flow solutions, environmental excellence, operational 
excellence and people leadership were defined as new development areas 
for 2008-2010, supported by corporate programs and committees, as 
explained by a company vice-president: 
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So we have long-term objectives, and these five battles. […] And then those are 
divided into practical actions. For example, environmental excellence is divided 
into five subdivisions, we have project teams and once a month we report to the 
committee our accomplishments. So how the different actions are taken forward, 
we have long- and short-term objectives that support the corporate strategy. 
 
The objective was to develop such customer-focused solutions that would 
optimize the life cycle use of the building and be distinctive in usability. 
Having already globally harmonized logistics, manufacturing, installation 
and maintenance methods, the next effort was to create more uniform 
structures to ensure operational efficiencies. In the field of environmental 
action and sustainability, the firm continued the development of eco-
efficient solutions, with an objective to reduce the energy consumption of its 
elevators by 50% in four years, and at the same time maximize the eco-
efficiency of its own operations.  
Kone monitored the legislative and standardization developments related 
to safety and energy consumption requirements, and sought to influence the 
development of codes and standards through its active participation in 
professional associations and standardization committees both nationally 
and internationally, including ISO and various councils promoting 
sustainable development. Kone also scanned local product and service 
requirements to create improved solutions for local needs. In China, the 
demand for energy efficiency was growing alongside the requirement for 
space efficiency, e.g., in China the State Construction Commission issued a 
‘Construction Energy-saving Management Rule’, requiring real estate 
developers to disclose their ‘residential energy-savings index’ in all future 
projects. A Kone vice-president in R&D and technology commented: 
 
So really influencing these decision-makers early on when we are working on a 
new code. We want to drive the code to harmonize it, and make it more global. So 
we are actively working at the code committees, also together with the 
competitors.  
 
Kone was able to maintain its position as the technological leader, a 
position backed up by some 3,000 elevator- and escalator-related patents. 
As technological innovations became less frequent, the firm’s new offering 
development was directed towards the areas of visual design and user 
experience focusing on ride comfort and car ambiance through the use of 
light, color, patterns, materials and sounds, as well as in space and energy 
efficiency, as reckoned by the vice-presidents in R&D and design: 
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It’s also becoming more and more difficult to come up with this kind of 
breakthrough innovation […].  
 
I think that when you notice that we have reached this maturity level in this 
technology, that it really needs an extra gear to make a breakthrough. […] But we 
have other type of innovations too, not just technological. And then, design could 
be an innovator, if it’s used in the right way. 
 
The positioning of Kone in the field of people flow provided the company 
with an option to expand its core business beyond elevators and escalators 
in the future. They also strengthened their offering of complementary 
products and services to create further growth opportunities. An example of 
this extended offering included a control system solution enabling 
integration between building door access, elevator performance, and 
lighting control. At the same time, the company acknowledged the need to 
extend beyond the boundaries of the firm and rely more on partners for 
innovation. Kone started looking for new technologies that would enhance 
the user interface and enable the building up of customer-driven solutions, 
explained by the R&D vice-president as follows: 
 
I think there are different technologies entering. If you look at elevators 50 years 
ago, it was more this kind of mechanical component, hoisting functions, ropes, 
steel structure and less electrical components. Now we go more into this kind of 
user interface integrating into other building systems, security, safety, artificial 
intelligence, more options in how elevators work in groups and how elevators are 
used for different types of businesses. […] Now we have more and more partners 
that share the innovations, and how we come up with innovations is typically in 
this kind of joint project. […] When you start dealing more with user interface 
and new technologies, then you have to rely more on partners. And how to apply 
something where maybe the initial idea has been developed somewhere else and 
how to integrate that into the elevator and escalator environment and our 
technology.  
 
At this time, design was recognized as a key differentiator both internally 
and externally69. Moreover, the scope of design had extended well beyond 
visual outlook, the initial motivation for Kone to start building up design 
capability. The repositioning of the company in the field of people flow that 
entailed a focus on user experience further reinforced design with the firm’s 
capability base and gave design capability a key role in the company’s future 
                                                   
69 Kone Corporation was awarded Good Design awards in 2008 and 2009 for its 
innovative designs for new elevator design concepts and for its new design 
signalization series, and is up to date the only elevator and escalator company to 
have ever received this award 
   
 148 
development, as the following quote by a senior vice-president in R&D 
substantiates: 
 
So [the vice-president for design] took a very strong grip, she was visionary and 
applied design in a larger extent, so that design was not simply a visual outlook 
but much more. […] And now that we talk about the people flow experience, 
design is even more clearly integrated into this second phase strategy. 
 
In addition to adding value to Kone products, design as a forward-looking 
capability contributed to the overall capacity of the company to react to 
external changes, as an indication of how the level of dynamic capabilities 
may vary between different business units. The vice-president for design 
makes a case: 
 
If I think of design, I think that our capability has grown faster vis-à-vis external 
changes. We have been able to react faster to external changes than Kone on 
average. 
 
However, as the role of design expanded, it became more difficult to 
manage and control, both geographically and in relation to other business 
functions as a reflection of the complexity and inertia of the MNC internal 
selection environment. As Kone vice-presidents reasoned during the focus 
group discussion: 
 
The top management understands, and design is built into the R&D process. But 
how to make the significance and the value-added of design to become more 
concrete at the customer interface, there is still a lot of work to do. […] We are a 
house of thirty-five thousand people, and we are used to selling products with the 
technical specifications  
 
How do you make someone who has 30 years experience in selling screws, nuts 
and bolts talk about flowers, pictures and emotions? 
 
Consequently, there were large geographical differences on how design was 
perceived and exploited within different subsidiaries, depending on the 
prevailing internal environment and top management support. Yet other 
difficulties arose from determining the ownership of design capability as it 
was extended within the multinational firm. A company senior vice-
president reflects upon the geographical differences: 
 
Then we went to India, and somehow [the vice-president for design] got a really 
good link to the Indian top management. They understood the concepts and 
design got the support from the country manager. So [the vice-president for 
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design] and [the managing director for India] have had a really good 
collaboration and mutual understanding. [The managing director for India] has 
given recognition to the design teams, and they have been actively marketing 
design and made it visible at the frontline. [...] So India is a country that has 
taken design as a key thing and according to them, it has had a significant impact 
on upgrading the Kone profile in India. […] But China has been very reluctant; it’s 
not mature yet. And in the US we are taking the first steps and I think that it’s 
going to work out there, at least the first feedback from customers is very positive.  
 
At the end of the case time, in 2010, Kone’s operating margin had reached 
the level of 14%, and its global market share had increased for four 
consecutive years, up to 12%. Kone was one of the fastest growing elevator 
companies in China and became the second largest elevator and escalator 
company there in 2011 having acquired an 80% share of Giant Kone, a joint 
venture established in 2005.  
 
5.2.3 Summary of the Focused CMO-Configurations and Within-Case 
Analysis (Diagnostic Case) 
 
Table 7 summarizes the case periods and CMO-configurations by 
highlighting key factors in context (internal and external) and capability 
development.  
As the case evidence illustrates, during the case time the main events, or 
sequences of events, that had an impact on the elevator and escalator 
industry included: 1) the consolidation of the industry; 2) maturation of the 
market in Europe and the simultaneous establishment of the EU promoting 
the standardization of products; 3) ageing of buildings in Europe putting 
emphasis on maintenance and modernization, further reinforced by the 
accessibility requirements of the ageing population, and the increasing 
safety norms; 4) urbanization of Asian countries and the consequent high-
volume residential construction and high-level office building construction; 
5) environmental consciousness and actions promoting more energy-
efficient solutions. Moreover, certain innovations shaped the market, 
especially Kone’s hoisting machinery that enabled the development of a 
machineroomless elevator (MRL) in 1996, thereby creating a new segment 
and making it a new market standard. 
The high level of consolidation of the elevator industry can be considered 
a joint outcome of the firms’ actions and changes in the institutional 
environment. Similarly, the high level of industry globalization can be 
regarded as an outcome of co-evolution between the incumbents’ actions 
and the growth of markets in Asian countries, China in particular. The main 
external drivers in the industry were, first, institutional, as the removal of 
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 1994-96 1997-2001 2002-04  2005-07  2008-10 
Ex
te
rn
al
 c
on
te
xt
  (
C
) 
 
Highly consolidated 
elevator and escalator 
industry. Slowdown of 
the European market, 
growing role of Asia. 
The establishment of 
the EU and the removal 
of trade barriers enable 
harmonization and 
standardization. Low 
market potential in the 
US. 
Globalization: 
customers operate 
increasingly across 
borders and seek global 
partners. Intense 
market share and price 
competition. 
Maturation of the 
elevator and escalator 
market. The growth of 
the Chinese market. 
Market stagnant in 
industrialized countries, 
emphasis on 
maintenance and 
modernization. Market 
growth and potential 
shifting to Asia, 
especially China. Other 
growth markets :India, 
Russia, and the Middle 
East.  
Rise of the Asian markets: 
China to represent 30% of 
the global market. Market 
growth in China driven by 
urbanization: high-volume 
residential building and high-
rise office building. 
Intensified competition from 
incumbents and Asian 
competitors. 
Global megatrends create 
new technology and 
service requirements. 
Asian market driven by 
new equipment. European 
market driven by new 
requirements related to 
safety, accessibility and 
eco-efficiency. Intensifying 
competition because of 
economic slow-down. 
In
te
rn
al
 c
on
te
xt
  (
C
) 
(In
te
rn
al
) 
 
Focusing on elevators 
and escalators.  
Internationalization 
through acquisitions. 
Subsidiaries loosely 
integrated to the 
headquarters. 
Reorganizing and 
harmonizing European 
operations. 
Reinforcement of the 
customer service 
network in China and 
decision to enter China 
with a greenfield 
investment. Acquisition 
of the Montgomery 
Elevator Company in 
the US. Gaining 
technological 
leadership with the 
invention of the 
machineroomless 
elevator in 1996. 
Need to transform into 
a global organization 
with uniform practices 
and processes.  
Companies within the 
Group adopt the Kone 
name.  
Rationalization of 
production and 
improving the efficiency 
of operations.  
Diversification into 
automatic doors.  
Growth in Asian set as 
the key target: 
Establishment of the 
Chinese subsidiary, 
manufacturing facility 
and new regional 
offices in China. 
Strategic alliance with 
Toshiba of Japan and 
MacGregor.  
Divesture of South 
American operations. 
Global alignment of 
operations and 
business processes.  
Expansion of the 
Kunshan factory in 
China. Decision to set 
up a joint venture with 
Giant to expand the 
sales network and 
production capacity. 
Strengthening the 
Toshiba alliance: co-
operation on major 
projects.  
Corporate restructuring: 
New elevators and 
escalators into a single 
division. Production and 
supply into a single unit. 
Global R&D and 
marketing units. 
Changes in corporate 
governance. 
Change of top management. 
Kone to go through strategic 
transformation  
5 development programs: 
1) Customer focus  
2) Product portfolio to meet 
customer requirements in 
Asia and North America   
3) Business processes and 
productivity  
4) Sourcing power  
5) Market position in Asia 
Management of major 
projects to China. 
Cooperation with Toshiba on 
double-deck elevators and 
escalators. 
Preferred offerings: global 
product platforms and 
modular technology 
Kone-Giant joint-venture 
Kone positions itself in the 
field of ‘people flow’. 
Five development 
programs:  
1) Customer focus and 
user experience  
2) People Flow solutions 
3) Environmental 
excellence 
4) Operational excellence 
5) People leadership  
 
Kone to acquire 80% of the 
Giant-Kone joint venture. 
 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
(M
) 
Capability trimming, 
focus on the core 
business accelerates 
capability development. 
Focus on R&D. 
Capability 
reconfiguration and 
rationalization in 
Europe. 
 
Putting in place global 
processes and 
practices, and 
balancing resources 
geographically. 
Capability trimming: 
outsourcing of 
component 
manufacturing and old 
technology. 
Exploiting existing 
capabilities in automatic 
doors, extending R&D. 
Capability 
reconfiguration and 
transfer. Putting in 
place global business 
processes and 
practices. Structural 
changes to promote 
capability development, 
e.g., marketing 
capability. 
Re-insourcing 
component 
manufacturing to 
ensure production 
capacity in key areas. 
 
Active internal capability 
development and renewal in 
line with business strategy. 
Broadening the capability 
base geographically. 
Identifying best practices 
and spreading them 
globally. Building up 
capabilities in customer 
management and design. 
Transfer of major projects to 
China. 
Active internal capability 
development to support 
differentiation based on 
end-user experience, 
solutions and eco-
efficiency.  
Capability renewal through 
partnerships. 
Development programs 
divided into sub-programs 
and supported by project 
teams and committees. 
Influencing decision-
makers in various 
committees and 
associations. 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 o
ut
co
m
es
 (O
) 
Mainly local 
capabilities, not 
exploited globally.  
A global R&D process. 
The invention of the 
machineroomless 
elevator.  
Harmonized and 
streamlined production 
and supply processes, 
improved economies of 
scale. 
Material handling 
capabilities divested. 
Kone Model: Global 
alignment of operations 
and business 
processes  
Investments from 
product development to 
R&D and emerging 
technologies, e.g., 
global software 
development center in 
India. Joint R&D with 
Toshiba, marine 
elevators with 
MacGregor 
Kone Model II to 
harmonize global 
business processes 
and practices. Improved 
capability to meet the 
local demand in China. 
Enhanced capabilities 
in major projects and 
high-rise technology 
(str.alliance with 
Toshiba). 
Kone way: global process 
architecture and diffusion of 
best practices.  
Redefinition of corporate 
values. HRM: internal 
training and communication, 
facilitators network.  
New customer processes. 
Global product platforms 
and modular technology. 
Strengthened R&D in China 
and India. 
 
Differentiation based on 
user experience, eco-
efficiency and customer-
driven solutions. 
More open source 
innovations with partners, 
complementary products 
and services, extended 
offerings. More eco-
efficient solutions. 
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Period
  
1994-96 1997-2001 2002-04  2005-07  2008-10 
C
ap
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ili
ty
 m
ec
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ni
sm
s 
(M
) r
el
at
in
g 
to
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es
ig
n 
 Harmonization creates a 
need and opportunity for 
design.  
Capability upgrading: 
exploiting external design 
capability. 
 Identification the 
potential in 
product design. 
A new vice-president 
in design, integrating 
design into R&D 
processes, building 
up a design process 
and strategy.  
Design to have a 
central role in the 
new strategy in 
conjunction with 
R&D.  Focus on 
user experience.  
 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 o
ut
co
m
es
  (
O
) 
re
la
tin
g 
to
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es
ig
n 
 
Design used in the 
development of the 
MonoSpace, 
machineroomless elevator 
to create a harmonized 
pan-European product. 
Limited 
internal 
design 
capability, no 
design 
process. 
Short-and long 
term road-maps 
and actions, a job 
description for a 
design manager. 
Design process and 
strategy. Global 
design concepts, 
adapted to local 
contexts (China, 
India). 
Harmonized product 
offerings. 
Building up design 
in the US. 
 
 
Table 7. Summary of the Case Periods and Focused CMO-Configurations at Kone 
 
trade barriers and the harmonization of codes enabled standardizing 
product offerings and their underlying technologies, and endorsed global 
alignment of sourcing, manufacturing and logistics. The second external 
driver was the growth of the Chinese market and the shift of focus to Asia 
that had a significant impact on business operations. The third key driver 
was the globalization of customers and other stakeholders that has 
advanced the harmonization of business practices and marketing.  
While the consolidation of the industry promoted an aggressive 
acquisition strategy in the race for market presence and position, the 
subsequent globalization required an ability to integrate and reconfigure the 
acquired companies’ operations globally. As the European and other 
Western markets became mature and saturated, the focus shifted to Asia, 
requiring new capabilities from the incumbents. On the one hand, the 
incumbents needed to address the high-volume residential markets and to 
cope with cost-based competition from Chinese companies forcing them to 
improve their cost structures and look for operational efficiencies. On the 
other hand, to address the high-level office construction and to combat 
Japanese companies that had a strong position in the Chinese market and 
that had set new market standards in terms of quality and ride comfort, the 
incumbents needed to upgrade their capabilities in technology and quality. 
 In parallel, the consolidation of the industry and the maturation of 
technology had standardized interfaces and led to an increasing amount of 
transactions being performed across rather than within organizational 
boundaries. With access to the same technology and component 
manufacturers, innovations and differentiation based on technical 
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attributes became more difficult to achieve. This forced the incumbents to 
look for new sources of value creation, and to build up new capabilities.  
 
Capability development mechanisms and logics within the case firm 
As indicated by the case analysis, both the shift of markets to Asia, as well as 
the related business strategy changes induced intensive capability 
development within Kone. During the case time Kone transformed itself 
from a family-owned conglomerate to a globally aligned corporation and at 
the same time, from an engineering-driven elevator and escalator company 
into a customer-focused company. Capability development within Kone was 
driven by corporate development programs related to the reorganization of 
the company, and was supported by the establishment of new corporate 
wide programs and processes. 
The consolidation of the escalator and elevator industry since the 1960s 
had relied heavily on an aggressive acquisition strategy to attain market 
presence and position. Despite its relatively small size, Kone had been able 
to pursue an aggressive acquisition strategy, like the other main players in 
the industry. Instead of internationalizing by replicating its home-based 
capabilities, Kone internationalized through acquisitions and resulted with 
a number of independently operating firms. Enabled by the removal of 
barriers to standardization and motivated by improved efficiencies, Kone’s 
main challenge vis-à-vis its capability development was first, to harmonize 
business processes and practices, and second, to reconfigure its capabilities 
globally, build geographically balanced competence centers, as well as 
transfer capabilities and ‘best practices’ to and from various geographical 
units as an example of retention.  
At the same time, Kone strove to maintain and develop technological 
capabilities that were superior to its competitors, and subsequently to drive 
the industry evolution. Although the company had a lead in technological 
capabilities vis-à-vis its competitors, the maturation of technology had led 
to competitors developing and gaining access to technological capabilities 
comparable with those possessed by Kone. As industry evolution resulted in 
elevators becoming increasingly built on external modules and components, 
the ability to access external technology and component manufacturers 
became key.  
Faced with radical changes in its external environment and hampered by 
internal forces, Kone changed its CEO in order to reinvigorate the company 
into new growth and profitability. An aggressive acquisition strategy had led 
to a large amount of local variation in terms of capabilities, products and 
business processes. These, however, were not exploited on a large scale, but 
instead led to inefficiencies that prevented the firm from meeting the 
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requirements of global competition. The company headed for a new course 
with a development and restructuring program to transform it into a 
customer-driven and globally aligned company, with global capabilities, 
business processes and products. The strategy, revised in the spring of 
2005, included focusing on a select number of key capabilities, labeled as 
five ‘must-win battles’, including customer focus, broadening and 
improving product and service portfolio, improving business processes and 
productivity, reinforcing sourcing power, and strengthening market 
position in Asia.  
The growth of new equipment sales to China also had a significant impact 
on Kone’s capability development requiring the firm to both extend and 
upgrade its capabilities in order to succeed in the highly competitive 
environment. On the one hand, it demanded the highest technology, quality 
and execution speed to be able to address the requirements of high-rise 
buildings. On the other hand, it required the ability to address the high 
volume mid-range markets forcing Kone to reassess its high technology 
positioning and to extend its sales and service network. To achieve this goal, 
it opted for a joint venture with Giant Ltd. in 2005, followed by an increase 
in its ownership up to 80% in 2011. Like other elevator and escalator 
companies, Kone used Giant-Kone as its second brand in order to address 
the lower segments. The ability to access and complement Kone’s internal 
capabilities with those of local actors improved not only the firm’s 
geographical spread within China, but also its capability to address the 
volume markets and the lower-cost sectors of the market.  
At the same time, measures were taken in order to limit the amount of 
local variation in products and services. The objective was to respond to 
local market opportunities with global product platforms, which entailed, 
however, adding more flexibility and adaptability to the global platforms. 
This was attained by putting in place ‘Preferred Offerings’ applied to the 
new release of the MonoSpace elevators. They consisted of a set of 
harmonized, internally selected and predefined packages, which, at the 
same time offered customers improved performance features (e.g. a 
destination control system and more space) and shorter delivery times.  
Having set the company on a new course starting in 2005 based on a 
select number of key capabilities, the objective of Kone was to build new 
capabilities to support further value creation and differentiation. In the 
search for more variation and differentiating capabilities, the firm focused 
on capabilities that it considered to provide the most value-added at the 
customer and user-interface, such as customer processes, design and eco-
efficiency. Kone refined its vision and repositioned the company in the field 
of people flow, with an objective to build distinctive capabilities in user 
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experience while having an equivalent performance to its competitors in 
other capabilities. At this time the company estimated that enhanced 
customer focus, including user experience, people flow solutions as well as 
environmental excellence would provide ideal platforms for further 
capability development. The objective was to develop such customer-
focused solutions that would optimize the life cycle use of the building and 
be distinctive in the user experience. They also scanned local requirements 
in products and services to be able to offer better solution for local needs. 
As technological innovations became less frequent, Kone’s new offering 
development was directed towards the areas of visual design and user 
experience focusing on ride comfort and car ambiance through the use of 
light, color, patterns, materials and sounds, promoting the development of 
design capability. During the case time, the development of design 
capability went through the processes of establishment and consolidation as 
a strategic capability. Although design was at first a relatively small function 
in terms of resource investment, its position at the top of the company 
hierarchy put it into a position to contribute to the strategic transformation 
of the company. Although the design capability development was supported 
by firm strategy, it did not receive unanimous support from various 
geographical units because of differences in internal and external selection 
environments. 
The positioning of Kone in the field of people flow also provided the 
company with an option to create more variation and to expand its 
capabilities beyond elevators and escalators, and to find new application 
domains for its extant capabilities. As an outcome, the firm strengthened its 
offering of complementary products and services to address different 
external selection criteria in new market segments or application domains. 
At the same time, it acknowledged the need to rely more on partners on 
innovation, and established partnerships with an objective to gain access to 
new capabilities and technologies that would enhance the user interface. An 
example of its extended offering included a control system solution enabling 
integration between building door access, elevator performance, and 
lighting control.  
During the case time, Kone’s capability development was first mainly an 
outcome of reacting and adapting to the external environment, but became 
later characterized by proactive internal capability development. Moreover, 
it was able to manage the diversification of external selection criteria and to 
develop capabilities adapted to changes in the external environment, such 
as the market growth and the shift of focus to Asia, while at the same time, 
retaining capabilities required in other markets. The repositioning of the 
firm in the field of people flow reflected an opportunity-seeking approach to 
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capability development: on the one hand, it enabled Kone to use its existing 
resources and capabilities to address new business opportunities, on the 
other hand, it motivated the firm to extend its capability base. Although the 
role of external innovation was not as prominent within the elevator 
business as in other high-technology industries, the move to solutions and 
the integration of software into elevators raised the need to rely more on 
partners on innovation and new technologies underlining a heightened 
need to complement the internal capability development with access to 
complementary capabilities. 
 
Internal and external selection environments  
The Kone case provides an illustration of a company that was able to build 
dynamic capabilities to address changes its operating environment and to 
do it during a relatively short period of time. However, it also illustrates 
how the internal selection environment affects both strategic renewal and 
capability development as illustrated by the development of design 
capability, for example. The objective of this section is to put forward those 
conditions and contextual factors within the external and internal 
environments of the case firm that have had an impact on capability 
outcomes and the evolutionary fitness between firm capabilities and the 
prevalent selection criteria. While the main drivers have traditionally been 
associated with the complexity and velocity of the external environment, 
data analysis indicates that a number of factors can be attributed to the 
internal selection environment and originate from the alignment between 
internal selection criteria and strategy.  
It can be contested that capability development within Kone was 
influenced by both serendipity, as illustrated by the invention of 
machineroomless elevator, but also by corporate strategy directed to 
address market opportunities in China and to reposition the company to 
ensure future growth. The analysis reveals that Kone’s proactive capability 
development was enabled, first and foremost, by a careful alignment of its 
internal environment with its strategy. By defining key organizational 
processes, labeled as ‘must-win battles’ it was able to ensure that internal 
selection, including resource allocation, was harnessed to support corporate 
strategy. Moreover, the establishment of new corporate-wide programs and 
processes, redefinition of corporate values, as well as intensive training and 
communication, including internal material and a facilitator network, 
supported both the alignment of the internal selection environment with 
strategy and retention. 
At the same time, Kone was able to manage the diversification of external 
selection criteria. Consequently, it was able to develop capabilities in new 
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equipment sales adapted to changes in the external environment, such as 
the shift of markets to Asia, while at the same time, retaining capabilities 
required in other markets, such as modernization and maintenance 
capabilities. Within the elevator and escalator industry, market growth and 
technological development were both concentrated to Asia that facilitated 
the challenges associated with identifying and addressing divergent external 
selection criteria. Moreover, when identifying gaps within its capability 
base, Kone was able to complement and combine its capabilities with those 
of various partners, as illustrated by the Toshiba alliance and the joint 
venture with the Chinese Giant elevator company. 
However, despite the ability of Kone to pursue a strategic transformation 
as a demonstration of its dynamic capabilities, the organizational change 
was demanding in the context of the multinational firm. First, there were 
significant differences as to how well capability development was supported 
by various geographical units as illustrated for example by the development 
of design capability. As the role of design expanded, it became more difficult 
to manage and control, both geographically and in relation to other 
business functions that pointed to the difficulties in determining the 
ownership of a particular capability as it is diffused within the multinational 
firm.  Also, as indicated by the data, there were large geographical 
differences on how design was perceived and exploited within different 
subsidiaries, depending on the prevailing internal selection environment 
and top management support. In addition, the study of design capability at 
Kone also provided an illustration on how the level of dynamic capabilities 
may differ between different business and geographical units. Second, the 
Kone data pointed to the difficulties in performing a strategic renewal 
because of the size and complexity of the multinational firm, as expressed 
by Kone the executive vice-president in the middle of the organizational 
change: 
 
This picture is very simple, but execution is very difficult, how to make it happen 
in the whole company. If you do it just in one part of the company, that will not 
help. Normally what happens when implementing strategy is that some part of 
the chain is not exactly understanding it and able to pull in the same direction.  
 
I think that the biggest barrier to change is the slowness of organizational 
learning.  
 
In summary it can be concluded that during the case time, Kone was able to 
capitalize on external changes and to build the required capabilities to 
address changes and opportunities in the external environment. These 
included the participation in the consolidation of the industry, building up 
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capabilities required to take advantage of market growth in Asia, especially 
in the Chinese market, and the recent technological and design solutions to 
address the management of people flow. As an outcome, Kone was able to 
influence future selection criteria in line with its resources and capabilities 
and to benefit from its lead vis-à-vis its competitors. The firm’s capability 
development was supported by the establishment of adequate selection 
criteria and resource allocation, as well as by an ability to complement its 
internal capabilities with those of external partners through alliances and 
acquisitions. At the same time, the Kone case also points to challenges in 
performing strategic renewal and building a shared vision within the 
context of the multinational firm because of differences in internal selection 
environments. 
 
 
5.3 Iittala: Capabilities to Support Reorientation and 
International Development70  
 
5.3.1 Background and Context 
 
The Iittala Group, which is at present part of Fiskars Corporation, operates 
in the field of homeware and interior design and includes brands such as 
Iittala, Hackman, Arabia and Rörstrand with a long history in Scandinavian 
design71. In 200972, Iittala’s net sales amounted to 143.9 M€, out of which 
some 80% came from the home markets, Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
Iittala has had a very strong market position within its home markets, 
notably Finland, with an approximately 50% market share. During the case 
time the strategy of Iittala involved leveraging its home market position and 
at the same time seeking growth through international expansion, and it 
operated a dual business model with a multi-brand, multi-channel 
approach in its home markets, and a single-brand, single-channel strategy 
based on the Iittala brand and its own retail concept in international 
markets. 
The homeware industry is mature and stagnant, characterized by low 
demand and overcapacity. Confronting a number of locally operating and 
historically rooted companies, the objective of Iittala has been to outpace 
market growth and outperform the traditional companies by capitalizing on 
                                                   
70 Iittala will be used to refer to the business unit under analysis despite changes in 
its name and ownership arrangements during the period under analysis. 
71 Rörstrand factory was founded in 1726, Hackman in 1790, Arabia in 1873 and 
Iittala in 1881 
72 Since the integration of Iittala as part of the Fiskars Group Home Division in 
2009, its turnover has not been separately reported 
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evolving user trends and by effectively managing the entire value chain, 
from design, product development, sourcing, production and distribution, 
to retail sales. The poor quality of distribution and lack of dynamic channels 
in many countries has prompted Iittala to establish a retail store concept, 
applied to its own stores as well as to department stores as ‘shop-in-shops’. 
Iittala has also put in place a franchise model in order to be able to expand 
internationally in a faster and less capital-intensive way. The objective has 
been to build the Iittala brand internationally and, at the same time, to gain 
direct access to consumers. The increasing consumer focus has served as a 
basis for its ambition to establish a product leadership position within the 
industry. 
Partly resulting from the globalization impact, the homeware consumer 
market has become more polarized, with demand for premium brands and 
luxury products on the one hand, and low-cost private label and mass-
market products on the other. Although differences in country costs have 
promoted further globalization of the industry, unfavorable logistics and 
differences in quality have, to some extent, slowed down the process. 
However, Asia, and especially China, has become an important supply-base 
for the homeware industry, and low-cost imports from Asia have generated 
cost pressures to the incumbents. In order to respond to these cost 
pressures, traditional companies have increased automation, closed 
European-based factories and shifted their production to Asia, and at the 
same time increased the extent of outsourcing to adjust their capacities. 
Iittala has also undertaken some significant industrial reorganization, 
closing four factories in its home markets during a period of 7 years, and 
has put in place processes to improve its operational efficiency and use of 
capital. At the same time, it has rationalized its product offering and cut 
down the number of its product variants from 17 000 to 3000, and 
increased outsourcing from 0% to 30% of net sales. 
The Iittala Group has also undergone major changes in its ownership 
structure during the same period. First it was a business division within the 
Hackman Group. The Hackman Group, established in 1790, was formerly a 
conglomerate involved in a variety of businesses73, but in early 1990s it 
started divesting its non-core businesses and starting in 2000 it focused on 
its two main divisions, Designor, the homeware product division, and 
Metos, the professional kitchen equipment and systems division. However, 
the internationalization process of the two divisions was hampered by the 
company’s limited resources, which led the company to look for 
rearrangements in its ownership structure. In 2003, the Hackman Group 
                                                   
73 Including, e.g., tools for wood processing industry (Hackman TTT), water 
treatment systems (Hadwawo), and milk cooling products (Eurotanks). 
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sold its operations to the Italian Ali Group, and in 2004 Iittala Group 
became independent with an ownership arrangement between a venture 
capital company74, private investors and the operating management. The 
company targeted listing at the Helsinki Stock Exchange in March of 2007 
but was acquired by the Fiskars Group in June 2007 and integrated as part 
of the Fiskars Home division in 2009. The ownership changes, among 
others, promoted intensive capability development within the company 
with an objective to augment the value of the company. 
The beginning of the case time was set at 2000, when the strategy for the 
company was revised. Following a new strategy that became effective in 
2002, Iittala started transforming itself from a traditional industrial 
company to a consumer focused company with retail expertise, and put in 
place several processes to upgrade and build up new capabilities. The 
company was acquired by the Fiskars Group in 2007 but was only loosely 
integrated to this group until 2009, which marks the end of the case time. 
Capability dynamics within the case firm will be discussed at an aggregate 
level and at the level of design capability.  
 
5.3.2 Capability Development at Iittala (Analytical Chronology) 
 
During the case time, Iittala’s capability development was related to two 
fundamental and simultaneous developments. First, the firm underwent a 
strategic transformation from a traditional industrial company to a 
consumer-driven retail company. Following this strategic shift, Iittala had 
to build new capabilities and put in place new processes. The firm’s core 
capabilities had historically included superior design, brand management 
and certain core competences in manufacturing, such as color glazed 
porcelain, colored pressed glass and glassblowing (mouth-blown glass birds 
and Aalto vases). Following the strategic reorientation, capability 
development was directed towards retail expertise and product 
development, as well as to improve its operations and use of capital. Being a 
relatively small company with limited resources Iittala had to prioritize 
internal capability development, as stated by the CEO: 
 
We assess it every year as we go forward; what is our success rate, how much 
resources we need to put into internal development and how much we can put 
into expansion. 
 
The second development relates to its international expansion. The shift 
from an internationalization process based on a limited number of sales and 
                                                   
74 ABN Amro Capital 
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marketing offices to presence in international markets with its own retail 
stores also had implications on its capability development. The relatively 
low pace of market expansion and the lack of global head-on competition 
enabled Iittala to expand gradually and to incrementally develop the 
required capabilities. However, many of the firm’s capabilities resided in 
Finland and it encountered difficulties in transferring its home-based 
capabilities to new locations, even to other Scandinavian countries, as 
acknowledged by the CEO during the focus group discussion: 
 
We have been constantly raising this question of why we are not able of to 
replicate this [home market] business model. That is just something that we are 
not capable of. 
 
2000-2003: The revised strategy sets the course for capability 
development 
Accompanied by a change of CEO, Iittala revised its strategy in 2000. The 
strategy became effective in 2002 and involved seeking strong growth 
internationally while reinforcing its position in the home markets. It 
assessed that the poor quality of traditional distribution in many countries 
did not provide an ideal platform for international expansion or brand 
building, and consequently, developing a new retail concept was 
determined as a cornerstone of its international strategy. The objective of 
the revised strategy was to base the international expansion on the Iittala 
brand, narrower target group, premium product positioning, and an own 
retail concept in select focus markets, while maintaining a broad range of 
brands in the home markets enabled by its strong market position. 
Prior to the case time all the different brands within the division had their 
own production units and organizational structures, and the brands 
pursued internationalization independently, which had led to a dispersal of 
resources and mediocre results, as recalled by the CEO: 
 
And they [business units] all had ambition to be successful in home markets and 
also build international business with these four brands in all the markets […]. At 
least for me it was so totally clear that there is absolutely no chance we were going 
to build four brands with our resources. […] Internally it was a lengthy and 
heated discussion and debate, because we had all of these business areas and 
business heads that had been running their own businesses and own factories. 
They each had a very strong opinion that their brand was the one that should be 
chosen.  
 
Other brands were withdrawn from international markets and a number of 
internationally potential products were consolidated into the Iittala concept 
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brand extending it beyond traditional homeware products to solutions 
ranging from cooking to interior decoration.  
The company had opted for using external rather than internal designers 
in the 1990s as they assessed that the use of external designers would 
enable the company to obtain fresh ideas and exploit capabilities of external 
actors. Iittala products had been designed to carry a significant amount of 
both social and cultural capital in line with the design philosophy of each 
brand and they carefully controlled the design process.   Despite the lack of 
internal designers, Iittala maintained a high level of design capability 
embedded in the organization, as expressed by the CEO: 
 
When it comes to sort of modern design or Scandinavian design, that’s where we 
are one of the leading companies by any standard, by any measurement […]. We 
have always been here and we have a track record and credibility and probably 
some sort of in-built capabilities and those. Latent knowledge in the company is 
spread around a lot of people so that we can develop, create, and maintain 
modern design in our portfolio. 
 
2004-2006: International expansion and building up retail capability 
Following the buy-out in 2004, the company continued to aggressively 
pursue its revised strategy by expanding internationally through direct 
retail operations and the Iittala brand while leveraging its market leader 
position in the home markets. The home market business model involved a 
multi-channel, multi-brand market leader strategy with a large target group 
and distribution, including mass-market distribution, whereas the 
international strategy relied on a tightly focused and narrower target group 
addressed with a single brand and with a tightly controlled retail concept.  
Iittala sought to establish a strong retail presence in markets where there 
was appeal for Scandinavian design and that provided the best application 
for its capabilities. The objective of Iittala was to target clusters with a 10-15 
million population within Scandinavia and Northern Europe75 with a 10-20-
store coverage, regarded as ideal in terms of purchase potential and for 
brand building. The objective of the company was to first establish a strong 
position within these select markets before further expansion to other 
markets. The retail concept was honed to a franchise model, enabling the 
firm to expand at a faster pace and with lower capital expenditure. Iittala 
brand was withdrawn from a large number of sales points to pave the way 
for their own stores or franchise stores with a considerable impact on 
turnover. Japan and the US continued to be served as main export markets. 
                                                   
75 The specific countries are not indicated due to confidentiality reasons. 
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The Netherlands was chosen as the pilot market with significant resource 
investment to build a successful business model and to enable 
organizational learning to take place. The Dutch market was assessed as 
having sufficient demand for modern design and the local sales unit was 
very committed to the new strategy. The lack of historical companies in the 
market provided a favorable ground for international brands, while, at the 
same time, the market was competitive as most of the international brands 
were present. A success in the Netherlands was assessed to pave the way for 
further expansion. 
As Iittala’s strategy was increasingly linked to its retail concept, building 
up the retail capability became a priority for the company, as the CEO 
reckoned in 2006:  
 
It is this big commitment to retail, own retail concept. […]  For an industrial 
company with 125 years of history with several factories and lot of history in 
traditional production industry to suddenly say that we are going to be a retail-
oriented company that is going to make this brand internationally available 
through an own retail concept, was and still is a big bold statement.  
 
Rather than looking at ways of operating within the industry, the company 
sought benchmarks and best practices from other industries, such as the 
clothing industry. The company considered itself to be in direct competition 
with retail stores in the quest for consumers’ shopping time and ‘share of 
wallet’. They used external consultants to gain expertise in retail but 
refrained from recruiting from other industries. Instead, Iittala opted for 
building up the retail capability internally to enable organizational learning 
to take place, as expressed by a company director, and member of the 
executive board: 
 
There has been a lot of discussion on whether we should have recruited external 
experts, instead of creating the competence [retail capability] internally. The 
decision that was taken in 2003 was to develop it in house so that it gradually 
builds into our corporate DNA.  
 
Design capability, deeply embedded in the company, also served as a 
platform that enabled Iittala to extend the scope of its core business to 
retailing and consequently, the use of design was extended from product 
development to shop and service design, as described by a company 
director: 
 
The role of design, well, it’s in our corporate DNA, present in everything, so we 
don’t just design a product but the whole offering […]. The company has been 
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changing, we have traditionally been a product and production-driven company 
and design has been a strong factor. And now that the company has evolved and 
integrated forward, design has been involved in all these stages. […] All the way to 
the customer contact. In fact design is even involved in how the sales people 
approach the consumer, the way they look and how they talk. So it is not only the 
product but also the service.  
 
Related to the new strategy Iittala also sought to improve its productivity 
and render its operations more efficient. These arrangements entailed 
streamlining internal processes, simplifying structures and optimizing 
resources between production and sourcing, and included setting up a 
demand-driven way of operating, more efficient production capacity 
utilization, industrial restructurings, procurement and increasing the 
outsourcing from none to 30% of net sales. Iittala closed production plants 
and established a strategic alliance for cutlery production. The objective was 
to maintain core capabilities in production to ensure competitiveness and 
flexibility, but to constantly look for outsourcing possibilities. Moreover, to 
optimize production capacity Iittala decided to reject investing in more 
production units or production technology but instead to cooperate with 
suppliers who could either offer latest innovations in production or provide 
lower production cost. At the same time the firm started to significantly cut 
down the number of product variants76. A key process, demand-driven 
Iittala (DDI), was set in place to utilize demand-based information for the 
forecasting of sales, optimal planning of production and inventory 
management, in order to improve the performance of the order-delivery 
chain and the use of net working capital. 
 
2007-2009: Augmenting capabilities underpinning product leadership 
In order to optimize home and international operations, the dual operating 
model was reinforced and became explicit in the organizational structure. 
The home market operating model involved efficient management of the 
entire value chain including production, while the international business 
model relied on the retail concepts used in own stores as well as in selected 
departments stores as shop-in-shop. The Fiskars Group acquired Iittala in 
June 2007 to be integrated into the Fiskars Home Division. By the end of 
the case time77 Iittala brands had been only loosely integrated into the 
company, and Iittala pursued it own strategy and capability development. 
                                                   
76 Between 2001-2006 the number of SKU’s [stock keeping units] was reduced from 
17 000 to 3000. 
77 September 2009 
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However, the influence of the parent group started to gradually influence 
Iittala’s operations and capability development. 
In terms of capability development, due to limited resources, the 
management had to be content on strengthening key organizational 
processes, while accepting to be at good industry average in most corporate 
processes. The management defined the product development process as a 
key priority considering it to have the most leverage in both home and 
international markets. Despite the relatively low renewal rate compared to 
other industries, 300 new product variants were introduced to the market 
on a yearly basis providing scope for both enhanced effectiveness and 
efficiency. Moreover, it was contested that success in retail was increasingly 
dependent on the product assortment and renewal, as the CEO asserted: 
 
Two key processes, one is the product process, from the creation to selling the 
product to the consumers and that’s where we put most of our energy in and 
that’s where we say that we want to beat everybody. It’s our ability to create 
Scandinavian design and products, and to offer them attractively to our 
consumers. Then we have operations, inbound logistics, all that what we call DDI, 
this demand-driven Iittala. How we manage the business, the operations of the 
company, there we say, okay we want to be at a good industry average, we don’t 
think that we can beat everybody there, but we have to be at a good level, so it 
doesn’t hinder our performance. But the core is in creating that kind of 
assortment that delivers that turnover per square meter. At the end of the day, no 
matter how nice the concept is or how nice the experience is, if the products are 
not satisfying it won’t last for very long. 
 
To become the leading company in the product process, Iittala put in place 
the undisputed product leadership (UPL)-process, a tightly defined product 
management process. The UPL-process involved refining the entire product 
management process, from conception and technical product development 
to the management of the entire product life cycle. The objective was to 
enhance internal efficiency and to halve the time to market while, at the 
same time, enhancing the amount and quality of the output. Related to this 
process the company started shifting from a brand-driven product process 
to a more consumer-driven process, taking advantage of the customer and 
‘shopper’ data accessible through direct consumer sales.  
The retail capability had been built up separately disconnected from 
wholesale and the brands, and had not become embedded in the 
organization, as concluded by a company director and executive board 
member in 2009: 
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Retail has never been our core competence, Traditionally we have been a 
production –driven company and I think that the objective of the organizational 
change was to make it [retail] a priority, an area that we would learn. To be 
honest, we have not gotten very far with it.  
 
Retail was integrated to the same organizational unit with the Iittala brand 
to continue to build the capability in conjunction with other capabilities. 
The objective was to leverage the retail concept and expertise on a larger 
scale by transferring retail know-how gained from its own point of sales to 
wholesale operations. At the same time, the retail operations were more 
closely related to the country organizations. The head of the Iittala 
operations reflected upon the change in 2009:  
 
And that is a first step towards not having a key capability to reside in Finland. 
And I am assessing all the time how far to take it. But they have the consumer 
interface and they see the real need. And we are in a kind of an ivory tower here in 
Finland, not in the middle of action, so they have the best vision.  
 
While continuing to build the retail expertise, the focus increasingly shifted 
to a direct consumer strategy with the MyIittala concept. The objective was 
to manage the consumer contact through multiple channels, including own 
retail stores, partner stores and the Internet. Following changes in 
technology, the arrival of the Internet and the rise of social media, the 
consumer interface had increasingly moved to the Internet. As to design, 
Iittala managers realized that they had externalized too much of design 
capability. A director commented: 
 
We realized that we were lacking people with design education now that we use 
external designers and don’t have internal designers anymore. We have a lot of 
tacit knowledge, gained over the years. […] But I think that we externalized too 
much of the design capability.  
 
To reintegrate design, Iittala hired a design director to strengthen design in 
the company and to make it an integral part of the product development 
(UPL) process.   
These changes were, in part, an outcome of the Fiskars acquisition. With 
an objective to unify the strategies and structures of the two companies, the 
Iittala organization structure was modified to be more product- and 
wholesales-driven. Retail capability became divided between sales and 
marketing, which in part affected the implementation of the retail strategy 
and the development of retail capability. 
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5.3.3 Summary of the Focused CMO-Configurations and Within-Case 
Analysis (Diagnostic Case) 
 
The following table summarizes the case periods and CMO-configurations 
by highlighting key factors in context (internal and external) and capability 
development.  
 
Period 2000-03 2004-06 2007-2009 
 
External 
Context (C) 
 
The homeware industry 
mature and stagnant with 
overcapacity and strong 
seasonality.  
Geographic diversity with 
locally operating companies. 
Industrial restructurings to 
exempt overcapacity within the 
industry because of low 
demand.  
 
 
Evolving user trends and buying habits. 
Polarization of the consumer market 
between premium and mass-market brands. 
Traditional companies to close European-
based factories, increase automation and 
shift production to Asia. 
Increasing outsourcing within the industry to 
adjust capacity. 
Asia becomes an important supply base: 
the rise of private label brands and low cost 
imports from Asia.  
Acquisition by the Fiskars Group.  
Enhanced competition from other brands in 
Scandinavian design. 
Changes in technology, the Internet and 
social media move the consumer interface 
increasingly to the web.  
Need to manage the consumer contact 
through multiple channels. 
Financial crisis in 2008. 
 
 
 
Internal  
Context (C) 
 
Strong home market position.  
Low level of international 
operations, mainly exports.  
New strategy to become 
effective in 2002:  
Strong international growth 
while leveraging the home 
market position.  
Focus on the Iittala brand in 
international markets and 
withdrawal of other brands 
from international markets.  
Own retail concept to upgrade 
distribution and build the Iittala 
brand.  
 
Iittala to become an independent company 
with an ownership arrangement between a 
venture capital company and operational 
management.  
Pursuing a strategy of incremental 
international expansion through own retail 
presence. 
Management undertakes industrial 
reorganization and sets up a process to 
improve operational efficiency and the use 
of working capital. 
Industrial restructurings and increasing the 
amount of outsourcing to 30% of net sales. 
Rationalization of the product range. 
 
Integration into the Fiskars Home Division. 
Seeking for synergies between the Iittala and 
Fiskars brands.  
Strategy to establish a product leadership 
position within the industry and to reduce time 
to market by 50%.  
Maintaining the dual operating model: 
international/ home-market. Process of 
international expansion slowered by financial 
crisis 
Focus on direct consumer strategy and 
multichannel approach: retail/ wholesale/ 
web-based selling. 
Capability 
development 
mechanisms 
(M)  
Capability variation in home 
markets: control of the entire 
value chain from design to 
retail.  
Focus on select capabilities in 
international markets. 
Building up retail capability. 
Intensive capability development. Building 
up retail capability and extending it through 
franchising, using the Netherlands as a pilot 
market to generate organizational leaning. 
Capability renewal in operations 
management: streamlining processes, 
simplifying structures and optimizing 
resources between production and sourcing 
(DDI). 
 
Consolidating Iittala and Fiskars capabilities. 
Upgrading capabilities underpinning product 
development and management (UPL).  
Developing and leveraging retail capability in 
key markets and country organizations, retail 
capability driven by the Netherlands 
subsidiary. 
Scaling retail capability to other channels. 
Maintaining capabilities and processes 
related to operations management (DDI). 
Building up consumer understanding. 
Capability 
outcomes (O) 
Focus on product 
development, retail, brand 
management and some 
specific capabilities in 
production (color-glazed 
porcelain, colored glass, 
glassblowing).  
Internal retail capability and a 
franchise model in retail. 
DDI-process to improve capabilities related 
to the order-delivery chain, increasing 
outsourcing. Reducing the number of 
product variants from 17000 to 3000. 
Strategic alliance for cutlery production.  
Focus on key capabilities in production 
while looking for external capabilities in 
other production technologies.  
Capability transfer to and from the Fiskars 
Group, e.g. operations and product 
development. New product development and 
management process (UPL): a refined 
product development process from 
conception to the management of the entire 
product life cycle. Transferring a key 
capability to a country organization: locating 
retail capability in the Netherlands. Applying 
retail capability to partner stores as shop-in-
shop.   
Processes to gather consumer and shopper 
data. 
Capability 
mechanisms 
(M) relating to 
design 
Design capability renewal 
through externalization  
Redeployment to retailing.  Integrating design into the product 
development process (UPL). Hiring a design 
director in 2008. 
Capability 
outcomes (O) 
relating to 
design 
Focus from internal to external 
designers to take advantage of 
external design capabilities. 
From product to service and shop design. 
Design of the Iittala concept brand. 
Reinforced internal design capability. 
 
Table 8. Summary of the Case Periods and Focused CMO-Configurations at Iittala 
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As discussed above, the homeware industry was mature and stagnant and 
the most significant changes within the industry during the past years 
related to structural changes caused by globalization. The rise of Asia and 
other low cost locations as important supply bases, enabled by lack of 
government restrictions and motivated by differences in country costs, had 
increased the number of private label brands and generated cost pressures 
for the homeware companies. Affected by low demand, the traditional 
industry actors were obliged to reorganize their industrial structures, close 
European-based factories, rationalize product ranges and increase the 
amount of automation and sourcing to improve their cost base and to adjust 
their industrial capacity. As economies of scale had become relatively 
important for certain products, some lower-end industry actors focused on 
one category, such as glass, metal or porcelain with automated production. 
Although differences in country costs had promoted globalization of the 
industry, unfavorable logistics and differences in quality had, to some 
extent, slowed down the process. Moreover, apart from the increase in 
global sourcing, the industry remained relatively intact to other 
globalization effects, and can therefore be characterized as multi-local with 
a large number of local and historically rooted companies. 
At the same time, and partly as a consequence of the globalization impact, 
the consumer market became polarized. On the one hand, the rise of private 
label brands and increased automation had promoted the commoditization  
of the industry. On the other hand, there was increased demand for 
premium brands and luxury products. These evolving user and buying 
habits motivated Iittala to capitalize on its capabilities in modern 
Scandinavian design, and to seek growth through international expansion. 
The objective of Iittala was to outpace market growth and outperform the 
traditional companies by effectively managing the entire value chain, from 
design, product development, sourcing, production and distribution to 
retail sales. 
  
Capability mechanisms and logics within the case firm 
As the data indicates, the case time corresponds to a time of active internal 
capability development within the case firm driven by its business strategy 
change. Prior to Iittala’s strategic change, the company’s different brands 
had their own production units and organizational structures, and had 
pursued internationalization independently, which had led to a dispersal of 
resources and mediocre results. However, in 2002, the firm started 
executing a revised strategy to seek growth by expanding internationally 
through direct retail operations and the Iittala brand. Other brands were 
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withdrawn from international markets and a number of products from 
these brands were consolidated into the Iittala brand. While industrial 
restructurings can be considered as a reaction to stagnant demand and low-
cost imports from Asia, the strategy to address market opportunities 
internationally was primarily driven by the firm’s objective to generate 
growth by taking advantage of its unique capabilities within Scandinavian 
design. Active capability development was further motivated by the 
arrangements where the operating management shared the ownership with 
a venture capital firm with an objective to maximize the corporate value for 
future listing. 
During the case time Iittala aimed at transforming itself from a traditional 
industrial company to a demand-driven product and retail expert and 
reinforced its international presence with the Iittala brand and with its 
retail concept. In order to achieve the objectives set out by its new strategy, 
Iittala executed a dual business model with implications on its capability 
development. The home market business model involved a multi-channel, 
multi-brand market leader strategy with large target group and distribution, 
including mass-market distribution, whereas the international strategy 
relied on a focused and narrow target group addressed with a single brand 
and with a tightly controlled retail concept and channels. Backed up by a 
very strong market position in home markets, the objective of Iittala was to 
leverage its home market position with variation-generating mechanisms, 
while building its international expansion of selected variants. As an 
outcome of the variation-generating activities, Iittala put into the market 
some 300 product variants on a yearly basis with the largest possible 
distribution channels, with the objective to outpace their competitors in this 
established and mature market. Moreover, the home market business 
model involved retention of key capabilities related to the efficient 
management of the entire value chain from design, product development, 
sourcing, production and distribution to retail sales. The international 
business model, in contrast, relied on internal selection, involving a focused 
and narrower target group addressed with a single brand and on direct 
retail channels. Moreover, in international markets, to promote 
organizational learning and because of limited resources, Iittala decided to 
target a select number of markets that it estimated to have sufficient appeal 
for Scandinavian design and that provided the best application for its 
internal and home-based capabilities.  
In order to support its capability development, Iittala undertook three 
substantial development programs. The first was related to the industrial 
reorganization of the company and involved establishing a process (DDI) to 
improve the order-delivery chain as well as to rationalize the product range. 
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At the same time managers decided to prioritize key capabilities in 
production while increasing the amount of outsourcing both to access 
external innovation in production technologies as well as attain enhanced 
efficiencies. The second development program involved transforming the 
company into a retail expert and building up internal retail capability. 
Iittala’s integration downstream was driven by the need to build retail 
capabilities that were not sufficiently distributed within the homeware 
industry. Finally, the third development program (UPL) entailed 
establishing a product leadership position within the industry.  
Iittala's core capabilities had historically included superior design and 
certain core competences in manufacturing, such as color glazed porcelain, 
colored pressed glass and glassblowing. In order to pursue its business 
strategy change, the company set out to build and reinforce its capabilities 
in supply-chain management, product development and retailing. Building 
retail expertise was a significant commitment in Iittala’s strategy, which 
motivated the company to look for business models and best practices from 
companies in other industries. When repositioning the firm as a retail 
expert, Iittala extended the use of design from product development to 
designing the shops, services, and customer encounters. 
Iittala also started to seek complementary capabilities outside its own 
boundaries. Consequently, it undertook major industrial restructurings as it 
closed four factories and increased the share of outsourcing from 0% to 
30% of net sales in five years. The objective was not to invest in more 
production facilities or technology, but to constantly look for outsourcing 
possibilities in order to access the latest technologies in production, while 
keeping the production of those items that could be priced high enough to 
carry the cost of labor in Finland. Moreover, Iittala extensively exploited 
external capability networks to support its core capability, design. 
In summary, pro-active capability development to address new business 
opportunities characterized the behavior of the case firm during the case 
time. Being a relatively small company with limited resources Iittala had to 
prioritize the development of those capabilities and organizational 
processes that it assessed to have most leverage in home and international 
markets. Consequently, whereas Iittala’s capability logic in the home 
market relied on variation and retention enabled by its dominant position 
in the market, its strategy in international strategy was based on selected 
capabilities, products and distribution channels. 
 
The internal and external selection environments of Iittala 
Iittala’s capability development efforts generated both satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory capability outcomes. While the development programs 
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related to supply-chain management (DDI) and product development 
processes (UPL) were assessed as successful, the firm did not manage to 
build up a satisfactory level of retail capability during the case time. The 
objective of the present study is to discuss the underlying reasons as well as 
to put forward those conditions and contextual factors that had an impact 
on capability outcomes. In the Iittala case, the data analysis indicates that 
the majority of factors originated from its internal selection environment.  
First, the data suggests that the capability development was affected by a 
lack of unity within the organization.  Whereas the DDI- and UPL-processes 
attained uncontested support throughout the organization, the internal 
selection environment, affected by the underlying power distribution, was 
divided and equivocal towards retail capability development. Consequently 
the home vs. international markets, as well as the retail vs. wholesale 
dichotomy hampered the development of the retail capability. As an 
outcome, there was an attempt to build the retail capability disconnected 
from wholesale and the brands, deterring it from becoming embedded in 
the organization. An Iittala director commented in 2009, five years after the 
new strategy was put in place: 
 
It was like a huge ski race, the home market versus international strategy, and the 
vision how to manage it was very polarized. And I don’t think that we managed to 
get a shared vision until last year. 
 
Second, whereas substantial organizational resources were directed towards 
the DDI-and UPL-processes, the establishment of point of sales absorbed 
most of the corporate resources and insufficient resources were directed 
towards building internal retail capability. Moreover, the retail capability 
proved to be dependent on other supporting capabilities, especially product 
development capability. However, product development at Iittala was 
traditionally driven by design and product concepts rather than by retail 
requirements that did not result in an optimal product range and renewal 
from the retail perspective. Therefore, insufficient support from other 
capabilities, product development in particular, also affected the 
development of retail capability and as an outcome the implementation of 
retail strategy was hampered. The data also indicates that adhering to 
internal development slowed down the development of retail capability and 
that acquiring external expertise could have accelerated the process. The 
data analysis also hints that building up retail capability was insufficient to 
support the international expansion of the company resulting from the 
limited amount of resources. Instead, combining its capabilities with those 
of external partners, e.g., within the distribution network would have 
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facilitated and accelerated the international expansion of Iittala. An Iittala 
director reasoned:  
 
The retail has been a painful process, because we did not have the capability. And 
we tried to build it ourselves and it takes time. […] The learning process is so slow 
and you make so many mistakes. I would have invested [in the capability]. If you 
decide to do something, then you should be ready to invest. 
 
At the end, the acquisition by Fiskars also had an impact on the retail 
capability development and the implementation of the retail strategy had to 
yield to other priorities. As an outcome, the focus shifted from retail to 
wholesales, and to the UPL-process. At the same time retail capability was 
transferred and retained in wholesales. 
Third, it seems that Iittala perceived international markets as 
opportunities to leverage its home-based capabilities and chose markets 
that provided the best application for these capabilities. Consequently, 
capability development within the Iittala case was, to a large extent, 
headquarters-driven, and combining local capabilities with its home-based 
capabilities or locating key capabilities to country organizations was not 
prioritized until later in the development process. Moreover, the data 
indicates that Iittala did not pay sufficient attention to adapting capabilities 
to the local context, e.g., it approached Scandinavian countries as a home 
market but failed due to significant differences in the market context and its 
position within these markets. Finally, compared with the two former cases, 
Iittala, despite its unique capabilities, was not in the position to shape the 
markets or modify external selection criteria because of its limited resources 
outside its primary home market, Finland.  
Next, these within-case analyses will be followed by a cross-case analysis. 
 
5.4 Cross-case Analysis 
 
5.4.1 Capability Development Mechanisms and Processes 
 
The data analyses put forward illustrated how changes in the business 
environments or strategies generated intensive capability development 
within the case firms. As pointed out, there were a variety of mechanisms 
available to and employed by the case firms. These mechanisms were either 
internal to the firm, or as demonstrated by case evidence, they increasingly 
related to the external network of the MNC. The mechanisms that were 
mainly undertaken by the headquarters organization involved the 
establishment and development of new capabilities, as well as strategies to 
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redeploy existing capabilities to new product or service markets, or 
decisions to divest capabilities. The attempts to renew or transform the 
firm’s capability base were also directed by the headquarters organization. 
Although the headquarters exercised high command on capability 
development within each case firm, the detailed case analyses also illustrate 
that the majority of the multinational firms’ capability-related actions 
explicitly involved its subsidiary network. These capability mechanisms did 
not simply include replication and adaptation of capabilities to various 
contexts, but rather, these mechanisms increasingly included integration 
and reconfiguration of geographically dispersed capabilities, as well as 
accessing local capabilities and combining local capabilities with those 
transferred from the headquarters, to form ‘global capabilities’. 
The case evidence indicates that although the firms may have succeeded in 
expanding internationally by replicating their home-based capabilities, this 
mechanism became challenged along with changes in the external 
environment. Both the globalization of the industry, including mounting 
competitive pressures and the shift of markets to Asia, as well as dialectical 
forces from Western economies compelled the case companies to revise 
their capability strategies and to undertake development programs to build 
new capabilities. These developments required putting in place business 
processes aimed at the standardization of systems, processes, tools and 
business practices throughout the global organizations. At the same time, to 
further reinforce the value creation potential of the subsidiary network, 
activities were directed towards building up geographically balanced 
competence centers as well as organizing for the transfer of capabilities and 
‘best practices’ between various geographical units.  
Capability management related to the subsidiary network also involved 
balancing between global and local capabilities. While aiming at 
establishing ‘global’ capabilities independent of the home base and 
applicable to multiple contexts, the case firms encountered difficulties in 
responding to specific local market conditions. Consequently, in order to 
optimize market growth, they were often obliged to give greater weight to 
regional market requirements in the global decision-making processes as 
well as to adapt or build new capabilities in order to better respond to local 
requirements. For example, the geographical shift of new elevator and 
escalator markets to China had a significant impact of Kone’s capability 
development requiring it to both extend and upgrade capabilities in order to 
succeed in the demanding environment. Moreover, it established a joint 
venture with a local company capable of providing complementary 
capabilities to succeed in the highly competitive volume market.  
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Moreover, some of the case firms realized the need to increasingly use 
subsidiaries as a ‘competence-creating’ force, e.g., the fact that China served 
as a lead market in the elevator and escalator market enabled Kone to build 
and upgrade its global capabilities in this specific market and take 
advantage of these capabilities in other markets. Especially in R&D 
capabilities, both Nokia and Kone aimed at getting greater input from the 
emerging, high volume markets, such as China and India. Moreover, as part 
of the global reorganization of activities, the management of major projects 
and the development and production of escalators in the Kone case and the 
development and production of entry phones in the Nokia case were moved 
to China78. Likewise, the Dutch subsidiary played a key role in Iittala’s 
capability development processes related to its retail capability.  
The case evidence also reveals that the firms were obliged to increasingly 
extend beyond the boundaries of the firm to access complementary 
capabilities. The mechanisms related to the external networks and targeted 
at gaining access to new capabilities included licensing, outsourcing, 
acquisitions as well as various forms of cooperative arrangements (e.g. 
alliances). Other mechanisms that were increasingly gaining ground and 
some of which challenge conventional business logic include co-opetition, 
as well as mechanisms aimed at extracting value from competitors through 
patent and IPR management as exemplified by the Nokia case. The 
activities to reach outside the firm boundaries to access key or 
complementary capabilities were motivated by both enhanced speed as well 
as the possibility to access external innovations. Especially when faced with 
radical changes in the external environment, and because of the long 
development time of internal capabilities, the case firms increasingly sought 
external capabilities to accelerate capability development. At the same time, 
exploiting external capability networks enabled these firms to access 
external innovation as well as to explore emerging technologies from other 
industries and disciplines without heavy internal investments. Likewise, the 
increased focus on solutions led the case firms to seek complementary 
capabilities within the eco-system and prompted them to look for new 
collaborative and co-opetitive arrangements. Finally, the activities directed 
towards the external environment included monitoring the legislative and 
standardization developments and seeking to influence the development of 
codes and standards through active participation in professional 
associations and standardization committees on a global basis as illustrated 
by both the Kone and Nokia cases. Although the primary motivation 
                                                   
78 Of the complementary cases involved in the project but not included in the final 
case sample, Wärtsilä, shifted the entire ship building division to China because of 
the concentration of shipyards in Asia, and Perlos, following the acquisition by Lite-
On, moved its headquarters to China to be closer to the customers. 
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underlying these mechanisms dealt with enhanced value creation or speed, 
some of the mechanisms, such as outsourcing, licensing or effective IPR 
management, also enabled case firms to extract value from their extant 
capabilities or to optimize their capability investments. 
As the above analysis and the focused CMO-configurations indicated, 
when considering the firm’s entire capability base rather than taking 
individual capabilities in isolation, mechanisms and outcomes did not occur 
sequentially, but instead multiple mechanisms were simultaneously present 
in most cases. Consequently, in addition to the capability life-cycle model 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) that suggests fairly linear stages of founding, 
development and branching of individual capabilities when influenced by 
internal and external selection events, at the level of the capability base the 
development proceeded in multiple overlapping sequences involving 
actions such as renewal, reconfiguration, reorientation or trimming of the 
capability base in line with the firm’s strategic orientation, or as a response 
to external changes. The changes in the external environment included both 
long-term changes, such as the maturation of the industry or a geographical 
shift of major markets that forced the company to look for new strategies 
and capabilities, or competitive moves that prompted more immediate 
action. Consequently, both active internal capability development as well as 
reacting to the external environment, characterized the behavior of the case 
firms. However, in all the cases, capability development was subject to 
various conditions and contextual factors internal and external to the 
multinational firm. Next, this cross-case analysis will highlight various 
factors or conditions that had an impact on capability outcomes and point 
to the necessary and contingent conditions related to the various 
mechanisms and capability outcomes. 
 
5.4.2 Internal and External Contexts and Conditions  
 
As illustrated by the case analyses, the complexity of the context internal 
and external to the MNC gave rise to various mechanisms that neutralized 
or counteracted the capability development mechanisms put forward by the 
firm. The internal factors or conditions related to managerial cognition, the 
selection criteria alignment and internal, structural ‘fit’ as well as the scope 
of capability development mechanisms, including access to external 
capability networks that emerged as the internal and necessary conditions 
underlying capability development. The external, contingent conditions, 
instead, related to the dynamism, complexity and maturity of the external 
environment, as well as to its level of globalization, competition and market 
disparities. 
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First, the analysis across the case firms indicated that because of the long 
lead-times, capability development was dependent on the firm’s ability to 
identify key capabilities for future development and to build the required 
capabilities that address changes and opportunities in the external 
environment prior to its competitors thereby emphasizing the role of 
managerial cognition. Within the present study, the case periods included 
both periods of proactive capability development, driven by strategic 
foresight, as well as periods of more reactive behavior influenced by the 
external environment and firm’s current performance. As indicated by the 
case analyses, when the companies were able to anticipate, and 
consequently to capitalize on major changes related to the transformation of 
the industry they were in a position to internally develop the required 
capabilities prior to their competitors. A Nokia strategy director commented 
on the changing competitive landscape: 
 
The question is how much vision and foresight can be considered, and in the long 
term, that is possibly the only thing that matters. Everything can be imitated, it is 
just a question of time. Whether you can keep on running faster and evaluating 
directions. 
 
At the same time, the data also provided examples where firms had 
demonstrated a high level of strategic foresight or dynamic capabilities 
during certain case periods, but failed to recognize the speed and magnitude 
of the changes at other case periods with an impact on capability 
development and performance as well demonstrated by the Nokia case. On 
the one hand, the case analyses provide evidence of how insufficient 
attention to specific geographic or product markets hindered capability 
development with global implications, while, on the other hand, managerial 
attention and sensitivity to lead markets such as China potentially 
contributed to capability development on a global basis. Moreover, the data 
showed how the positive corporate performance at a given time affected 
managerial cognition and led managers to overestimate or misjudge the 
value of their extant capabilities. Related to managerial cognition are the 
strategic beliefs within the firm, for example, in the Nokia case, the 
management strongly believed that the global mobile phone device business 
had reached maturity and opted for a capability development process that 
was based on incremental changes, optimizing the exploitation of existing 
capabilities and shifting the focus on leveraging and protecting its 
capabilities globally, rather than on building capabilities that challenged its 
existing business logic or extant selection criteria. 
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Secondly, this study indicated that capability development within the case 
firms was also dependent on the scope of development mechanisms 
available to the firms, including access to external ecosystems or capability 
networks, as the industries were undergoing major changes. Especially 
within high-velocity environments, the required capabilities were 
increasingly outside the boundaries of the firm, calling for various forms of 
partnerships to access the required capabilities or external innovation. An 
adherence to internal development created lags in the development process 
and impeded the firms from attaining a fit with a changing environment. 
The case evidence showed how the lack of resources or negative experiences 
from former acquisitions refrained firms from proceeding with acquisitions 
to obtain the required capabilities and locked them into the slower internal 
capability development path, e.g., the risk aversion affected Nokia’s 
capability development processes and created a lock-in to internal 
capability development. At the same time, these findings also point to the 
stickiness of organizational resources and capabilities and the long-term 
consequences of internal selection as the development processes of various 
capabilities were largely superior to the length of product life cycles or the 
visibility within the industry79. Therefore, as the data illustrates, when the 
firms were able to complement and combine their capabilities with those of 
external partners the development processes were significantly accelerated. 
Consequently, despite the fact that competitive advantage and superior 
performance were associated with the internal and idiosyncratic 
capabilities, due to the long development times of internal capabilities, the 
firms increasingly sought capabilities outside their boundaries to speed up 
capability development. 
Thirdly, the cross-case analysis also demonstrated that capability 
development outcomes were dependent on how well the selection criteria 
was aligned with strategy. Within some case periods, an obstacle to 
capability development proved to be internal selection criteria that 
continued to reflect prevalent external criteria instead of being aligned with 
future external selection criteria. The data from this analysis revealed that 
even when companies acknowledged the upcoming changes within the 
industry they continued to apply extant selection criteria to future projects, 
e.g., within Nokia smart phone projects were affected by selection criteria 
that related to the basic phones, such as cost. In contrast, when the case 
firms managed to determine key organizational processes, or tightly couple 
                                                   
79 For example, the operating systems and technological platforms were slow to 
build and rigid, making radical changes difficult as indicated by the Nokia example, 
in general, the visibility within the industry was estimated at 18 months while the 
development of new capabilities could take 6-10 years (Häikiö, 2001c, Doz and 
Kosonen, 2008). 
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capability development with the business strategy the case firms were able 
to ensure that internal selection, including resource allocation, supported 
corporate strategy and the future development of the company. Moreover, 
positive capability outcomes were attained when the alignment of the 
internal selection environment with strategy was further reinforced by the 
establishment of corporate wide programs, definition of corporate values as 
well as by intensive training and communication programs, as is well 
illustrated by the Kone case. 
However, the findings also indicated that there were different selection 
criteria operational within different business and geographical units. 
Therefore, the case firms were faced with diversification of both internal 
and external selection criteria because of operating in different contexts 
(e.g. developed vs. emerging markets). The coexistence of diversified 
selection criteria within the MNC context amplified the difficulty in aligning 
internal selection criteria with strategy. Moreover, as illustrated by case 
evidence, various geographical units did not uniformly support the 
development of specific capabilities. As a consequence, there were 
significant differences on how a capability was perceived and exploited 
within different subsidiaries, depending on the prevailing internal selection 
environment and country management support, as indicated by design 
capability development in the Kone case for example. Furthermore, 
capability development was often headquarters-driven, and building local 
capabilities or locating key capabilities in country organizations was not 
systematically on the corporate agenda. In some cases this resulted in a low 
adaptability to the local context and a poor external fit within a specific 
market.  
The data also pointed to the importance of structural and cultural fit, 
which proved to be influential to capability outcomes when performing a 
radical change or transformation that required a disruption in the extant 
resources and capabilities of the firm. However, the case evidence also 
indicated that structural changes were overemphasized and frequently 
undertaken by top management to support changes in strategy. Therefore, 
findings were somewhat contradictory as to the role of structural changes in 
supporting capability development. On the one hand, the data suggested 
that if new business or capability development was structurally separated 
from the core business, on some occasions it protected the capability 
development from internal competition for resources80. On the other hand, 
the isolation of a specific capability to a separate unit also hindered its 
development if the capability was dependent on other surrounding or 
supporting capabilities within the firm. Data also hints that the impact of 
                                                   
80 See also Burgelman  (1996; 1983b) for findings on Intel. 
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the structural changes were not always positive, but instead deterred 
capability development at some occasions mainly because of the period of 
turmoil it generated. As opposed to structural changes, process congruence 
seemed to be imperative to capability development, especially when 
integrating new capabilities to the firm’s capability base. Moreover, as 
changes in the resource and capability base of the firm implied both cultural 
change and organizational learning, the findings highlighted the necessity 
to undertake programs to define corporate values and to set up extensive 
communication and human resources programs. This case research also 
highlighted the significance of process specificity and ownership 
designation to support capability development. As the role of different 
capabilities diffused within the multinational firms, they became more 
difficult to manage and control, both geographically and in relation to other 
business functions without a clear process or ownership designation. 
Moreover, capability development was subject to conflicts originating from 
the power distribution that led to a divided and equivocal internal selection 
environment in some cases. 
Finally, the findings indicated that the observed capability outcomes were 
contingent on selection events originating from the external environment of 
the firm, including the institutional-, technological-, competitive or market 
environment of the firm. The external environment has commonly been 
described in terms of its dynamism (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), 
uncertainty (e.g. Cantwell et al., 2010) or maturity (industry life-cycle 
theories such as Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback and Suarez, 
1993; Klepper, 1997). This study found that the external, contingent 
conditions also relate to its level of globalization and market disparities. 
First, these findings indicate that globalization of markets has both 
increased the number and impact of selection events because of the 
increasing amount of external stimuli as well as the interdependencies of 
markets and competition, e.g., environmental shocks seem to have gained 
in magnitude because of interrelationships between markets and actors. 
Moreover, in addition to complex technological and institutional change, 
the Internet proved to be emerging as an undercurrent to complex changes 
involving changing user trends and behavioral patterns and generating 
uncertainty. Consequently, relatively minor changes in technology or 
behavioral patterns led to important changes and speciation events (Adner 
and Levinthal, 2002), as they diffused globally. As a result, external 
selection criteria proved to be constantly evolving and shifting making 
capability outcomes difficult to predict. As an outcome, the case firms 
experienced selection events frequently and repeatedly leading to both 
capability gaps as well as capabilities becoming obsolete.  
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Moreover, the analyses indicate that the external selection criteria started 
diversifying in the 2000s when the growth of the emerging markets, such as 
China and India, put emphasis on different capabilities than the industry 
evolution in the Western economies, further amplifying the complexity and 
uncertainty of the environment.  Consequently, the case firms needed to 
address different external selection criteria and the capability outcomes 
became dependent on the appropriate mechanisms-context relationship. 
Moreover, the market disparities also gave rise to dialectical forces. For 
example, the emergence of the smart phones, which addressed a new 
application domain and combined capabilities from new industry entrants 
with those of their extended networks, generated a dialectical force and an 
antithesis to the ultra-low cost phones in the mobile phones industry. As the 
smart phones will enter the volume markets requiring lower costs and rapid 
time to market, the two dialectical forces are likely to merge into a 
synthesis, making use for the retained capabilities that relate to global 
supply-chain management and manufacturing systems in order to attain 
economies of scale and operational efficiencies.  
 
5.4.3 Capability Logics Adopted by the Case Firms  
 
Finally, this part will put forward various higher-level mechanisms, or 
logics that provide more abstract accounts of MNC capability dynamics, 
identified through both within-and cross-case analyses. These analyses 
indicated that the various patterns or ‘logics’ by which the MNCs build 
capabilities represented patterned links between the firms’ internal 
evolutionary processes, dynamic capabilities and capability development, 
and can broadly be categorized into four different logics: variation-based, 
selection-based, retention-based, and access-based logic. These various 
logics acted as ‘higher-order’ mechanisms and produced complex capability 
outcomes or patterns as they involved and operated at the level of multiple 
capabilities. Next, these logics will be presented in conjunction with the 
related conditions and potential outcomes. Moreover, the different logics 
put emphasis on the different types of dynamic capabilities as will be 
discussed. As the following discussion will indicate, these logics do not 
represent organizational processes per se, but are rather more aggregate 
level and abstract accounts of mechanisms. 
 
Capability mechanism based on variation 
Variation-generating capability mechanisms aimed to disrupt existing 
capabilities and practices. As the case evidence indicates, variation in 
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capabilities originated from various sources and through multiple 
mechanisms, such as corporate strategy and the related processes, or by 
action undertaken by distinct units, or through cooperative arrangements. 
Although attempts to introduce variation seem to have been relatively 
programmed in the case firms, variation also originated from the more ‘ad 
hoc’ problem-solving to external changes or customer requirements, or even 
serendipity. This logic became manifest in new product or service variants, 
and supported both value creation and differentiation, as the following 
quote by the Nokia head of strategy substantiates: 
 
Variation of known concepts is what you do all the time, identifying purchase 
motivations and ways to meet them and categorize them […]. In practice we 
aimed at having a 2-3 year advance on what was going to happen in the market as 
the market volume and penetration grew. […] A big part of the time was spent on 
finding parallels [from other domains], understanding how other consumer 
goods, for example writing instruments or watches, what kind of evolution they 
had gone through in a hundred years. And then figuring out how we could 
generate a similar evolution in ten years by differentiating in an interesting and 
meaningful way, in order to get us into the position where we could create 
variation and find new purchase motives. 
 
As illustrated by case evidence, the rationale for the variety-seeking logic 
was to ensure the presence in both existing and future markets that provide 
new opportunities for growth, and thereby to maximize the growth potential 
of the firm. Within the MNC context the sources of variation are multiple as 
the multinational firm is able to draw on several environments to generate 
variation. With an objective to generate a maximum amount of variation, 
the multinational firm may utilize variety-generating mechanisms both at 
the headquarters-level and within subsidiaries. Moreover, it is likely to 
establish a number of cooperative arrangements with external partners with 
an objective to gain access to emerging technologies and complementary 
assets. 
In terms of internal necessary conditions, this variation-generating logic 
relies on a large scope of capability mechanisms. Moreover, this logic builds 
as much on internal selection to select the best variants as on external 
selection mechanisms, such as market feedback mechanisms. When relying 
on external feedback mechanisms, it is less dependent on managerial 
foresight but builds more on instrumental cognition to be able to develop 
operational capabilities, as well as on managerial attention directed towards 
new emerging capabilities. Likewise, as it seeks to address different external 
selection criteria in various market segments or application domains, the 
ability to diversify the internal selection criteria when evaluating initiatives 
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or capabilities for future development is a prerequisite for this logic to 
thrive. However, as pointed out by Adner and Levinthal (2002), firms, 
governed by a hierarchical structure, have difficulties in reflecting the 
diversity of the external selection environments in their internal selection 
processes. Moreover, they note that firms tend to overlook potential 
application domains for an existing capability, and therefore the key 
challenge relating to this logic involves recognizing the emergent selection 
criteria in addition to identifying the diversity of existing selection criteria. 
The findings from this research also suggest that a business model that 
aims at generating an extensive amount of variation may lead to ambiguity 
in internal selection, such as resource allocation. If the company needs to 
address existing product needs with multiple product lines and variants, 
insufficient resources may be available for future developments. 
Consequently, instead of supporting developments with high albeit 
uncertain potential, resources may be dispersed between a large number of 
product variants corresponding to the current business and jeopardizing the 
future development of the company. Therefore, the prerequisite for this 
logic is that the resource allocation processes ensure sufficient resources for 
each development process, and are flexible to reallocate resources when 
markets provide positive feedback for certain capabilities. The drawback of 
this logic is that it is resource-demanding and consequently, not adapted to 
firms where each individual capability development project requires 
significant investments, or to firms with scarce resources. 
In terms of external contingencies and subsequent capability outcomes, 
this variation-generating logic enables firms to respond to environments 
were market disparities and multiple selection criteria are present. This 
approach may enable firms to outpace their competitors and provide a co-
evolutionary advantage both in established and emerging markets. 
However, this logic runs the risk of dispersed corporate resources that may 
inhibit the firm from making sufficient investments in a future capability 
and consequently deteriorate the firm’s possibilities to respond to radical 
changes in high-velocity environments. Therefore, an ability to build 
‘robust’ strategies and resource combinations that provide “potential of 
success under varying future circumstances or scenarios” (Bettis and Hitt, 
1995:16) in a changing environment underlies this logic. However, limited 
resources or lack of managerial foresight may lead to insufficient resource 
investments in a specific capability or application domain that may become 
dominant.  
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Capability logic based on internal selection 
The selection-based logic, in contrast, relies on internal selection of 
organizational variation and a focus on select capabilities for future 
development. Instead of relying on external forces, such as market forces or 
institutional environment to select organizational variation, as suggested by 
models that emphasize external selection (e.g. the population ecology 
model, Hannan and Freeman, 1977), this logic relies on internal selection 
based on superior managerial foresight and decisions. The rationale for this 
logic is to have internal selection outperform external selection, as well as to 
direct the external selection criteria to suit the firm’s resources and 
capabilities. Whereas the variation-maximizing logic builds on a large 
variety of capability development mechanisms, this logic relies on select 
capability development mechanisms that are mainly top management and 
headquarters driven, and often internal to the firm.  
In terms of internal, necessary conditions, the selection-based logic is 
primarily dependent on managerial foresight to recognize the key resources 
and capabilities for future development, and on the ability to develop these 
capabilities prior to competitors. Moreover, this logic is dependent on a 
careful alignment of internal selection criteria with strategy and focused 
resource allocation. This logic often relates to centralized decision-making 
and puts the role of top management and their managerial capabilities at 
center stage. The selection logic involves ‘big bets’ and high risk, as it 
requires investments before actual demand. This logic also aims at 
influencing ‘speciation events’, enabling firms to cope with or take 
advantage of the uncertainty involved in market development (Adner and 
Levinthal, 2002). The following quote by a Nokia’s head of strategy gives an 
example of internal selection choices: 
 
Relating to the dominant design, e.g., choosing between candy bar or flip or slide 
models, it is about setting the bets. And then a new product paradigm would be, 
e.g., the communicator that Nokia launched in '96.  
 
As to the external contingencies and the subsequent capability 
development, the selection-based logic is well adapted to emergent or high-
velocity industries, or industries characterized by high complexity. Within 
these types of environments, this logic offers a possibility to build a co-
evolutionary advantage, which competitors may have difficulties to attain. 
On the other hand, this logic involves high risk if the firm’s future scenarios 
are not realized. The logic also applies to firms with limited resources, in 
which case the firm chooses to compete with select capabilities in a select 
target market. In this case, this logic also applies to established markets 
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resulting from lack of or limited amount of competition in a particular 
‘niche’.  
 
Capability logic based on retention 
As opposed to the two former capability logics, the retention-based logic 
maintains a status quo in the capability base but provides the mechanisms 
by which the benefits of the firm’s former variety-generating activities and 
extant capabilities are collected, e.g., by extending to new product or 
geographic markets through the replication of existing routines and 
capabilities. Moreover, the retention processes underlie a firm’s ability to 
transfer some of its key capabilities or distinctive competencies to a new 
business or application domain when external changes prompt firms to 
perform an exit from a specific business81. This retention-based logic relies 
primarily on replication and redeployment as capability development 
mechanisms or at ‘scaling’ capabilities on a global basis, and aims at value 
capture rather than at value creation.  
In terms of internal necessary conditions the retention-based capability 
logic requires that the operations are carefully coordinated and configured 
to allow for an efficient transfer of knowledge and capabilities. As the firm’s 
global operations rely on the same capabilities, this approach builds on a 
high structural fit between the organizational elements, such as its control 
systems and on high inter-unit alignment of internal selection criteria. As to 
the external contingencies and the subsequent capability outcomes, this 
logic is well suited to stable environments. The retention-based logic is 
unlikely to provide the firm with a co-evolutionary advantage, but may 
enable them to achieve an optimal fit in fairly stable environments. The 
advantage of this logic relates to the low level of investment and subsequent 
risk. At the same time, the potential rents are lower. Moreover, the reliance 
on the logic may also create a ‘co-evolutionary lock-in’, as indicated by prior 
research (Burgelman, 1996).  
 
Capability logic based on access to external capabilities 
This logic is based on a superior access to external resources or capabilities 
and is thus related to the evolutionary process of struggle that reflects the 
competition for resources among firms (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). The 
approach relies heavily on access to external networks and complementary, 
co-specialized assets. They include both equity- and non-equity-
arrangements, such as joint ventures, acquisitions as well as cooperation 
within a network of ecosystem partners or competitors. Underlying this 
                                                   
81 See e.g. Burgelman’s (1994, 1996) findings on Intel’s strategic exit from DRAM 
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logic is the increasing horizontalization and specialization within many 
industries that have increased outsourcing opportunities. The fact that 
many critical capabilities are increasingly outside the boundaries of the 
firms has entailed both formal and informal partnerships and alliances to 
access the required capabilities. Consequently, firm capabilities increasingly 
depend on ecosystem accessibility and the advantages of the MNC on its 
access to global ecosystems. As opposed to the other logics, this logic is 
more of a complementary mechanism, although it may in some cases be the 
primary approach applied by a firm as was demonstrated by case evidence.  
The logic relies on superior access to the external network, which 
constitutes the necessary and internal condition for this logic. It is also 
dependent on attention as managerial cognition as well as on the ability to 
integrate and configure the acquired capabilities to the firm’s capability 
base. Related to the external contingencies and capability outcomes, this 
logic is applicable to emergent industries to gain access to the critical 
resources and capabilities before the competitors, e.g., to achieve first-
mover advantages, or in mature industries to strengthen market position, 
e.g., during industry consolidation. Superior access to the external network 
may also provide the firm with value capturing opportunities, such as the 
opportunity to license a particular technology or to extract value from the 
firms’ patent portfolio.  
 
Summary 
The following Figure 15 illustrates the capability logics employed by the case 
firms during the case periods. Although the evolutionary processes of 
variation, selection and retention are recurrent, i.e., there are multiple 
evolutionary processes and multiple competing logics operating 
simultaneously within each case firm and case period, this illustration 
relates each case period to the most prevailing logic. Moreover, as Figure 15 
seeks to illustrate, these logics enabled both adapting to external changes, 
but also underlie shaping of the external environment. Consequently, based 
on case evidence, each period was placed either in the upper part of the 
table corresponding to shaping or the lower part of the table corresponding 
to adaptation. 
As Figure 15 illustrates, Nokia first utilized primarily selection-based 
capability logic when focusing on the telecommunications, by internally 
selecting and building up the capabilities for a consumer-focused 
positioning that then generated a substantial variation in the environment. 
Second, as the mobile phone penetration grew and the industry became 
more established, Nokia moved into a variation-retention based capability 
logic with an objective to maximize its variation-generating activities and 
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capabilities, and retaining these on a global basis. However, when Nokia 
utilized the variation-retention capability logic between 2002-2010, first its 
emphasis was on variation (2002-2005), and then on retention (2006-
2010) as illustrated in Figure 15. Moreover, when relying primarily on 
retention, it first continued to shape the market (2006-2007), while during 
the latter period (2008-10) it was obliged to adapt to external changes, 
forcing it to complement its capability development with a access-based 
logic in order to obtain the required capabilities. 
In contrast, Kone’s capability development was first dominated by access-
based logic as it built its international expansion on acquisitions. At the 
same time its machineroomless elevator, MonoSpace, a product- and 
process-innovation represented a significant variation in the market. 
However, when responding to the globalization phenomenon with a need to 
build uniform practices and processes on a global basis, the retention-based 
capability logic became dominant, while Kone still sought to access 
complementary capabilities via acquisitions and strategic alliances (e.g. 
Toshiba). Related to the strategic renewal of the company and the case 
period of 2005-07, Kone internally selected the key capabilities and 
processes to develop, expressed as ‘must-win battles’. During the last case 
period, the firm adopted an increasingly proactive role in capability 
development and started moving towards variation-based capability logic as 
it positioned itself in the field of people flow but also took an active role in 
environmental issues to influence the external selection criteria. 
Iittala, alternatively, used a selection-based logic in international markets 
while using variation- and retention-based logics in its home market. These 
capability logics enabled it to shape the external selection criteria within its 
home market while adapting to external selection criteria in international 
markets. 
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Figure 15. Capability Logics adopted by the Case Firms During Case Periods 
 
As Figure 15 illustrates, the case firms applied different capability logics at 
different times or to cope with different contexts. Although these logics 
correspond to relatively persistent patterns of behavior, this study found, 
however, that the logics are not mutually exclusive. Consequently, there 
were multiple competing logics present in these firms. These logics were 
also utilized simultaneously to address different types of selection 
environments and as an outcome, two logics could be equally prevailing as 
illustrated by the Iittala case. The case firms also demonstrated relatively 
different patterns on how they shifted from one logic to another, for 
example when comparing Kone with Nokia.  
Finally, the study suggests that dynamic capabilities occupy a different 
role in the various logics. As discussed earlier and suggested by Teece, 
dynamic capabilities can be disaggregated into a “capacity to 1) to sense and 
shape opportunities and threats, 2) to seize opportunities, 3) to maintain 
competitiveness through enhancing, combining, protecting, and when 
necessary reconfiguring, the firm’s intangible and tangible assets” (2009: 
4). While both the selection-based and variation-based logics put emphasis 
on sensing and seizing opportunities prior to competitors and subsequently 
shaping the selection environments, the retention-based logic put emphasis 
on maintaining competitiveness through leveraging, protecting, and 
reconfiguring the firm’s assets on global basis. 
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6. Discussion: Integrating the Dynamic 
Capabilities View (DCV) and the 
Evolutionary Perspective within the 
MNC Context 
The main research question of the study was, How are capabilities 
developed within MNCs? This main research question was addressed 
through the following sub questions: First, What are the processes and 
mechanisms underlying capability development within MNCs? and 
second, How does the MNC context, including globalization, impact 
capability dynamics? The key findings presented in the previous chapter 
demonstrated how in multinational firms capabilities are managed in a 
systematic way, in line with the dynamic capabilities perspective but also in 
patterned ways that relate to and are consistent with the evolutionary 
processes and the variation-selection-retention paradigm. The findings also 
indicated that the complexity originating from addressing both 
heterogeneous, geographically dispersed and temporally asymmetric 
environments may generate various forms of inertia, or counteracting 
mechanisms within multinational firms. This discussion part will argue that 
the integration of the dynamic capabilities view (DCV) and evolutionary 
perspective will provide a more holistic view on capability development in 
the MNC context. In what follows and in order to answer the sub questions 
that this study set out to investigate, I will demonstrate, first, how a closer 
integration of these two perspectives enables a better understanding of the 
mechanisms by which firms develop capabilities but also the internal and 
external selection mechanisms that constrain these development processes 
within MNCs. Secondly, I will discuss the MNC context and relate the 
findings to research on multinational firms. In the final part I seek to 
elucidate how the scientific paradigm adopted in this study enables 
extending research on capability dynamics. Figure 16 illustrates the key 
findings of the study. In this discussion part I will iterate between theory  
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and data, and relate the findings of the study to extant research on 
organizational capabilities and the multinational firm. 
 
6.1 Processes and Mechanisms Underlying Capability 
Development  
 
The purpose of this study was to ‘deepen, specify and focus’ the 
understanding of the mechanisms, contexts and outcome patterns (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997) related to capability development within MNCs. The study 
sought to identify the underlying mechanisms that relate to capability 
development and occur within MNCs subject to a globalizing business 
environment of complexity and uncertainty. The objective was to 
understand how MNC strategies and activities, in different contexts, trigger 
various mechanisms and generate complex outcome patterns in 
capabilities.  
As discussed earlier, literature on organizational capabilities has offered 
different perspectives on the pace and mechanisms of capability 
development. On the one hand, the evolutionary perspective has argued for 
a gradual, incremental nature of capability development (Aldrich, 1979; 
Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Dosi et al., 2002) In contrast, the dynamic 
capabilities view (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2009; Helfat et al., 2007) has 
offered a perspective that firm capabilities can be managed and modified in 
a purposeful manner to achieve congruence with the rapidly changing 
external environment. Consequently, the former perspective has focused on 
firm adaptation to the environment while the latter has emphasized the role 
of the firm in shaping the environment. Similar to the differences on the 
nature of capability development, there are also underlying differences on 
sources of organizational development and change between these two 
perspectives. According to the dynamic capabilities view, organizational 
change is managed by the means of dynamic capabilities that reside within 
top management (e.g. Teece, 2009). From the evolutionary perspective, 
such a view disregards the forces internal and external to the firm, and the 
fact that development and change in large organizations involves multiple 
levels of management. Therefore, while the dynamic capabilities view 
emphasizes top management action in sensing environmental change and 
in crafting responses to such changes, the evolutionary perspective and 
especially the research conducted by Burgelman (1991; 1994) underlines the 
role of the internal selection environment and suggests that adaptation and 
co-evolution may occur, without top management having ‘extraordinary 
foresight’ or a ‘grand strategy’ in place. 
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The findings from this study indicate that integrating these two 
perspectives enables a better understanding of the capability development 
phenomenon in multinational firms. On the one hand, the findings indicate 
that multinational firms manage capabilities in a purposeful and systematic 
manner. These findings also confirm that multinational firms do act as key 
mechanisms that create and diffuse capabilities and have the capacity to 
alter the external selection environment with their products, services and 
business models. The case evidence provides an illustration of how the case 
firms were able to build capabilities superior to the prevalent ‘fit’, and 
consequently to drive changes within their respective industries by 
influencing the external selection criteria to their own benefit. On the other 
hand, the findings indicate that this capacity was constrained by the 
complexity of the external and internal selection environments of the 
multinational firm, and by the existence of diversified selection criteria 
within different geographical and business units. And therefore, the 
complexity emerging from multinationality proved to be an important 
source of strategic inertia. As an outcome, both shaping and active internal 
capability development as well as adaptation and reacting to the external 
environment characterized the behavior of the case firms.  
The findings from this study suggest that the evolutionary perspective 
does not fully account for firm action in influencing the internal and 
external evolutionary processes, or the firm’s ability to shape the external 
environment in line with their strategies and capabilities. At the same time, 
the findings suggest that the dynamic capability view does not sufficiently 
take into account the internal and external forces that impact or counteract 
the firm’s ability to do so. In this discussion, part I will argue that although 
these perspectives display substantial differences as indicated by the 
literature review, they also have the potential of informing each other for a 
more holistic view on capability development, as will be demonstrated.  
 
Capability logics 
First, by integrating the dynamic capabilities view and evolutionary 
perspectives within the MNC context the study was able to put forward 
various logics by which multinational firms develop capabilities. The 
within- and cross-case analyses indicated that the various patterns or 
‘logics’ by which the case MNCs built capabilities can be regrouped into four 
main logics: variation-based, (internal) selection-based, retention-based 
and access-based logics, which represent patterned links between the intra-
firm evolutionary processes, dynamic capabilities and capability 
development. As discussed, they do not represent organizational processes 
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per se, but are rather more aggregate level and abstract accounts of 
mechanisms operative in organizational processes.  
As they involve and operate at the level of multiple capabilities, these 
various logics act as ‘higher-order’ mechanisms and produce complex 
capability outcomes or patterns. This perspective is consistent with 
Laamanen and Wallin’s findings that while individual capabilities may 
evolve continuously at their own pace, capability development at the 
portfolio level resembles a “race in which different co-specialized 
capabilities are evolving in parallel” (2009: 977) as well as with their 
argument that when subject to discontinuous environmental changes, 
evolutionary progress is insufficient and instead, capability constellations of 
co-specialized assets need to be fundamentally changed and revised. 
Consequently, this research enhances understanding of capability 
development at the level of capability base or capability constellation, and 
therefore extends research that has looked at individual capabilities that 
may proceed in a life cycle manner when influenced by internal and 
external selection events (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). 
This study also suggests that multinational firms apply various logics not 
only to cope with the uncertainty and complexity in the environment or to 
address the changes within, but also exploit these changes to their 
advantage. So in addition to prior research that has demonstrated how the 
intra-firm evolutionary processes in complex organizations enable various 
forms of adaptation (Burgelman, 1991), the present study suggests that by 
careful maneuvering of these processes, the managers can also make 
various forms of shaping possible. They may, for example, aim at 
influencing the speciation events and take advantage of the uncertainty 
involved (Adner and Levinthal, 2002). 
Moreover, the findings suggested that dynamic capabilities occupy a 
different role in the various logics. While both the selection-based and 
variation-based logics put emphasis on sensing and seizing opportunities 
prior to competitors and subsequently on shaping the selection 
environments, the retention-based logic places emphasis on maintaining 
competitiveness through replicating, leveraging, protecting and 
reconfiguring the firm’s intangible assets. The approach put forward in the 
study therefore recognizes the possibility of alternative developmental paths 
or equifinality, but also the possibility of different combinations of dynamic 
capabilities to the same performance outcome.  
 
The role of the internal and external selection environments within MNCs 
Based on the findings of the study, I argue that a closer integration of the 
evolutionary and dynamic capabilities perspectives enables not only a better 
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understanding of the mechanisms by which managers may maneuver the 
intra-organizational, evolutionary processes of variation, selection and 
retention, but also enables taking better into account the internal and 
external forces that condition (and may either promote or counter) the 
firm’s capability development mechanisms. The findings revealed that 
within the context of the multinational firm, it is the complexity of the 
context internal and external to the MNC that gives rise to various 
mechanisms that neutralize or counteract the firm’s capability development 
mechanisms. The findings in general, and the discrepancy between the 
strategy and the capability outcomes within the case firms in particular, 
provided support for the claim that the quality of the firm’s internal 
selection environment is vital to its ability to cope with changes in its 
external selection environment (Burgelman, 1991; Burgelman and Siegel, 
2008; Adner and Levinthal, 2002; Henderson and Stern, 2004). The 
multinational firm is also likely to encounter a greater diversity of external, 
often opposing forces because of operating in multiple contexts (e.g. 
developed vs. emerging markets) in comparison to local firms.  
First, the findings from this research point to managerial cognition as a 
key determinant to capability development consistent with the growing 
amount of research in that domain (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Adner and 
Helfat, 2003; Gavetti, 2005; Laamanen and Wallin, 2009; Danneels, 2010). 
The findings indicate that managerial cognition in recognizing new 
opportunities or in understanding how external changes may impact the 
firm is influential to identifying the key resources and capabilities for future 
development. However, the findings from this research reveal how a lack of 
sufficient managerial attention to specific regions, or to some lead countries 
that do not represent significant weight in terms of turnover may obstruct 
firms from identifying early signals that lead to significant changes in the 
external environment and to proactively develop the required capabilities. 
This finding confirms Gavetti’s (2005) argument that the actor’s distance 
from action is determinant to the actor’s ability to interpret the action-
outcome relationship, suggesting that higher-level managers may not 
devote sufficient attention to signals that are ambiguous from its prevalent 
setting or commitments, or may pay insufficient attention to early signals or 
to those that emerge from outside the main divisions, or in the case of the 
multinational firm, from outside the key markets or subsidiaries. 
Second, the findings from this study point to the existence of diversified 
selection criteria within different geographical units that may impede firms 
from acknowledging that certain selection criteria, capabilities or business 
models are becoming obsolete if there are geographical markets where these 
capabilities and the corresponding business models are still applicable. 
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These findings provide support for Tripsas and Gavetti’s (2000) argument 
that management’s cognitive inertia and strategic beliefs may prevent it 
from applying its capabilities to specific products or activities required to 
embrace the radical changes in the environment and from adopting a new 
business model, especially if the capabilities and the business model are 
supported by another business area. This study also sheds further light to 
their argument as it indicates that such strategic beliefs or inertia may 
originate from the presence of divergent geographic markets and the need 
to address multiple selection criteria simultaneously. Moreover, the 
findings from this research highlight the need to address the various market 
contexts with the appropriate capabilities and timing. These findings are 
therefore consistent with Adner and Levinthal’s (2002) proposition that the 
development or a particular technology (or capability) may be mistakenly 
discontinued if it is too early transplanted to the market that is still 
premature for it.  
Third, reflecting on research put forward by Burgelman (e.g. 1991; 2002), 
the findings from this study point to the difficulties in aligning the strategic 
and structural contexts within multinational firms. These findings also 
suggest that due to the very size and complexity of the multinational firms, 
the ‘structural context’ becomes predominant, and therefore, the ‘strategic 
context’ determination has difficulties in selecting variations different from 
those selected through the structural context. These findings are also 
consistent with Adner and Levinthal’s (2002) findings on how new 
initiatives have difficulties in developing within established firms if they do 
not match the existing strategic context or if their magnitude is insufficient 
to draw managerial interest, and may subsequently not be given sufficient 
managerial attention or resources. These findings also hinted at the 
difficulties relating to power distribution, and in determining the ownership 
of a specific capability as it is diffused within the multinational corporation, 
and revealed difficulties in building a shared vision within the multinational 
firm, as there may be contrasting views on the corporate development or on 
the importance of a specific capability within that vision. The findings from 
this study also indicated that different units display different levels of 
dynamic capabilities, and that the dynamic capabilities of one unit may be 
counteracted by inertial forces originating from another unit.  
Moreover, Burgelman (1991) has suggested that the firm’s internal 
selection processes may be more important for adaptation than its official 
corporate strategy or top management action that may be hampered by 
inertial forces, such as rational justification, emotional attachment, or 
bounded rationality, including a willingness to protect the firm’s core 
technology, or difficulties in divorcing from the strategy that made the 
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company successful in the past. Different from Burgelman’s (1991; 1994; 
1996) findings this study illustrated a case (Nokia) where the official 
corporate strategy was aligned with future changes in the external 
environment but where the internal selection processes continued to 
support extant selection criteria instead of being aligned with the future 
selection criteria, and as an outcome, the development of certain 
capabilities was inert despite the official strategy. The coexistence of 
diversified selection criteria within the MNC context further underlines the 
difficulty in aligning internal selection criteria with corporate strategy. 
Consequently, the internal selection environment may impact corporate 
development either positively, when the internal selection environments 
adjusts action to better reflect the external selection environment than the 
official corporate strategy (Burgelman, 1991; 1994; 1996), or negatively, 
when it hampers corporate development by applying extant selection 
criteria for future development as identified in this study.  
The evidence from the study therefore suggests that a close alignment of 
internal selection criteria with the current external selection environment 
may decelerate capability development in high-velocity environments where 
capability development needs to anticipate future shifts. The difficulties to 
align the internal selection environment with future shifts is even more 
pronounced in the context of the multinational firm as it needs to address 
divergent selection environments as evidenced, e.g., by the Nokia case and 
illustrated by Figure 17. Therefore, I suggest that the efficiency of the 
internal selection environment should not only be assessed by how well it 
reflects extant external selection criteria (α) but also by how well it is able to 
transform itself to address future selection criteria (β) in a changing 
environment and across multiple markets, as indicated in Figure 17.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 17. The Complexity of the MNC Environment Resulting from Divergent and 
Temporally Asymmetric Selection Environments  
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Finally, these findings also provided support for Laamanen and Wallin’s 
(2009) argument that capability development not only requires managerial 
attention to accurately allocate resources at the portfolio level but also 
requires foresight to be able to change business models and revise entire 
capability constellations of co-specialized assets when subject to 
discontinuous environmental changes. However, the findings from this 
study were also consistent with Burgelman (2002) in that a company’s 
ability to dominate a specific market may create a ‘co-evolutionary lock-in’ 
in its current product-market environment, making it difficult to change 
strategic direction, and with Teece (2007; 2009) in that a co-specialization 
may create a lock-in when technologies and other capabilities form a tightly 
integrated system. The findings from this research suggest that this type of 
co-evolutionary, or co-specialization, lock-in is even more likely within the 
context of the multinational firm when assets are organized on a global 
basis to form highly integrated and complex systems. 
In brief, this study pointed to inertia or mechanisms that emerge from the 
fact that multinational corporations possess complex internal and external 
selection environments and need to respond to divergent external and 
internal pressures. The findings from this study also emphasize difficulties 
in assessing different and potentially contrasting context-mechanism-
outcome relationships, requiring ambidexterity, or the ability to address 
contradictory and ambiguous elements, such as temporal and spatial 
asymmetries within the context of the multinational firm.  
Next, I will relate the research findings to extant research on the 
multinational firms.  
 
6.2 The Impact of the MNC Context and Globalization 
 
As the above discussion substantiated, integrating the dynamic capabilities 
view and the evolutionary perspectives enables putting forward various 
mechanisms and outcome patterns related to capability development. In 
this part, I will argue that this approach also enables identifying the impact 
of the MNC context on capability outcomes and mechanisms.  
The findings provided evidence on the capacity of the multinational firms 
to alter the external environment by means of the different capability logics. 
As the data demonstrates, the case firms not only reacted to the external 
environment but also actively sought to and were able to modify the 
external environment supported by active, internal capability development 
or by building ecosystems of co-specialized assets or ‘capability 
constellations’. These findings therefore, provide further evidence on the 
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multinational firms ability to alter the external selection criteria (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2010; Cantwell et al., 2010) and to co-create markets (Pitelis 
and Teece, 2010). 
The findings from this study also indicate that the advantages of the MNC 
are increasingly enabled by its network of subsidiaries and its network at 
the ‘extended enterprise’ level that provide the MNC with a larger scope of 
capabilities and mechanisms vis-à-vis domestic firms or those operating in 
a specific region. The various internal and external mechanisms undertaken 
by the MNCs enable them to generate more variation in the environment, 
and to engage in selection, retention and cross-border diffusion of their 
routines and capabilities. The capacity for the multinational firm to shape 
the external environment was especially pronounced in less-developed host 
country environments where the multinational firm transferred capabilities 
developed at the headquarters or at other affiliates. 
Moreover, the study demonstrated how capability development within 
MNCs was increasingly an inter-firm, rather than an intra-firm 
phenomenon. The findings from this research indicate that as a result of the 
increasing horizontalization and specialization within many industries, the 
required capabilities increasingly originate from outside the firm 
boundaries and therefore the advantages of the MNC are increasingly 
enabled by the capabilities that reside within its ecosystem. At the same 
time the horizontalization has provided the competing firms with access to 
the same complementary capabilities and consequently put more emphasis 
on partnership management to access the required capabilities. Therefore, I 
argue that what has become to be called as the ‘dynamic capabilities’ 
increasingly operate at the level of the extended enterprise and emerge 
from, and are activated through, interaction with other firms. However, it 
seems that this dimension of the dynamic capabilities construct has not 
been fully acknowledged within IB literature (for an exception, see Teece, 
2009). Therefore these findings extend organizational capabilities research 
within IB that has tended to look at capability development as an intra-firm 
phenomenon (see Forsgren, 2008 for a review). 
Furthermore, the key findings of the study pointed to the need to consider 
the complexity of the selection environments internal and external to the 
multinational firm that may give rise to factors or mechanisms that 
counteract the capability development mechanisms. The internal factors 
and mechanisms included, e.g., lack of sufficient managerial attention to 
key regions, difficulty in acknowledging that certain internal selection 
criteria or capabilities are becoming obsolete if there are regions where 
these capabilities are still applicable, the existence of diversified selection 
criteria within different regional units, difficulties relating to power 
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distribution and building a shared vision within the multinational firm, 
while external mechanisms related to forces that MNC  encounters as a 
consequence of operating in multiple contexts as opposed to local firms. 
Therefore, it seems that the liabilities of the MNC do not relate merely to its 
liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) or newness (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
Maloney and Manrakhan, 2007) but can also be associated with the 
complexity of the context internal and external to the MNC that may 
generate various mechanisms that neutralize or counteract the advantages 
or ‘powers’ of the multinational firm. However, when these powers are 
superior to the counteracting mechanism, the MNC is not only able to adapt 
to changes in the environment but also able to direct the capability 
development in the desired direction. Therefore, the multinational firm 
needs to be able to overcome the counteracting mechanism and to activate 
the competence-creating powers of the MNC in the intended direction. As a 
consequence, this study suggests that it is up to the multinational firm to 
overcome the inherent heterogeneity of the internal selection environments 
and to construct such internal selection processes that enable the desired 
capability outcomes to be realized. The findings therefore provide further 
support the suggestion of Kostova et al. (2008), that in order to cope with 
the heterogeneous, ambiguous and complex external environment the 
MNCs are likely to establish a strong intraorganizational field for the 
purpose of transferring and leveraging capabilities on a global basis. 
Therefore, the intraorganizational field, analogous with the concept of 
internal selection environment utilized in this study, may be more 
influential to capability development than the external selection 
environment in the case of the multinational firm. When internal selection 
processes outpace external selection, the firm is in the position to modify 
the external selection environment in line with its strategies and resources, 
confirming the suggestions put forward by Madhok and Liu (2006). 
However, the findings also point to the impact of the external 
environment on the firms’ internal processes, including its capability 
development. As suggested by Forsgren (2008) prior research on MNCs 
from the organizational capability perspective has tended to neglect the role 
of the external environment, whereas contingency theory has granted it a 
dominant role, looking at the external environment as given and suggesting 
that the main focus of MNCs is to adapt their strategies and structure to 
attain a ‘strategic fit’ with the environment external to the firm. Although 
institutional theory explicitly incorporates the external environment into 
the analysis suggesting that MNCs are able to modify the external 
environment in line with their needs (Dunning and Lundan, 2010), these 
theories have mainly focused on the MNC as a ‘political actor’ and 
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emphasized their ability to impact the institutional environment of the firm 
(see Forsgren, 2008 for a review). The findings indicate that firms do not 
only adapt to their environment in search for a strategic fit as suggested by 
contingency theory, but also modify the environment and the selection 
environment with their resources and capabilities. In doing so, this thesis 
complements the work of Cantwell et al. (2010) and Dunning and Lundan 
(2010) on the institutional environment.  
With regards to the various process models of development and change 
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) the literature review presented earlier pointed 
out that many international business theories are implicitly based on a 
lifecycle model, adopting a developmental view assuming that organizations 
change gradually or in stages, and resulting in an evolutionary process at 
industry level. This research, in contrast, indicates that within multinational 
firms, capability development increasingly relates to the teleological 
processes of strategy formulation, evaluation and reformulation that may 
result in capability patterns that are recurrent or discontinuous instead of 
linear and sequential. Both the external environment and the firm action, 
including its capabilities, proved to influence the development process and 
direct or redirect the entities towards various developmental paths and 
result in multiple, equifinal ways to achieve the end state, as opposed to a 
single predetermined way regulated by given rules or programs (Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995). These findings therefore confirmed the need to replace 
the ‘unilinear evolutionary models’ by ‘multi-level, empirically based 
research’ to challenge the idea of a limited number of evolutionary paths 
within MNC research (Westney and Zaheer, 2009). This equifinality, when 
combined with external forces such as globalization, then proved to produce 
system-level changes that were also dialectical, and not just evolutionary by 
nature, as indicated by the telecommunications industry for example. The 
findings from this study therefore, in line with the arguments put forward 
by Aldrich and Ruef (2006), suggest that the traditional international 
business theories be complemented with models that do not assume a 
predetermined order of developmental sequences but instead assume that 
external events interact with firm action to produce firm-level changes that 
are characterized by non-linearity and equifinality, and result in industry- 
or system level changes that are rather dialectical than evolutionary, as 
indicated by Figure 18.  
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Figure 18. The MNC and Process Theories of Organizational Development and Change 
(Adapted from Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) 
 
 
6.3 Extending the Understanding of Capability Dynamics 
through Critical Realism 
 
In this part, I discuss how the scientific paradigm adopted in this study 
enabled extending research on capability development. Various scholars 
have suggested that both critical realism as a philosophy of science and a 
focus on mechanisms provide an explanatory foundation for process 
research and processual analysis (Pajunen, 2008; Morais, 2011), adapted to 
the study of phenomenon that incorporate characteristics of the open, 
dynamic and complex nature of the social world (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). 
As I discussed in the methods section, the rationale for adopting a critical 
realist paradigm in the present study was that as it focuses on combinations 
of entities with causal ‘powers’ and contextual factors that may activate 
these powers, it enables to unravel the various mechanisms-context-
outcome combinations underlying the phenomenon under study. Combined 
with appropriate research methods it enables a better access to the 
processes and mechanisms underlying the researched phenomenon 
(capability development), as well as to the context (the MNC environment 
and globalization) than a positivist paradigm commonly adopted in 
research within international business (Piekkari et al., 2009). The critical 
realist perspective and especially the approach put forward by Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) enabled extending the understanding of capability dynamics in 
many ways. 
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First, the present study affirmed the critical realist assumption (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997) that firms are able to produce the intended capabilities as 
outcomes (O), only if they are able to introduce the appropriate 
mechanisms (M) in the right conditions (C) internal and external to the 
firm. Moreover, according to these assumptions, it is not ‘programs’ or 
‘strategies’ that work, but rather the actors that make them work, and 
therefore, the causal potential of a strategic initiative is dependent on 
providing the reasons and resources as mechanisms to enable the actors to 
change and to produce change. Moreover, firms, just like other 
communities, also have characteristics that cannot be reduced to individual 
actors including the culture and structure or the organization as well as the 
sets of social rules, norms and values as part of the internal selection 
environment. Just like social programs work if they change the reasoning 
and the subsequent actions of individuals or groups (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997), strategic initiatives work only if the internal selection environment is 
aligned to produce the desired capability outcomes. It is these internal 
attributes that determine whether the organization accepts or resists change 
and consequently, the pre-existing structures either enable or disable the 
intended mechanisms of change. Following this reasoning, within the 
context of the firm, although the actors do not have the free choice of 
whether they commit to capability development or an organizational change 
or not, the degree of change is impacted by the internal selection 
environment, or there may be other influencing factors, such as the 
availability of resources.  
Second, the critical realist perspective enables access to the embeddedness 
of capability development within a wider set of macro and micro forces 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997). The findings from this study are consistent with 
the critical realist supposition that the capacity to change is only triggered 
in the appropriate conditions. Therefore, the spatial or institutional location 
into which capability development mechanisms are embedded sets limits to 
these mechanisms, and contextual changes may either promote or counter 
the functioning of these mechanisms. Thus, capability development, just 
like social programs, is considered to involve an interplay of ‘individual and 
institution’, and, of ‘structure and agency’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997: xiii). 
Therefore, in order to understand capability dynamics the critical realist 
approach enables taking into account both macro and micro processes, 
individual and institutional influences as well as causal powers that 
originate from both ‘reasoning and resources’ (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997:160).  
Third, the critical realist paradigm acknowledges that because the social 
world is in continuous flux and change is endemic, causal impacts are not 
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fixed but contingent (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Therefore, as these authors 
explain, social systems undergo change both from the reflexive behavior of 
actors within them and from external impacts. Agents, such as firms or 
managers, may be aware of the patterns, regularities and underlying forces 
involved and of the opportunities available to them. This awareness, as 
these authors point out, may result in an attempt and ability to change the 
pattern that needs to be accounted for when building explanations. As an 
outcome, because of the open and transformative nature of social systems 
(Bhaskar, 1979) the mechanisms, contexts and outcomes are inclined to 
shaping and reshaping and therefore, the contexts cannot be controlled and 
actors’ decisions are likely to be irregular and unstable (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997). The following Figure 19 indicates how contexts may impact change 
mechanisms and how an inappropriate contextualization may lead to a 
malfunction of an intended capability development mechanism. In the first 
case, no change is sought and as the context (C2) continues to support the 
mechanism M1, there is no change in outcome or regularity R1. In the 
second case, a new mechanism is induced to a context C3 to produce 
another outcome or regularity. The new mechanism supersedes the former 
mechanism and produces a new outcome or regularity R2. A similar 
configuration results when no change is sought and a mechanism M1 is 
introduced to a context C3 that has changed. However, this changed context 
has given rise to a new counteracting mechanism M2 that then results in a 
new regularity R2 in place of the intended regularity R1. In the last case the 
change mechanism M2 fails to fire because it is introduced to an 
inappropriate context C4 that continues to sustain the former, ‘problem’ 
mechanism M1, producing again, the regularity R1 instead of an intended 
outcome or regularity R4. 
  
 
Figure 19. The Interplay between Mechanisms –Contexts- Outcomes, Adapted from 
Pawson and Tilley, 1997 
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Moreover, the critical realist paradigm enables to take into account that 
some of the contextual factors have an influence (present) while others do 
not (absent), and that the influence may vary in degree (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997). Furthermore, following Pawson and Tilley (1997), it enables to take 
into consideration that the context into which initiatives are embedded may 
set limits to the mechanisms, either promoting or counteracting the 
intended mechanisms. Therefore, the impact of both internal (such as 
organizational changes) and external changes (such as globalization) is also 
dependent on how they interact with the corresponding context within each 
case, and consequently, although the same external context (e.g. 
globalization) is present in each case during the case time under 
investigation, it may operate in different way because of a set of internal 
relations. 
Another benefit in a critical realist perspective is that it builds on an 
assumption that collectivities (such as social groupings, organizations or 
ecosystems) have attributes, such as capabilities that emerge from 
interaction (Ackroyd, 2004) and may have emergent causal powers above 
and beyond those of simple aggregation (Easton, 2000). This provides 
ground for the study of networks of firms or capability constellations, or to 
understand the power or superiority of ‘ecosystems’. It also provides 
justification why a study on the MNC as part of an ecosystem requires 
treating the entities in the ecosystem as part of the internal, necessary 
conditions and not as part of the external, contingent conditions.  
Finally, this approach may also elucidate the concept of dynamic 
capabilities. Because, if we accept that the reality is stratified (Bhaskar, 
1979; Sayer, 1992), the notion of dynamic capabilities as a ‘higher-order 
capability’ (e.g. Collis, 1994) becomes more justified as it can be related to 
the powers, potentialities or liabilities of an organization. From this 
perspective, the fact the dynamic capabilities then originate from real 
domain of reality unobservable to the firm’s managers or researchers helps 
us to better understand the obscurity of the dynamic capabilities concept 
and the difficulties in operationalizing it. Therefore, this also explains why 
any attempts to reduce the dynamic capabilities to a set of independent 
variables is highly unlikely to capture the complexity, interdependencies 
and dynamism inherent in the construct.  
Table 9 summarizes the key findings of the study.   
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Different Capability 
Logics within MNCs 
(Figure 15) 
 
-In multinational firms capabilities are managed in a systematic way, in line with 
the dynamic capabilities perspective but also in patterned ways that are 
consistent with the evolutionary processes and the variation-selection-retention 
paradigm 
-The different logics by which firms develop capabilities can be regrouped into 
variation-, (internal) selection-, retention- and access-based logics 
-These logics build on different mechanisms, relate to different necessary and 
contingent conditions, and provide the firms with different kind of advantages 
-The dynamic capabilities of the firm occupy a different role in the different 
logics 
Internal and 
External Selection 
Environments within 
MNCs 
(Figure 17) 
-The heterogeneity and complexity within the MNC context may generate 
various forms of inertia, e.g., 
Insufficient managerial attention to key regions 
Inability to acknowledge that certain internal selection criteria or capabilities are 
becoming obsolete if there are regions where these capabilities are still 
applicable 
Reluctance to address diversified selection criteria originating from different 
regional units 
Difficulties relating to power distribution, building a shared vision or ownership 
designation as the capability is diffused within the multinational firm 
-The heterogeneity of the MNC context requires an ability to address 
contradictory and ambiguous elements, such as temporal and spatial 
asymmetries  
-The ‘structural context’ is likely to become predominant over the ‘strategic 
context’  
Impact of the 
MNC Context and 
Globalization 
(Figure 18) 
 
-Capability development within MNCs is increasingly an inter-firm, rather than 
an intra-firm phenomenon  
-The advantages/powers of the MNC are increasingly enabled by its network of 
subsidiaries and its network at the ‘extended enterprise’ level 
-The liabilities of the MNC can be associated with the complexity of the context 
internal and external to the MNC that may generate various mechanisms that 
neutralize or counteract the advantages/‘powers’ of the multinational firm 
-Within MNCs capability development increasingly relates to the teleological 
processes of strategy formulation, evaluation and reformulation that may result 
in recurrent or discontinuous rather than linear and sequential patterns (Figure 
18) 
-This equifinality when combined with external forces such as globalization then 
proved to produce dialectical, in addition to evolutionary, system-level changes 
(Figure 18) 
Extending the 
Understanding of 
Capability Dynamics 
through Critical 
Realism 
(Figure 19) 
CMO-analysis (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) provides a structured way to approach 
capability outcomes (O), that relate to certain mechanisms (M) or internal and 
external conditions (C), as well as 
-enables access to the embeddedness of capability development within a wider 
set of macro and micro forces 
-acknowledges that because the social world is in continuous flux and change in 
endemic, causal impacts are contingent 
-provides an explanation on how an inappropriate contextualization may lead to 
a malfunction of an intended capability development mechanism (Figure 19) 
-recognizes that collectivities (such as social groupings, organizations or 
ecosystems) have capabilities that emerge from interaction 
suggests that the dynamic capabilities concept can be related to the powers, 
potentialities or liabilities of an organization 
 
Table 9. Summary of the Key Findings 
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7. Contribution and Implications  
By taking capabilities as the focus of analysis and drawing on organizational 
capabilities-, evolutionary-, and MNC literatures, and supported by a 
multiple case study and process research, this monograph-based 
dissertation investigated capability dynamics within MNCs and the 
interactions between strategy and the environments internal and external to 
the firm in order to understand how capabilities are developed within 
MNCs. The longitudinal case study was performed during a period of time 
when the external environment was undergoing fundamental changes with 
implications on firm activities and capabilities. On the one hand, changes in 
the external environment such as the rise of the emerging markets and 
related cost pressures, as well as intensifying competition required firms to 
adapt to changes in the environment, on the other hand, the arising 
opportunities promoted new innovative and value-creating strategies and 
activities. This changing global landscape provided a fascinating context to 
enhance our understanding of the mechanism, contexts and outcome 
patterns (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) related to capability development within 
MNCs, with an objective to produce middle-range theory that provides 
relatively abstract configurations for further specification within different 
contexts. The contributions of the study are the following.  
First, this study extends current research by explicitly integrating the 
dynamic capabilities view (DCV) and the evolutionary perspectives. I argue 
that a closer integration of these two perspectives provides a more holistic 
picture of capability development as it enables a better access to the 
multiple, equifinal mechanisms by which firms develop capabilities as well 
as the internal and external selection mechanisms that constrain these 
development processes. An integration of these two perspectives within the 
MNC context enables putting forward different capability logics as the firms 
respond to and aim at influencing changes in the globalizing business 
environment, as well as the taking into consideration the factors that 
condition MNCs’ capability development mechanisms, such as the 
challenges associated with addressing temporally asymmetric, 
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geographically dispersed and heterogeneous selection environments. By 
revealing factors that originate from multinationality, it enriches the 
discussion on path dependencies, inertial forces and managerial cognition. 
Second, this study contributes to international business literature by 
demonstrating that the power and advantages of the multinational firm 
increasingly relate to and are augmented by its capacity to use not only the 
subsidiary network but also its global network of partner firms to 
complement its internal capability base with co-specialized assets. The 
study demonstrates how this purposeful management of firm capabilities 
across borders, including the extension of firm boundaries, not only enables 
adaptation but also underlies shaping of the external environment, and 
gives rise to teleological and dialectical models of capability development in 
addition to the linear and sequential models common in international 
business research. By providing ‘multi-level, empirically based research’ it 
puts forward an alternative to the ‘unilinear evolutionary models’ that have 
been dominating research in international business (Westney and Zaheer, 
2009).  
Third, the study broadens the empirical research of organizational 
capabilities research with a longitudinal case study and process research 
founded on a critical realist paradigm that enables a deep access to the 
processes and mechanisms underlying capability development and to the 
impact of the context. By doing so it responds to a call for more longitudinal 
field research and case-based methods (Helfat et al., 2007) and 
contextualized explanation (Welch et al., 2011). Moreover, this study 
provides empirical evidence of the dynamic process of capability 
development when subject to a globalizing external environment. As the 
study provides insights on the impact of the interplay between the internal 
and external environment on capability development within MNCs, it is 
likely to make an empirical contribution to the literature on co-evolution. 
Finally, the managerial implications relate to the various capability logics 
that managers may employ to cope with and to influence the external 
environment. I also aim at contributing to practitioners by highlighting the 
temporal and spatial asymmetries in the selection environments within the 
MNC context, and the importance of aligning the internal selection 
environment with strategy that involves, in part, overcoming the inherent 
heterogeneity within the multinational firm.  
These intended contributions are illustrated in Table 10 below. Next, each 
of the aforementioned contributions will be elaborated on and related to the 
literature to which this study aims at contributing. 
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Theoretical  
Contribution 
Research stream,  
key authors 
Contribution of this Study 
Dynamic and 
organizational 
capabilities literature 
(Helfat et al., 2007; 
Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; 
Teece et al., 1997; 
Teece, 2009; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Dosi et 
al., 2002) 
-Integrates the DCV and the evolutionary models for a more 
holistic approach and puts forward four different capability logics 
by which MNC develop capabilities 
-Identifies factors that condition MNCs’ capability development 
mechanisms 
-Provides context-rich research by linking capability 
development to temporal and spatial contexts  
-Illustrates how different business or geographical units display 
different levels of dynamic capabilities, and that the dynamic 
capabilities of one unit may be counteracted or neutralized by 
inertial forces originating from another unit within the MNC 
context 
Evolutionary perspective  
(Burgelman, 1991; 1994; 
1996; 2002; Burgelman 
and Siegel, 2008; Dosi et 
al., 2002) 
-Illustrates how MNCs manage the internal evolutionary 
processes in capability development in a systematic manner 
-Provides evidence on how a close alignment of the internal 
selection environment with current external selection 
environment may encumber capability development 
-Suggests that within the MNC the structural context is likely to 
be predominant over the strategic context  
Organizational 
Capabilities 
Literature: 
Capability dynamics/ 
Managerial cognition 
(Laamanen and Wallin, 
2009; Gavetti and 
Tripsas, 2000; Gavetti, 
2005; Danneels, 2010) 
-Enriches discussion on managerial cognition by pointing to the 
cognitive challenges associated with addressing divergent and 
temporally asymmetric selection environments within the MNC 
context 
Evolutionary perspective 
on the MNC (Kogut and 
Zander, 1993; Zander 
and Kogut, 1995; Kogut, 
1997; Westney, 2009; 
Westney and Zaheer, 
2009) 
-Illustrates how the evolutionary models can be applied to the 
study of capability development within MNCs  
-Provides insights on capability dynamics under the conditions 
of globalization 
-Provides evidence of teleological and dialectical models of 
capability development in addition to the linear and sequential 
models common in IB research 
MNC co-evolution 
(Cantwell et al., 2010; 
Madhok and Liu, 2006) 
-Demonstrates how capability development is increasingly an 
inter-firm, instead of an intra-firm phenomenon  
-Demonstrates how multinational firms modify the business 
environment and the external selection criteria with their 
products, services and business models and thereby 
complements prior research on the institutional environment 
International 
Business 
Literature:  
 
MNC and Dynamic 
Capabilities 
(Dunning and Lundan, 
2010; Teece, 2009; 
Tallman and Fladmoe-
Lindqvist, 2002; Luo, 
2000; 2002) 
-Demonstrates how the advantages of the MNC increasingly 
relate to its ability to use both the subsidiary network and 
external network to complement its internal capability base 
-Provides an illustration of how the liabilities of the MNC can be 
associated with the complexity of the context internal and 
external to the MNC that may generate various mechanisms 
that neutralize or counteract the advantages of the multinational 
firm 
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Dynamic capabilities 
research  
(Helfat et al., 2007; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000) 
-Broadens the empirical research on 
organizational capabilities with a longitudinal case 
study and process research founded on critical 
realism  
-Provides empirical evidence of how firms create 
market change by means of the capabilities 
manifest in products, services or business models  
International business 
research  
(Welch et al., 2011; 
Piekkari et al. 2009) 
-Responds to the call made for more 
methodological pluralism and contextualized 
research within international business studies  
-Puts forward a ‘contextualized explanation’ on 
the research phenomenon 
Empirical 
Contribution: 
 
Co-evolution research 
(Lewin and Volberda, 
1999; Cantwell et al., 
2010; Pitelis and Teece, 
2010) 
-Provides empirical findings on co-evolution in a 
global context of complexity and uncertainty 
-Provides empirical findings on how multinational 
firms co-create markets 
Managerial 
Implications: 
 
-Puts forward four different capability logics based on variation, (internal) 
selection, retention and access that managers may employ in order to adapt to 
external changes but also to shape the external environment 
-Highlights the temporal and spatial asymmetries in the selection environments 
within the MNC context  
-Emphasizes the alignment of internal selection environment with strategy as 
well as the role of appropriate timing 
 
Table 10. The Contributions and Implications of the Study 
 
 
7.1 Theoretical Contribution and Implications  
 
7.1.1 Organizational Capabilities Literature 
 
The findings from this study indicated that in multinational firms 
capabilities are managed in a systematic way, in line with the dynamic 
capabilities perspective but also in patterned ways that are consistent with 
the evolutionary processes and the variation-selection-retention paradigm. 
As the findings indicated, these different logics can be regrouped into 
variation-, (internal) selection-, retention- and access-based logics, and they 
build on different mechanisms, relate to different necessary and contingent 
conditions, and provide the firms with different kind of advantages. 
Therefore, the findings from this research provide justification for a closer 
integration of the dynamic capabilities view (DCV) and the evolutionary 
perspective.  
The findings from this study also indicated that the MNC provides a 
specific type of a context that should be better accounted for in current 
perspectives. This study suggests that the evolutionary perspective ought to 
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pay more attention to the powers of the MNC to generate new capabilities 
or to shape the external environment by means of its products, services or 
business models, while the dynamic capabilities ought to better account for 
the internal or external forces that may limit or neutralize the multinational 
firm’s ability to do so. The findings from this study pointed in particular to 
the difficulties in allocating managerial attention to all the regions as well as 
to the difficulties in acknowledging that certain internal selection criteria or 
capabilities are becoming obsolete if there are regions where these 
capabilities are still applicable. The findings also demonstrated the 
existence of diversified criteria within different regional units as well as to 
the challenges relating to power distribution, building a shared vision, as 
well as to designating the ownership of a capability as it is diffused within 
the multinational firm. Moreover, the findings indicated that due to the size 
and complexity of the multinational firm, the structural context tends to 
become predominant over the strategic context (Burgelman, 1991; 2002). 
Therefore, I argue that a closer integration of the evolutionary and dynamic 
capabilities perspectives enables not only to better understand the 
mechanisms by which managers may maneuver the intra-organizational, 
evolutionary processes, but also to better account for the internal and 
external forces that condition these mechanisms.  
The findings also demonstrated that the dynamic capabilities of the firm 
occupy a different role in the various logics. Moreover, as the dynamic 
capabilities are mainly considered to be located at the top management 
level (e.g. Teece, 2009), a closer integration of the two streams enables 
taking into consideration the organizational context more holistically, 
including different business units, geographic locations and multiple levels 
of management. The findings from this study also indicated that different 
units display different levels of dynamic capabilities, and that the dynamic 
capabilities of one business or geographic unit may be counteracted or 
neutralized by inertial forces originating from another unit. Because of the 
heterogeneity of the internal selection environments, I claim that the 
concept of dynamic capabilities within multinational firms should not be 
investigated as a corporate level construct. Rather, the findings from this 
study suggest that the business unit or regional/geographical unit provides 
a more meaningful level of analysis for the study of dynamic capabilities in 
the case of the multinational firm, or large firms in general. 
The study also contributes to the organizational capabilities research field 
by providing context-rich research. The detailed analysis put forward in the 
study illustrates that the majority of the firms’ actions related to its 
capabilities involve various spatial and temporal contexts, whereas this 
dimension, outside the field of international business has not been 
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recognized to its full extent. Likewise, within research on organizational 
development and change, Pettigrew et al. (2001) have claimed that there 
has been ignorance of temporal and spatial contextual factors that shape 
episodes of change, and have called for international comparative research 
in order to complement current understanding of organizational change 
across national boundaries. This study demonstrates how linking capability 
development to particular temporal or spatial contexts that affect 
patterning in this phenomenon may advance research within organizational 
capabilities and organizational change. 
Finally, I argue that an international business approach has a potential to 
enrich the organizational capabilities research through research that 
explains phenomena in context (Welch et al., 2011) and may therefore have 
important value to refining strategy theories (Tallman, 1991). Kostova et al. 
(2008), among others, have pointed to MNCs having “complex internal 
environments, with spatial, cultural, and organizational distance; language 
barriers; inter-unit power struggles; and possible inconsistencies and 
conflict among interests, values, practices, and routines used in the various 
parts of the organization” (2008:997). Similarly, Forsgren has claimed that 
“the management problems related to the geographically and operationally 
dispersed structures should not be underestimated” (2008:7). By 
emphasizing the need to consider the mechanisms that originate from 
multinationality or from having operations in multiple dispersed locations, 
the present study provides further insight into the discussion on inertial 
forces that may impact capability development.  
 
7.1.2 International Business Literature 
 
By integrating the dynamic capabilities view (DCV) with the evolutionary 
perspective and the variation-selection-retention paradigm this study also 
contributes to international business and MNC literature as it demonstrates 
how MNC strategies and activities, in different contexts, trigger various 
mechanisms and complex outcome patterns related to capability 
development. By putting forward dynamic processes by which MNC 
capabilities shape or are shaped by the external environment the study 
extends the traditional IB literature that has mainly looked at firm 
resources and capabilities as prerequisites for internationalization or as 
relatively static firm-specific advantages, and thereby offered only limited 
insights on capability dynamics under the conditions of globalization. 
Moreover, this study demonstrates how capability development is 
increasingly an inter-firm, instead of an intra-firm phenomenon, and 
suggests that the MNC advantages increasingly relate to, and are 
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augmented by, its capacity to use not only the subsidiary network, but also 
its external network to develop capabilities. At the same time, it provides an 
illustration of how the liabilities of the MNC can be associated with the 
complexity of the context internal and external to the MNC that may 
generate various mechanisms that neutralize or counteract the advantages 
or ‘powers’ of the multinational firm. 
By demonstrating how multinational firms modify the business 
environment and the external selection environment with their products, 
services and business models, the study complements the work by Cantwell 
et al. (2010) and Dunning and Lundan (2010) on the institutional 
environment. By incorporating the external environment into the analysis 
and recognizing the interplay between the external environment and the 
firms’ internal processes, this study contributes not only to international 
business research but to research more generally as it responds to the call 
for “synthesis of the resource- and environment based perspectives” (Priem 
and Butler, 2001:31) including the “ways in which capabilities and 
environmental conditions shape each other” (Henderson and Mitchell, 
1997:12). 
Finally, the study illustrates how external events interact with firm action 
to produce change in firms that is characterized by non-linearity and 
equifinality, and may result in industry level changes that are revolutionary 
rather than evolutionary by nature. In doing so it provides evidence of 
teleological and dialectical models of development and change (Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995) in addition to the linear and sequential models that have 
dominated international business research.  
This dissertation follows Westney in her argument that evolutionary 
models are ideal for studying processes and that are ‘multi-level, complex 
and emergent’ and that “making the evolutionary model of the MNE more 
explicit, examining the assumptions on which it is grounded, and drawing 
more systematically on recent developments in organization theory can 
provide a stronger theoretical anchor for MNE research” (2009:118). A way 
to take the present study forward is to investigate the presence of various 
logics in the different evolutionary subsystems (geography, business, 
function) within the MNC82. 
 
                                                   
82 See Westney, 2009, for a discussion on the evolutionary subsystems within the 
MNC 
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7.2 Empirical Contribution 
 
This study also broadens empirical research on organizational capabilities 
with longitudinal case study and process research founded on a critical 
realist paradigm. The adoption of a critical realist approach (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997) provided the following advantages. First, it provided a 
structured way to approach capability outcomes (O) that relate to certain 
mechanisms (M) or internal and external conditions (C). Secondly, it 
enabled access to the embeddedness of capability development within a 
wider set of micro and macro forces, acknowledging that causal impacts are 
not fixed but contingent because the social world is constantly changing. It 
also recognizes that collectivities have properties that emerge from 
interaction. The study also suggests that the dynamic capabilities concept 
can be related to the powers, potentialities and liabilities of an organization 
thereby providing a deeper understanding of the concept. This approach 
also responds to a call for more longitudinal field research and case-based 
methods within organizational capabilities research (Helfat et al., 2007), 
process research in studying organizational change (Aldrich and Ruef, 
2006; Pettigrew et al. 2001) as well as for ‘methodological pluralism’ and 
‘contextualized explanation’ within international business research 
(Piekkari et al., 2009; Welch et al., 2011). In studying the interactions 
between internal and external environments, it is also likely to make an 
empirical contribution to the literature on co-evolution (Lewin and 
Volberda, 1999). 
First, within organizational capabilities research, Helfat et al. (2007) 
contend that despite the conceptual link and connection between 
capabilities and processes, the research on dynamic capabilities has been to 
a large extent dominated by content research and deductive methods. They 
call for broadening both the disciplinary and methodological base, arguing 
that both longitudinal field research and “case-based approaches and other 
methods used to study strategy process will increase our depth of 
understanding of dynamic capabilities as well” (Helfat et al., 2007: 36). 
They also contend that dynamic capabilities research “fundamentally 
concerns how organizations emerge, develop, grow, change, decline, and 
rejuvenate over time” (Helfat et al., 2007: 37) and that dynamic capabilities 
research would therefore benefit from a more integrative approach, shifting 
the focus of attention from ‘what’ to ‘how’ of dynamic capabilities. Likewise, 
Danneels (2010) has pointed to a process gap in existing research on 
dynamic capabilities. Moreover, Newbert (2007) claims that in contrast to 
the more researched topic of resources, there are a limited amount of 
empirical studies on capabilities in general and dynamic capabilities in 
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particular. Furthermore, despite the commonly accepted claim that firms 
not only adapt to changes in the external environment but also create 
market change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007; 2009) there 
has been little empirical evidence apart from studies from the institutional 
perspective. This study provides ample empirical evidence of how firms 
attempt and do create market change by means of the capabilities manifest 
in new and innovative products, services or business models, as well as how 
multinational firms, by means of geographic expansion, create extensive 
market change within the host market environments by transferring new 
capabilities to these markets including their respective networks. 
Secondly, several researchers have highlighted the need to address 
processes in studying organizational change or transformation in order to 
produce more holistic explanations that incorporate the interaction 
between the multiple levels of the context and action (Pettigrew, 1990; 
Pettigrew et al., 2001). The evolutionary processes of organizational 
development are difficult to collect on a large scale, and consequences of 
different internal and external factors are not easily determined through 
quantitative methods. Therefore, it has been argued that qualitative 
research is the best situated for the study of organizational processes, 
including “collective organized action as it unfolds over time in context” 
(Doz, 2011: 583). The process method adopted in the study enabled 
incorporating complexity, such as multiple levels and temporal sequencing 
and interconnections into the analysis and a dynamic analysis of these 
processes revealed different patterns as the firms responded to the various 
internal and external factors. A process research approach also enabled to 
access and subsequently to respond to a call for a deeper understanding of 
the “complex interactions that occur over time between the firm’s resources 
and its competitive environment” (Priem and Butler, 2001: 35). 
Thirdly, this study provides insights on the interplay between the internal 
and external environments on capability development within MNCs and is 
therefore likely to make an empirical contribution to the co-evolution 
literature. Lewin and Volberda suggest that in research on co-evolution 
dynamics and complex systems of relationships that may involve non-linear 
feedback paths and multidirectional causalities, the “dependent-
independent variable distinction becomes less meaningful since changes in 
any one variable may be caused endogenously by changes in others and lead 
to multidirectional causalities” (1999:527). The approach adopted in this 
study enabled access to various internal and external drivers, or selection 
events that changed the capability development process, as well as their co-
evolution over time.  
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Fourthly, the methodological approach adopted in the study responds to 
the call made for more methodological pluralism (Piekkari et al., 2009) and 
contextualized research (Welch et al., 2011) within international business 
studies. Despite the strength of longitudinal case studies in capturing 
dynamism and underlying mechanisms of the research phenomena, to date 
longitudinal case studies have been fairly scarce in international business 
studies (Piekkari et al., 2009; Blazejewski, 2011) due to the focus within IB 
on spatial, rather than temporal patterns (Blazejewski, 2011), and to the 
complexity in capturing and conceptualizing process data (Soulsby and 
Clark, 2011). However, as Blazejewski (2011) suggests, there are a number 
of topics within IB, especially those related to processes and practices, that 
would benefit from longitudinal, in-depth research designs, arguing that IB 
field itself “has developed into a direction where an increasing number of 
research questions call for a longitudinal approach- although so far the call 
has not been heeded by large numbers of researchers” (Blazejevski, 
2011:253). Likewise, Burgelman (2011) claims that longitudinal qualitative 
research can contribute to bridging between ‘history’ and ‘reductionism’ in 
international business studies, adapted to phenomena characterized by 
complexity and involving non-linear causation. 
Finally, this approach also enabled to build a ‘contextualized explanation’ 
of the research phenomenon (Welch et al., 2011). This method, grounded in 
a critical realist ontology and epistemology, seeks to “reconcile explanatory 
rigor and contextualization through an understanding and recognition of 
the contingent nature of cause-effect relationships” (Welch et al., 2011: 
750). It relates causal explanation to understanding the constituent nature 
of objects and regards causality as set of interactions treated holistically 
(Welch et al., 2011). This study also sought to exercise a high sensitivity to 
context and to approach context analytically rather than descriptively called 
for by Welch et al. (2011).  
 
7.3 Managerial Implications 
 
The interest of this thesis was to generate theory with scope, and to provide 
insights that are not only relevant academically but also contain pragmatic 
usefulness (Corley and Gioia, 2011). I therefore hope that the managerial 
implications that relate to the various capability logics that managers may 
employ to cope with or to influence the external environment also contain 
some practical relevance. I also hope to contribute to practitioners by 
highlighting the importance of aligning the internal selection environment 
with strategy that involves, in part, overcoming the inherent heterogeneity 
within the multinational firm. 
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As noted by Amit and Schoemaker (1993) managers make decisions 
concerning resources and capabilities in a setting characterized by 
uncertainty about economic, industry, regulatory, social, and technological 
environments, including competitors’ behavior, and customers’ preferences; 
as well as complexity resulting from interrelated causes that shape the 
firm’s environment, the competitive interactions and the intra-
organizational conflicts. Moreover, recent research points to the rise in a 
non-ergodic type of uncertainty, referring to the type of uncertainty where 
prediction relying on extrapolation from past events and behavior becomes 
infeasible (Cantwell et al., 2010).  The complexity and uncertainty are even 
more pronounced in the context of the multinational firm. 
The present study suggests that firms can manage the internal 
evolutionary processes in a purposeful manner to generate new capabilities, 
to select the capabilities that they decide to compete with, or to retain 
capabilities selected by external forces or aim at accessing these capabilities 
by reaching outside the boundaries of the firm, and put forward different 
‘logics’ the MNCs may adopt to manage their capability base. The firms may 
seek to develop capabilities proactively, aiming at a high amount of 
variation to address multiple external selection criteria or optionally rely on 
a limited number of internally selected capabilities. While the former logic 
relies on external selection and feedback mechanisms, the latter is 
dependent on managerial foresight and on internal selection outperforming 
external selection. The more reactive capability development logic builds on 
retention of the firm capabilities and on collecting the maximum benefit out 
of the firm’s core capabilities. The logic that builds on access to external 
capabilities is more of a complementary mechanism that can be either 
employed proactively to generate more variation in the environment, or 
reactively to gain access to the required capabilities selected by external 
forces. Finally, just as prior research has demonstrated how ambidextrous 
organizations need to be able to balance between exploration and 
exploitation, the present study suggests that MNCs need to able to utilize 
the various logics to cope with diverse contexts and optimally apply 
different logics not only to the corporate evolutionary system but also to the 
various evolutionary subsystems (business, function, geography) within the 
multinational firm (Westney, 2009). 
These logics also embody different options that firms may undertake vis-
à-vis the changes in the external environment. The firms may either adapt 
to changes in the external environment, requiring high flexibility and 
agility, or the firms may aim at anticipating the upcoming changes in the 
external environment, which seems to have become increasingly difficult 
due the increasing uncertainty and complexity of markets related to 
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interdependencies and interaction between various actors. Finally, a firm 
strategy may be aimed at driving changes in the external environment and 
influencing the external selection criteria. This however, requires an ability 
to foresee and build the required capabilities prior to the competitors, as 
well as substantial resources to influence external selection criteria. 
In terms of managerial implications this study also highlights the 
temporal and spatial asymmetries present in internal selection 
environments within the multinational firm, and the importance of aligning 
the internal selection environment with strategy. This requires an ability to 
address ambiguous and contradictory elements, and to overcome the 
inherent heterogeneity within the multinational firm. Moreover, this study 
emphasizes the role of timing in determining an evolutionary fit between 
firm capabilities and the external environment. This involves not only being 
responsive to external changes but also avoiding a premature release of 
certain capabilities that in the case of insufficient support or negative 
feedback may hamper the future development of the capability, as 
suggested by Adner and Levinthal (2002). 
Finally, a key concern for managers of multinational firms is also how to 
ascertain the firm’s ability to congruently adapt to forthcoming changes or 
drive such changes, or in academic terms, how to ensure the firm’s dynamic 
capabilities ex ante? Although this question was not the a focus of the study, 
this research would suggest that the dynamic capabilities are dependent 
above all on the amount of variation present in a firm and on its capacity to 
select the best variants internally prior to external selection. Consequently, 
the integration of the dynamic capabilities view and the evolutionary 
perspective seems to be a promising avenue for illuminating the ex ante 
dimension of dynamic capabilities as it points to the evolutionary processes 
that occur within organization prior to more strategic changes. Moreover, 
the integration of the more ‘top-down’ view of the dynamic capabilities with 
the more ‘bottom-up’ view of the evolutionary perspective helps to take into 
consideration multiple levels of management and thereby to identify other 
sources and locations to the dynamic capabilities than the top management, 
or the headquarters in the case of the multinational firm. 
To conclude it can be contested that the world around us is fundamentally 
changing. In addition to nation states (e.g. China) driving changes, there are 
other social, democratic drivers in place that prove to be even more 
profound. In addition to the internal selection/managerial agency vs. 
external selection dichotomy addressed in this study, other emerging causal 
mechanisms, as well as shifts in the deep structures with causal powers that 
generate change should be granted scholarly attention if academic research 
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is to stay on par with the transforming world. An interviewed manager 
commented: 
 
That’s a good question that how the world will evolve. I think that this story will 
have a number of different chapters. Some of the current players are somewhat 
stagnated in their approach and refuse to see the changing ecosystem. They have 
a customer base and they tend to lock on and hang on to the people, and not see 
that the world around is changing. [Then] there are customers and players who 
actively experience new business models, seek for new partnerships, and are sort 
of open in their thinking. Those companies are most likely going to be successful 
in the future. 
 
With this quote I close this chapter and thesis, and at the same time invite 
many more chapters to come in order to enhance our understanding of the 
evolving and rapidly changing world around us, and the implications it has 
on organizing firm activities and on developing capabilities in the future.  
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IITTALA 9 
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TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS/ INFORMANTS 35/37 
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